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ABSTRACT 
American literature has an established history of interrogating subjective experience and 
what it means to be a person. As a result, American writers have a produced a pattern of thought 
that expresses a fascination with both the possibilities and devastating consequences that attend 
to competing visions of the self. This dissertation explores various attempts to theorize and 
tolerate experiences of “double consciousness”—a term introduced by Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and made famous by W. E. B. Du Bois. Examining how Emerson conceptualizes double 
consciousness as an ideal state of being introduces a theory of consciousness that reveals the 
difficulties associated with merging different iterations of the self to achieve this ideal state. 
Emily Dickinson translates this theory of consciousness into a condition suffered by subjects. 
Her meditations reveal that, while double consciousness may be something for which to strive, 
this condition comes with painful ramifications for individuated subjects. While Dickinson 
internalizes double consciousness as an experience felt by subjects, Henry James externalizes 
this condition to explore its effects not only on the individual subject, but also the ramifications 
of double consciousness on others with whom the subject forms social relationships. These 
meditations demonstrate how the experience of double consciousness not only devastates 
individuals, but also the systems of life in which they participate. Robert Penn Warren, on the 
other hand, strategically attempts to ameliorate the difficulties produced by states of double 
consciousness through the use of narrative technology and temporality so that an individual may 
achieve this state without necessarily suffering from it. “Self-Knowledge and ‘the end of man’: 
The Paradox of Double Consciousness in American Literature” thus produces an intellectual 
history that transcends period and genre demarcations to nuance traditional renderings of a 
subject’s ability to merge multiple and competing versions of self-hood.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDEX WORDS: Double consciousness, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Emily Dickinson, Henry 
James, Robert Penn Warren 
SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND “THE END OF MAN”: THE PARADOX OF DOUBLE 
CONSCIOUSNESS IN AMERICAN LITERATURE 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
AMBER L. ESTLUND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
2016 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Amber L. Estlund 
2016  
SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND “THE END OF MAN”: THE PARADOX OF DOUBLE 
CONSCIOUSNESS IN AMERICAN LITERATURE 
 
 
by 
 
 
AMBER L. ESTLUND 
 
 
Committee Chair:  Mark Noble 
 
Committee: Audrey Goodman 
Chris Kocela  
 
 
Electronic Version Approved: 
 
 
Office of Graduate Studies 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
December 2016 
iv 
 
DEDICATION 
For my grandfather, without whom I never would have started this journey, 
and  
for Philip, without whom I never would have finished. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The writing of this dissertation has been a long and difficult journey and I owe an 
immeasurable amount of thanks to several people. First and foremost, I would like to thank my 
director, Dr. Mark Noble. He always seemed to know just the right moments to push me a little 
further, to let me struggle and figure things out on my own, and to offer guidance and support 
when I needed it the most. From the very nascent stages of this project, he enthusiastically 
encouraged me, especially in my readings of Emerson, and this dissertation would not be what it 
is without his thoughtful and careful reading of even my most incoherent drafts. I am lucky to 
have him as a mentor and grateful for his infinite patience, generosity, and kindness. I would also 
like to thank the other members of my committee, Dr. Audrey Goodman and Dr. Chris Kocela. 
Though I didn’t know it at the time, this project originated from a reading of All the King’s Men 
in one of Dr. Kocela’s seminars early in my program. Both Dr. Goodman and Dr. Kocela have 
posed compelling questions that challenged me to take my ideas in directions I hadn’t imagined 
in order to achieve this end result.  
I would also like to thank several others for their continued support. I’d first like to thank 
my colleagues, Li-Lee Tunceren and Shelbey Rosengarten, at St. Petersburg College. They 
helped to make a year of transition a bit easier and were a constant source of goodwill and 
friendship. At Georgia State, I would like to thank Shannon Finck. Shannon was my first friend 
in graduate school and provided not only the scholarly companionship for which I was searching, 
but also helped me to maintain a life outside my books and learn to love city life. Without her, 
I’m sure I wouldn’t have survived the first year let alone have made it this far. I am also 
appreciative for the laughter and support I received from Danielle Rhodes, Julie Hawk, and 
Vickie Willis. I would also like to thank Paul Ardoin and Fiona McWilliam, who I met at Florida 
vi 
 
Atlantic University, and who have been willing to read my work and listen to me talk about 
Beckett, Emerson, folk drama, and all of my other literary interests over the last ten years. They 
are the very best kind of friends and I would, without a doubt, be a different scholar and person 
without them. I also owe more than words could ever express to Matt and Emily Beare. They 
pushed me to finish this project especially during moments when I didn’t think that I wanted to 
or could. They have never failed to offer me a retreat from this very isolating work, while also 
never failing to provide me with a good dose of tough love and a reminder about why I started 
this process in the first place. Matt and Emily are the embodiment of unconditional love, loyalty, 
and support.  
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my parents, Mike and Molly Dixon, and 
my brother, Blake Estlund. They have helped me in more ways than I can name here, but I’m 
thankful that they accompanied and supported me through this process. I am grateful for their 
love, but also for their constant and continued belief in me.  
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................... v 
1 INTRODUCTION: DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE AMERICAN 
LITERARY IMAGINATION ......................................................................................... 1 
2 CHAPTER ONE: THE SUFFERING SUBJECT: TOWARD AN EMERSONIAN 
THEORY OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS .............................................................. 23 
2.1 Dissolving Subjects and Flowing Objects ................................................................ 26 
2.2 The Impersonal and Manifestations of the “Not Me” ............................................ 37 
2.3 Suffering Subjects and Double Consciousness ........................................................ 43 
3 CHAPTER TWO: “BETWEEN THE FORM OF LIFE AND LIFE”: 
CONDITIONS OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE POETRY OF EMILY 
DICKINSON ................................................................................................................... 64 
3.1 Feeling Consciousness ................................................................................................ 65 
3.2 “The one the other will contain”: The Problem of Containment and Absorption ..  
 ........................................................................................................................... 72 
3.3 “Extatic Need”: The Experience of Double Consciousness .................................... 80 
3.4 “Covered Vision”: The Paradox of Choice .............................................................. 86 
4 CHAPTER THREE: ECONOMIES OF DEVASTATION IN HENRY JAMES’S 
THE BOSTONIANS AND THE WINGS OF THE DOVE ........................................... 96 
4.1 Sites of Double Consciousness: Verena’s and Milly’s (Self)-Possession ............... 99 
4.2 Economies of Devastation ........................................................................................ 133 
viii 
 
5 CHAPTER FOUR: DISCOVERING “SEPARATENESS”: THE PAINFUL 
PROCESS OF SELF-DEFINITION IN ALL THE KING’S MEN ........................... 153 
5.1 The “one thing” Jack Burden Can’t Know ........................................................... 156 
5.2 Jack Burden’s Multiple (Im)Personalities ............................................................. 163 
5.3 Relation is All: Affirming Identity through Narrative ......................................... 186 
WORKS CITED........................................................................................................................ 200 
 
 
1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION: DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE AMERICAN LITERARY 
IMAGINATION 
This project begins by examining the surprising correlation between the ways Ralph 
Waldo Emerson and W. E. B. Du Bois each develop an idea of double consciousness in their 
writing. Although Du Boisian double consciousness refers to an experience unique to African 
Americans and Emersonian double consciousness idealizes a sort of transcendent experience, the 
two iterations feature similarities in their very different conceptualizations. Exploring the 
connections between the two notions reveals a key feature central to each version: double 
consciousness, in each context, produces painful and violent consequences for the individual 
experiencing it. This is not to equate a double consciousness caused by racial discrimination and 
violence which the Du Boisian version emphasizes with the painful consequence that 
Emersonian double consciousness might have for individuals; instead, noting the shared 
tendency for double consciousness to produce violent ramifications illuminates how this psychic 
tension manifests the painful experience of subjectivity for other writers in different contexts and 
situations. Emily Dickinson, Henry James, and Robert Penn Warren, for instance, each produce a 
version of double consciousness in their writing. For each writer, the experience of double 
consciousness emerges as a problem of subjective experience that refuses our attempts to merge 
ways of seeing and knowing the self without devastating consequences to the person. Examining 
the ways in which canonical white writers such as these adapt and reframe the idea of double 
consciousness, which Du Bois famously employed for its description of a specific racial 
experience for black Americans, yields compelling questions about the challenges individuals 
face when trying to wholly know themselves as they strive to live and work in systems that 
trivialize the self.  
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Du Bois’s vision of double consciousness has become canonical within African 
American literary studies. As Ryan Schneider notes, however, Du Bois only used the term once 
in his entire writing career; it first appeared in “Of Our Spiritual Strivings” published in 1897 in 
The Atlantic Monthly and then again when the essay was included as the first chapter of the 1903 
The Souls of Black Folk (Schneider 49). Du Bois defines double consciousness as:  
a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at 
 one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a 
 world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness, 
—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two 
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being  
torn asunder. (168) 
Double consciousness thus describes a psychological tension unique to the black experience in 
America. It represents the challenges of being African American: though one considers himself 
American, black Americans must also see themselves through the eyes of white America. More 
specifically, Du Boisian double consciousness highlights how “the freedman has not yet found in 
freedom in his promised land” and is constantly faced with disappointment (170). Black 
Americans, for Du Bois, have gained “self-consciousness, self-reflection, and self-respect” but 
that with this new awareness also comes a sense of “poverty,” the “weight of [. . .] ignorance,” 
and the “hereditary weight mass of corruption from white adulterers” that darkens the soul with 
“the shadow of a vast despair” (171-72). This means facing the challenge of maintaining a sense 
of self and pride in who one is outside of an American context, while still having to overcome 
systematic racism and degradation that white America constantly and consistently imposes upon 
them.  These two perceptions of self—as proud, respected, and with plenty to offer the world and 
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as that of a group of people destined to ignorance, poverty, and servitude—rarely coalesce, 
rendering true or whole self-consciousness impossible because these two versions of selfhood are 
“unreconciled.”  
 Schneider’s book, The Public Intellectualism of Ralph Waldo Emerson and W. E. B. Du 
Bois: Emotional Dimensions of Race and Reform, while drawing fascinating parallels between 
Emerson’s and Du Bois’s lives as well as their individual brands of public intellectualism, 
examines what he calls the “reform narratives” of each to reveal “the emotional dimensions of 
race” in order “to delineate racial difference, examine problems of black-white relations, and 
explore models for reform” (2-3).  He employs Theory of Mind (ToM) strategies to argue that 
the reform writings produce “affective-cognitive experiences” to “provide audiences with a sense 
of emotional familiarity, intensity, and substance, meaning they try to define and depict feelings 
that are recognizable, provocative, and relatively long-lived” (8-9). Although Schneider’s focus 
is on the reform writings of Emerson and Du Bois, his study is useful to my own readings of 
double consciousness as he emphasizes the emotional or affective qualities of such an experience 
and how these affective qualities significantly impact an individual’s or groups cognitive and 
lived experience. 
 Du Boisian double consciousness typically refers to what Schneider calls a “normative 
experience” for black Americans that employs double consciousness and two-ness 
synonymously (55). In other words, readers tend to view this passage as a collective experience 
for all African Americans, while other critics argue that Du Bois’s use of the term was specific to 
black intellectuals and artists. Although the term can be understood as “an essential element of 
African American subjectivity,” it was also used as “a specific marker of the affective-cognitive 
experience of black intellectuals and artists whose obligation is to uplift the race” (Schneider 12). 
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Dickson D. Bruce, Jr. notes that Du Bois used double consciousness to raise at least three 
different issues, but chief among those was the depiction of an internal conflict for an individual 
between “what was ‘African’ and what was ‘American,’” and for Du Bois this conflict relied 
heavily on the “essence of a distinctive African consciousness” immersed in spirituality, a 
spirituality based in Africa but revealed among African Americans in their folklore, their history 
of patient suffering, their faith.” Bruce says that “in this sense, double consciousness related 
particularly to Du Bois’s efforts to privilege the spiritual in relation to the materialistic, 
commercial world of white America” (301). The other two issues raised by Du Boisian double 
consciousness, for Bruce as well as Schneider, are “the real power of white stereotypes in black 
life and thought” and “the practical racism that excluded every black American from the 
mainstream of society” (Bruce 301). 
 Whether read as a normative experience relative to all African Americans or as a 
condition specific to black intellectuals striving for racial advancement, at the heart of Du Bois’s 
conceptualization is an experience of “two-ness” that cannot be assimilated. Schneider notes that 
there is a critical tendency to conflate double consciousness and two-ness. He argues that while 
this linkage “is certainly plausible given their shared thematic emphasis on duality,” Du Bois’s 
approach does not necessitate such conflation” and that “there is room for difference.” For 
Schneider, in other words, “double consciousness and two-ness could be the same thing; or they 
could designate closely aligned yet still distinct notions; or they could exist in a dynamic relation 
of cause and effect.” He goes on to note that Du Bois appears to cast double consciousness as 
“an abstract, potentially universal sensation,” while the description of two-ness appears “more 
closely linked to race and particulars” (51). What seems to be at stake in differentiating two-ness 
and double consciousness are types of experience. Schneider’s description of two-ness as 
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specifically linked to race and its particulars is the experience of what Du Bois calls the 
“contradiction of double aims” whereby “the black man’s turning hither and thither in hesitant 
and doubtful striving has often made his very strength to lose effectiveness, to seem like absence 
of power, like weakness” (169). In reality, for Du Bois, this is the “double-aimed struggle of the 
black artisan” that on one hand must “escape white contempt for a nation of mere hewers of 
wood and drawers of water” while on the other hand he must “plough and nail and dig for a 
poverty-stricken horde” (168). The black American experiences two-ness, for Du Bois, because 
he has “but half a heart in either cause” (169). Conversely, the experience of double 
consciousness is a psychic one that results from an experience of two-ness in the material world.  
The experience of double consciousness then for black Americans is thus a struggle “to 
attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self” where the  
person “wishes neither of the older selves to be lost” (168-169). Keeping Schneider’s distinction 
between double consciousness and two-ness in mind, Du Bois’s condition of double 
consciousness as an experience that prevents the merging of selves in order to develop into a full 
or true state of self-consciousness, without relinquishing a previous self, recalls the logic of 
human consciousness developed by Emerson.1  
Many of Emerson’s essays describe human consciousness as split between various binary 
oppositions as a person strives toward transcendence. Joel Porte calls this split a core challenge 
faced by Transcendentalists as the human psyche is separated between “Reason and 
Understanding” (42). More specifically for Emerson, knowing the self in two ways may appear 
                                                 
1 Scholars of Du Bois are appreciative of the Emersonian influence on his use of the term. Werner Sollors has noted 
this influence in Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture (New York: Oxford UP, 1986) as has 
Anita Patterson in From Emerson to King: Democracy, Race, and the Politics of Protest (New York: Oxford UP, 
1997). Schneider even goes so far as to argue that as Du Bois’s version of double consciousness is a 
“multidisciplinary phenomenon” that there are “more references to Emersonian double consciousness” in criticism 
of Du Bois “than one finds in the extant body of Emerson criticism” (50).    
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in one essay as a difference between the “idealist” and the “materialist,” “Nature” and the “Soul” 
in another, or any other number of ambiguous configurations. Across these iterations, Emerson 
demonstrates an impulse to merge these divergent, often antagonistic, constructions of self in 
order to achieve what he calls for in Nature—“an original relation to the universe” (7). Of course 
Emerson seldom discusses the psychic and corporeal violence of American racism that frames 
double-consciousness for Du Bois.2 But this impulse toward “original relation” nevertheless 
reflects the desire for what Du Bois would later call “a better and truer self” or a complete and 
whole sense of self: that is, a self capable of seeing the two opposing and separate versions 
amalgamating in order to coexist.  
Du Bois’s use of double consciousness recalls this Emersonian desire to attain true self-
consciousness. Interestingly enough, like Du Bois, Emerson only uses the term double 
consciousness twice over the course of his career, despite consistent descriptions of a fractured 
and split consciousness. He first uses it in 1842’s “The Transcendentalist,” where he says that the 
“worst feature of this double consciousness is, that the two lives, of the understanding and of the 
soul, which we lead really show very little relation to each other; [. . .] and, with the progress of 
life, the two discover no greater disposition to reconcile themselves” (205-206). Emerson again 
uses the term in the 1860 essay “Fate” where he states that “one solution to the mysteries of the 
human condition, one solution to the old knots of fate, freedom, and foreknowledge, exists; the 
propounding, namely, of the double consciousness. A man must ride alternately on the horses” of 
                                                 
2 Emerson’s public reflections on race are sparse. One example, and the one cited most frequently by Schneider, is 
his 1844 “Address on the Emancipation of the Negroes in the British Indies.”  Emerson also directly addresses 
American racism in 1854’s “The Fugitive Slave Law.” Though explicit commentary on race in America is rare for 
Emerson, many critics examine his private letters as well as his other, more popular essays and addresses as a 
commentary on the problem of slavery and racism in America. For more on Emerson as a reform writer and his 
reflections on slavery, abolition, and women’s rights, see The Emerson Dilemma: Essays on Emerson and Social 
Reform, edited by Gregory Garvey (U of Georgia P, 2001) and Sam McGuire Worley’s Emerson, Thoreau, and the 
Role of the Cultural Critic (State U of New York P, 2001). 
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this dichotomous relationship (which appears in this essay as one between man’s “private and 
public nature”) (792). These passages demonstrate that Emerson, before Du Bois posits double 
consciousness as a condition suffered by African Americans—whether collectively as a race or 
solely amongst those belonging to what he would refer to as “The Talented Tenth”—, recognizes 
the difficulty, and perhaps even impossibility, of assimilating two divergent modes of self-
knowledge even as he advocates that individuals strive towards this reconciliation in an effort to 
achieve the original relation to the universe.3  
There are clear similarities between Emerson’s use of the term double consciousness and 
Du Bois’s. I want to re-emphasize here that by highlighting the ways in which Emerson’s and Du 
Bois’s use of the term appear similar or that Emerson first used the term, I am not suggesting that 
the term be appropriated from African American literature and culture and credited solely to 
Emerson nor am I suggesting that the Du Boisian configuration of double consciousness be 
applied to situations outside of the cultural and historical context for which he sought such a 
metaphor. Yet, at the heart of each writer’s use of the term there is a comparable inability to 
mediate or reconcile alternative versions of the self. In the Du Boisian version, this fractured 
sense of self tears one “asunder;” likewise, in the Emersonian version that appears in “Fate,” 
double consciousness causes a man to be “the victim of his fate” and “ground to powder by the 
vice of his race” (792). Both notions of double consciousness then also share a sense that a 
divided self has the potential to cause violence to the person experiencing such a fractured state 
of mind.  
                                                 
3 In 1903, the same year as the publication of The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois published the essay “The Talented 
Tenth” in the book The Negro Problem: A Series of Articles by Representative American Negroes of To-Day (NY: 
James Pott & Co, 1903). This book included contributions by Booker T. Washington, Paul Laurence Dunbar, and 
Charles W. Chesnutt among others.  
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The inability to merge iterations of the self as well as the potential violence that follows 
underlie both Emersonian and Du Boisian conceptions of double consciousness. Both writers 
tend to use the term strategically to address this inability of merging versions of the self though 
they do so for different ends. For Emerson, double consciousness, even as he argues that we 
strive for it, becomes a strategy for naming the fractured sense of self that emerges from the 
individual’s incapacity to achieve an understanding of the whole that generates and evades 
human experience. For Du Bois, double consciousness, because it results from the experience of 
two-ness, names the debilitating implications of racism on the individual consciousness. Because 
Emerson and Du Bois use the phrase double consciousness so minimally, I argue that it is this 
common feature that generates a logic for thinking about and understanding a type of 
psychological tension an individual faces when trying to understand and assimilate multiple 
forms of seeing and knowing the self.  
By positioning double consciousness more specifically as a logic for determining the 
challenges associated with knowing oneself, the terminology itself can be removed from specific 
historical and cultural moments of significance to be understood and applied more broadly to 
breaks in consciousness as they appear in a wide spectrum of literature produced by American 
authors. This approach is not meant to undermine existing applications of double consciousness 
by Du Bois or any other writer, but rather to develop the term in a larger context that will 
ultimately offer a tool by which to read and offer more nuanced versions of double 
consciousness in texts that are already recognized as featuring a version of this experience as 
well as in texts that are not traditionally associated with this term. Read in this manner, double 
consciousness becomes more than just a term with a solid or fixed definition to describe one 
particular condition, but rather transitions into a way of reading experiences of subjectivity. Used 
9 
 
as a tool for reading these experiences, double consciousness also helps to establish an 
intellectual history in works of American literature that uncovers a pattern of thought about the 
experience of subjectivity that often transcends genre and period demarcations. 
 Since Du Boisian critics generally recognize Emerson’s influence upon Du Bois, to 
generate what I am calling a logic of double consciousness, this project argues that it is Emerson 
as he tries to work towards a state of being that resembles transcendence, despite his infrequent 
use of the actual term, that develops a logic or theory for this psychological tension over the 
course of his writing career.4 Again, I am not trying to appropriate the term from Du Bois, but 
am suggesting that Emerson’s project conceptualizes double consciousness as a necessary state 
of being that later writers such as Du Bois reframe as an actual condition experienced by 
individuals living and participating in the world. In other words, understanding the Emersonian 
logic of double consciousness may help to better understand the debilitating effects of something 
like the experience of two-ness that Du Bois describes. Starting with Emerson then, double 
consciousness evolves from an idealized experience to a potentially devastating and even fatal 
condition once experienced. Double consciousness becomes a term that I am applying to an 
Emersonian way of thinking about consciousness and subjective experience and then arguing 
manifests, in the work of other American authors, as not only a condition experienced by 
individuals, but one that has dangerous consequences.  
 In the first chapter, “Toward a Theory of Emersonian Double Consciousness,” I examine 
the development of this psychological tension as it emerges throughout Emerson’s writing career 
in order to seek a definition of double consciousness. The chapter begins with a reading of 
Emerson’s early essay Nature where he opens with a call for individuals to “enjoy an original 
                                                 
4 For full-length treatments on Emerson’s influence on Du Bois as well as the ways in which the two men share as 
well as diverge in their ways of thinking about individualism, race, and politics see Schneider and Patterson.  
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relation to the universe” (7). He goes on to say that “Undoubtedly we have no questions to ask 
which are unanswerable” and that “every man’s condition is a solution in hieroglyphic to those 
inquiries he would put. He acts it as life, before he apprehends it as truth” (7). In other words, we 
already know how to enjoy an original relation to the universe as it is inherent—we simply have 
to decipher our internal hieroglyphics. But how does an individual do this? The first section of 
the chapter asks not only what an original relation to the universe looks like, but how we can 
achieve such a relation. I examine how essays like “Self-Reliance,” “The Over-Soul,” “Circles,” 
and “Experience” take up these questions not to clarify or provide answers, but to obfuscate such 
answers by taking what appears as a simple question of how subjects relate to objects, and 
conflating what constitutes subjects and objects, as if to make orienting oneself toward an 
original relation feel like an impossible task.  
For example, in Nature Emerson argues that “Nature and the Soul” compose the universe 
to which we should enjoy an original relation. On the surface, because our common assumption 
that souls belong to persons, one might assume that the soul would constitute the subject in 
Emerson’s relation while Nature would constitute the object. Yet Emerson quickly distinguishes 
persons from souls as he says that NATURE is “the NOT ME, that is both nature and art, all 
other men and my own body” (8). Here, Emerson takes traditional associations and muddies 
them by disembodying souls from subjects or persons: that is, the soul exists outside of a 
person’s body and outside of what we typically identify as subjects—the physical body and 
individual agency. His attempts to clarify only continue to confuse. In Nature he says that when 
immersed in physical nature “all mean egotism vanishes” and that a person “becomes the 
transparent eye-ball” where he is nothing but sees all as “the currents of the Universal Being 
circulate through him” so that he becomes “part or particle of God” (8). Similarly, in “The Over-
11 
 
Soul” he insists that persons “live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime 
within man is the soul of the whole” (386). These passages make evident that while the Soul, 
along with Nature, constitutes the universe, it is distinct from the person that exists or is 
contained within the physical body that comprises the same Nature of which the universe 
consists. These passages also demonstrate the type of paradoxes that can be found in Emerson’s 
essays as one tries to determine not only what an original relation to the universe is or looks like, 
but how persons can orient themselves toward it. These paradoxes, I argue, produce a fluidity 
between subjects and objects; this fluidity, more particularly, causes us to wonder how we can be 
both separate from and constituent of the universe in which we are trying to relate. 
 The second part of this chapter takes the questions produced by my readings of 
Emerson’s essays and attempts to clarify Emerson’s often opaque terms in order to understand 
the dilemma of how one can achieve an original relation as a problem of consciousness. In order 
to do this, I borrow what Sharon Cameron has famously termed the “impersonal” when 
describing Nature’s call for and an original relation to the universe. Cameron describes the 
impersonal as “the antidote for the egotistical, the subjective, the solipsistic” because “it refutes 
the idea that the mind is one’s own ‘property,’ that one’s relation to being is that of ownership on 
one hand, and separate identity on the other” (4). It is important to note, however, that while 
Cameron uses the impersonal synonymously with Emerson’s term “The Over-Soul,” I use it 
more broadly to apply to all references for a catholic entity that exists outside of a particular 
subject for the purposes of my argument (for example, I use the impersonal to describe 
Emerson’s characterization of the universe, Nature, God, the Over-Soul, the Universal Being, 
etc.). The idea of the “impersonal” is useful because it provides clear demarcations between the 
subject and object where Emerson’s own definitions do not. Using the term “impersonal” allows 
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me to position subjects as people—what I will refer to as particular and personal identities—as 
distinct from what constitutes objects, or the impersonal. More importantly, once clear 
demarcations are established between the subject who is trying to orient itself toward the object 
or the universe, it is easier to determine how this call for relation is actually a problem of 
consciousness which produces the logic of double consciousness.  
Reconfiguring the original Emersonian dilemma found in Nature as one between how a 
particular person can enjoy an original relation to the universe when he or she both contains and 
is contained by the impersonal, allows me, in the third part of the chapter, to read Emerson’s 
later essays such as “Nominalist and Realist,” “Illusions,” and “Fate” to determine that achieving 
the original relation is much more complicated than Emerson initially suggests. Instead, these 
essays propose that how we know and understand ourselves within the physical world prevents 
the acquisition of the original relation and thus all of the benefits Emerson finds in such a 
relation. Emerson suggests in these essays that knowing oneself simultaneously as a particular 
person and as a particle of the impersonal comes with demanding and difficult sacrifices for 
individuals who attempt such knowledge. For example, in “Fate” Emerson tells us that “when a 
man is the victim of his fate [. . .] or is ground to powder by the vice of his race;--he is to rally on 
his relation to the Universe, which his ruin benefits” (389). He instructs the reader to “learn this 
lesson, namely, that by the cunning co-presence of two elements, which is throughout nature, 
what lames or paralyzes you draws in with it the divinity” (389). Here we are fated to the 
particularity of personhood even as we strive to dissolve into the impersonal. As we realize this 
fate, we become simultaneously aware of ourselves as both particular and particle of the larger 
universal. This consciousness of ourselves as “part and particle” grinds us to powder—destroys 
us—all for the promise of “universal benefit.” This moment of simultaneous recognition and 
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dissolution of the self is what I am arguing underlies Emerson’s idea or theory of double 
consciousness. Moreover, it is this moment that I argue presents consequences with the potential 
to devastate or even decimate particular individuals entirely as we must sacrifice knowing 
ourselves as particular and distinct in order to dissolve back into a universe that cares little for us. 
 For Emersonian double consciousness to occur, and thus for an individual to attain an 
original relation to the universe, an individual must be aware of himself as both a particular and 
distinct individual as well as part of the make-up of the impersonal. The problem, however, is 
that for an individual to know, recognize, and understand himself as a constituent part of the 
impersonal necessitates that he sacrifice himself as a particular person in order to dissolve back 
into the impersonal, to know the original relation. Yet, it is consciousness—the ability to think, 
make meaning, and to know—that in part helps to distinguish persons from the impersonal. So to 
achieve an original relation, one must develop a kind of consciousness that abandons 
consciousness and with it particularity. To imagine giving oneself up for the “universal benefit,” 
is to imagine the particular person ceasing to exist.   
Because an Emersonian theory of double consciousness relies on simultaneous or 
concurrent knowledge of the self as two things—particular and impersonal—full or complete 
knowledge of the self is never truly possible for any sustainable period of time. People and their 
actions are mere representations or performances of the impersonal, but because they claim a 
proprietary possession over themselves and their actions in an effort to distinguish and define 
themselves as particulars, they do not recognize the “soul of the whole” that is inherent within in 
them without experiencing some consequence to their particularity. Yet, in giving way to one 
version of the self for another, a person gives up or sacrifices the alternate version of self-
knowledge and in so doing eliminates that version. This sacrifice to know the self in one capacity 
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prevents double consciousness and allows the particular person to return to living life knowing 
itself in one particular way rather than through the fractured and split manner that occurred at the 
moment of double consciousness. This sacrifice is a defense mechanism against a total 
dissolution back into the impersonal which necessitates a person wholly relinquish his or her 
particularity and thus their personhood altogether.  
Despite the impossibility of achieving true double consciousness so long as an individual 
wishes to continue to live as a particular person, an Emersonian theory of double consciousness 
positions the self and self-knowledge in a constant state of flux and transition. Though Emerson 
recognizes the impossibility of reconciliation between different ways of knowing the self, he 
makes up for this impossibility by advocating a life of succession or continual motion. 
Emerson’s emphasis on a successive life allows a person to get closer to an original relation and 
a continual state of double consciousness without an immediate need to sacrifice his entire 
personhood or experience within the world. However, living a successive life also means that a 
person must continually reposition himself within the various social, political, and even temporal 
systems that govern daily life so that he is constantly remaking and re-knowing himself. It is this 
constant remaking and re-knowing of the individual self in order to successively live that I argue 
reflects the psychological tension that the material condition of double consciousness can 
produce for someone like Du Bois in his discussions of American history.  
To this end, the remainder of this dissertation will examine how other American authors 
use an Emersonian logic of double consciousness to test what happens when this logic 
transforms into a condition experienced by individuals actively participating in life and the 
systems that govern it. When understood as a condition, double consciousness presents violent, 
devastating, and sometimes even fatal consequences for the individual suffering from it as well 
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as to others and the various systems in which the individual exists. The remaining chapters 
demonstrate both the limitations of human consciousness to possess and inhabit a state of double 
consciousness as well as how the consequences of this psychological tension manifest in 
different scenarios in which individuals may find themselves. 
I begin Chapter Two, “‘Between the Form of Life and Life’: Conditions of Double 
Consciousness in the Poetry of Emily Dickinson,” by exploring what critic E. Thomas Finan 
calls Emily Dickinson’s “poetry of consciousness.” The chapter examines what happens when 
Dickinson’s speakers find themselves experiencing moments of double consciousness. I open by 
arguing that Dickinson’s poems “I felt a Funeral, in my Brain” and “I felt a Cleaving in my 
Mind” depict the psychological tension or fracture that an individual experiences as he or she 
becomes aware they are conscious of themselves in two ways: as a particular person and a person 
who is part of a larger and impersonal force. Though full or complete knowledge of the 
impersonal is almost always impossible in Dickinson’s poems, as it is for Emerson, these two 
poems depict the moment of double consciousness as a transitional state once persons determine 
that they are, to borrow from Emerson’s “The Over-Soul,” “so much more” than just the selves 
they occupy in the physical world. More importantly, these poems characterize this transitional 
state as violent and painful. For instance, Dickinson’s speaker feels a “Cleaving” in her 
“Mind/As if” the Brain had split” and this fractured state of being feels like “a Funeral” in the 
“Brain” where “Mourners” are marching “to and fro” until her “mind “goes “numb.”  
Dickinson’s speaker here seems to transcend the particular self in order to observe how much 
pain multiple forms of self- knowledge can cause and how such a fracture in consciousness can 
resemble a death. These poems, I also argue, demonstrate the limitations of human consciousness 
whenever it attempts to reconcile or assimilate multiple forms of self-knowledge. Dickinson’s 
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speakers labor to take the pieces of the split consciousness and “match” them “Seam by Seam -
/But could not make them fit.”  
Because these two poems are representative of ways in which Dickinson’s poetry 
demonstrates the painful and violent nature of double consciousness as a condition suffered by 
subjects, I go on to argue that her poetry tries to outline the limitations of individual 
consciousness that are ultimately responsible for this condition. The poems “The Brain – is wider 
than the Sky” and “I thought that nature was enough,” for example, employ metaphors of 
absorption and containment, to describe crucial indeterminacy that effaces the distinctions 
between subject and object on which our understanding of consciousness depends. In these 
poems, persons trying to orient themselves via an “original relation” know themselves as 
particular individuals striving to reach the impersonal; consequently they confront an uncertainty 
about the reliability of distinctions between the self and the world.  This indeterminacy, I argue, 
complicates the process of knowing so that one becomes incapable of differentiating between 
knowledge of the self as a self and knowledge of that same self as necessary to the construction 
of something larger beyond a particular identity. Dickinson re-imagines this indeterminacy in 
poems like “Between the Form of Life and Life” and “This Consciousness that is aware” as a 
moment of double consciousness in which persons, unable to delineate the particular self from 
the impersonal, are caught or trapped in this painful condition.  
Stuck in this indeterminate place, poems such as “Before I got my eye put out” and 
“Renunciation – is a piercing Virtue” demonstrate how, because of the limitations of 
consciousness, we must ultimately choose between one version of self-knowledge over the other 
if we hope to end the suffering that double consciousness imposes because of the impossibility of 
reconciling or merging the two. While these poems necessitate a choosing of one form of 
17 
 
knowledge over another to end the suffering of double consciousness, they also highlight how 
the choosing in and of itself reproduces the pain of the actual experience. In other words, 
whenever we suspend the condition of double consciousness with a determinate choice between 
types of self-knowledge, we deny and effectively terminate the alternate mode of knowing. For 
Dickinson, this termination, or dispossession of one version of the self, turns out to be just as 
violent and painful as the condition itself, often resulting in a figurative death. Finally, I argue 
that Dickinson’s “poetry of consciousness,” because a person chooses one form of self-
knowledge over the other in order to end the state of double consciousness, posits double 
consciousness as a temporal condition that occurs multiple times over the course of a lifetime. In 
Dickinson’s poetry then, double consciousness is a relational experience that differs throughout a 
person’s life based on the current role or position that he or she occupies. Double consciousness 
thus emerges as a condition that enables individuals to test this relationality to other systems of 
organization outside of the self that govern and organize the temporal life in which it must 
participate.  
While Dickinson’s poetry imagines the internal effects of the experience of double 
consciousness on a person, I argue in Chapter Three, “Economies of Devastation in Henry 
James’s The Bostonians and The Wings of the Dove” that Henry James explores the devastating 
consequences of double consciousness on persons as they participate in the interpersonal 
relationships that are inherent byproducts of living in modern societies. In order to do this, my 
chapter articulates how double consciousness emerges in James’s The Bostonians and The Wings 
of the Dove. More particularly, the first part of the chapter investigates how the protagonists of 
each novel—Verena Tarrant and Milly Theale respectively—experience psychological tension as 
they come into contact and form relationships with other people. Verena and Milly enter into 
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states of double consciousness because their relationships with the other characters force them to 
see themselves through the eyes of others. As each woman must acknowledge the version of 
herself generated by a relationship with someone else, she must also try to incorporate what the 
others see with her own notions of selfhood. And because, as established by Emerson and 
demonstrated by Dickinson, it is so difficult to know multiple versions of the self 
simultaneously, Milly and Verena suffer the painful consequences of double consciousness: 
Verena sacrifices her agency as she chooses one version over another and thus the ability to 
define herself while Milly fails to choose and thus erases her voice from the novel’s narrative 
until she ultimately dies.  
So while Dickinson’s poetry externalizes the internal struggle that a person suffers in a 
moment of double consciousness, James’s further illustrates one of the forces—social 
relationships—that can cause persons to enter into this fractured sense of self. The second part of 
this chapter, however, argues that not only does one particular individual suffer double 
consciousness as a result of his or her interactions with others, but that those same interactions 
result in a state of double consciousness for all parties engaged in the relationship. I argue that 
Verena and Milly, because they lack the strength of personality and particularity of the other 
characters in each novel, act as sites on which the impersonal more clearly manifests to be 
experienced by the other characters. As characters like Olive and Basil in The Bostonians and 
like Kate and Densher in Wings come into contact with the impersonal via Verena and Milly, 
these characters occupy a state of double consciousness and generate what I call economies of 
devastation. These economies of devastation begin as economies of relation and work to 
highlight not only how states of double consciousness effect individual subjects, but also how 
such revelations impact the organizational systems in which these individual subjects live. In 
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other words, James’s economy of devastation demonstrates the ways in which something like a 
relationship between two particular subjects, which is one type of system that works to organize 
daily life, not only produces a condition of double consciousness for the participants, but also 
how the relation itself has the potential to be annihilated in the process. Neither the person nor 
the relation are immune from the consequences of this condition.  
Finally, Chapter Four, “Discovering ‘separateness’: The Painful Process of Self-
Definition in All the King’s Men” takes the internalization of double consciousness that I argue is 
present in Dickinson’s poetry and the externalization of this condition that I argue is present in 
the fiction of Henry James and combines them. This combination attempts to determine how an 
individual might try to manage the painful and potentially fatal consequences of this condition as 
he or she experiences it again and again over the course of a lifetime. Through a reading of 
Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s Men and his essay, “Knowledge and the Image of Man,” 
this chapter explores the roles time and relation have on a person’s ability to reconcile or merge 
alternate versions of self-knowledge. 
Though All the King’s Men first appears to be the story of Willie Stark told by a third 
person narrator, Jack Burden, as the story unravels Jack reveals that the story actually belongs to 
him. When read as a first person narrative, Jack emerges as two different characters: that of the 
narrator who has already experienced the events in the story and that of the character who 
appears in relation to the story of Willie Stark. Using the past-tense narrative as well as his 
relationship to Willie to tell his story, allows Jack to examine the events of his past, and thus 
different versions of himself, in order to piece together how those events and versions of himself 
have worked to produce the current version of himself as narrator. Although Jack experiences a 
condition of double consciousness throughout this story, I argue that his narrative reveals how he 
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chooses again and again one version of himself over another and in this choosing generates an 
ethos for living that creates a defense mechanism for him to avoid feeling and internalizing the 
painful effects this condition produces. This ethos takes several forms—such as “The Great 
Sleep,” “Life is Motion towards Knowledge,” and “The Great Twitch”—throughout the 
narrative, but no matter its iteration these philosophies allow Jack to protect himself from 
acknowledging how his particularity plays a role in the impersonal by denying the fact that his 
actions have an impact on others.  
However, the distance that Jack gains through the use of the narrative, I argue, enables 
him to examine more objectively, not unlike Dickinson’s speaker when she seems to be outside a 
particular self, those moments in his life in which his ethos shifted. It is in these moments of 
transition that Jack enters into a state of double consciousness and thus causes the shift in his 
ethos. The elapsed time that the narrative structure of All the King’s Men provides, allows Jack to 
examine how these moments altered him; in other words, they allow him to see not only how he 
chose one version of knowledge over another, but also why he chose that version. He then, 
through re-telling of his story, determines how these choices influenced his relationships, his 
career, and his actions (or inaction as the case may be). Each choice initiates a new moment of 
double consciousness and another choosing of one self over another until the end of the novel 
where Jack reveals how he knows himself in the moment of the re-telling. Yet, the narrative only 
occurs because of a lapse in time from these actual moments and because Jack only comes to 
understand these moments by distancing himself from himself and from his relationships, 
Warren reinforces that a person cannot simultaneously know himself in more than one way at a 
time without some sort of consequence. Even as Jack re-tells his story and sees himself anew, the 
current way he sees himself is being remade through the telling. The experience of telling his 
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story in and of itself causes Jack to re-know himself and thus sacrifice these older versions of 
self. I argue that both time and relation not only make the condition of double consciousness 
possible multiple times, but they are also what allow an individual to attempt to reconcile 
alternate versions of the self.  
Yet, the time and relation that Jack utilizes in order to narrativize his experiences with 
double consciousness also further highlight the paradox of this condition. What I mean here is 
that as both a character and a narrator, Jack enjoys a particular privilege within his historical 
moment as a white male narrator, a privilege which Warren himself enjoys as a white male 
author, that make the technology of narrative more easily available to him that would not be 
available to those black Americans for who Du Bois is writing (or even to the female characters 
of James’s novels).  In other words, though Emerson and Dickinson posit double consciousness 
as a condition that afflicts all persons, Warren’s novel while on one hand offering a possible 
strategy, through narrative, to reconcile multiple versions of the self, demonstrates that literary 
technologies that may be used for this reconciliation are largely determined and limited by one’s 
cultural and historical circumstances. And, as Du Bois illustrates, these circumstances often 
heighten the experience of double consciousness, making it even more paradoxical and 
challenging for those who find themselves marginalized and alienated from the dominate culture.  
Although Dickinson, James, and Warren all make use of what I am calling an 
Emersonian idea of double consciousness, each does so in a different way and to a different end. 
The logic of double consciousness manifests for Dickinson, James, and Warren as a condition 
with devastating, painful, even fatal consequences for the individual as it struggles to know itself 
as more than the particular identity it possesses. Often, in the case of all three of these writer’s, 
double consciousness is caused as the particular self tries to reconcile its self-knowledge with the 
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knowledge that it is also a constituent part of larger and more powerful force such as the 
impersonal. In reading the logic of double consciousness as it emerges in the work of Dickinson, 
James, and Warren, I am hoping that this study produces an intellectual history that explores 
questions of what it means to know oneself as a self or a subject while also trying to know how 
that self fits into a larger context, whether that context is religious, racial, political, etc.  This 
intellectual history provides a manner in which to read texts outside period and genre distinctions 
that often determine how we understand the experience of the subject as these distinctions are 
usually representative of a particular cultural and/or historical moment. What an Emersionian 
logic for double consciousness offers us then are more comprehensive and nuanced versions of 
what the experience of personhood looks like for a subject; as a result we can better situate, 
understand, and articulate the specific challenges of subjectivity within a particular circumstance 
such as Du Bois’s iteration of double consciousness as a racial experience.   
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2 CHAPTER ONE: THE SUFFERING SUBJECT: TOWARD AN EMERSONIAN 
THEORY OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS 
  In his 1836 work, Nature, Ralph Waldo Emerson wonders why each person should not 
“enjoy an original relation to the universe.”5 “Every man’s condition,” he goes on to say, “is a 
solution in hieroglyphic to the inquiries he would put. He acts it as life before he apprehends it as 
truth” (7). In other words, the person who seeks this relation, or what Barbara Packer has termed 
“a state of grace,” already possesses the answers to questions about how he or she might achieve 
an original relationship to the universe even if those answers remain unintelligible (25). An 
individual who wants to realize a relationship to the universe must face the challenge of not only 
locating such answers within him-or herself but also of decoding those answers so as to make 
this relation possible. Emerson’s writing career, for the most part, attempts to characterize this 
original relation to the universe while providing methods with which individuals may decipher 
those internal hieroglyphics.6 For instance, an essay like “Self-Reliance” reads as an instruction 
manual famous for generating popular adages in the rhetoric of individualism: “Trust thyself” 
and “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds” (260, 265). And an essay like “The 
Over-Soul” characterizes the other participant in this original relation; what Nature calls “the 
                                                 
5 Ralph Waldo Emerson. Emerson: Essays and Poems, ed. Joel Porte (New York: Library of America, 1996), 7. 
Subsequent references to Emerson’s essays are from this volume and appear in the text.   
6 Packer’s Emerson’s Fall: A New Interpretation of the Major Essays demonstrates the historical and biographical 
influences on the composition of Emerson’s major essays. There she argues that the early Nature “includes 
condensed versions of every major Emersonian theme” that appears throughout his later work (25). Conversely, 
Stanley Cavell in Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes argues that “Nature, granted the wonderful passages in it” do 
“not yet constitute the Emersonian philosophical voice” and that it is a departure from the voice found in “The 
American Scholar,” “The Divinity School Address,” and “Self-Reliance” (112). For Cavell, Nature takes the “issue 
of skepticism as solvable or controllable” while the later essays reveal “unsolvability to be the heart of his thinking” 
(112). For my purposes, Packer’s and Cavell’s readings are not so diametrically opposed as they seem. Though 
Emerson’s voice certainly does alter in his later work, Nature does seem to contain many of the themes that appear 
in the later essays. Most of these “themes” or central arguments address what Emerson initially viewed as a solvable 
condition in Nature—the original relation to the universe in my reading rather than the skepticism of Cavell’s—as 
an unsolvable, or more precisely an inaccessible condition to the person seeking it.  
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great apparition” here becomes “The Supreme Critic,” “Unity,” “the Eternal ONE,” “God,” and 
finally “The Over-soul” (Nature 7, “The Over-Soul” 385-386). Yet, even the most novice reader 
of Emerson often notes the tensions, challenges, and paradoxes that his writing tends to produce. 
These names for the Over-soul are understood as synonymous despite the disparateness with 
which they refer to an abstract idea. Such moments reveal the opacities in Emerson’s writing that 
haunt even his most ardent attempts to clarify just what an “original relation” might look like 
from the vantage of a particular person.   
 In its simplest form, the relationship promised by Emerson in Nature and sought after in 
his later essays could be described as one between a subject and an object. The subject seems to 
be the “we” that Emerson opens with: the individual seeking the original relation to the universe. 
Determining the object, however, proves more difficult. Is the object the thing Emerson names 
here as “the universe” or the “great apparition” and later “the Over-soul”? Or is the object “the 
original relation” to that universe for which one is searching? Nature never succinctly clarifies 
the object leaving critics like Packer to note that trying to interpret “Emerson’s attempt to 
unriddle the cosmos” in Nature “has a way of swallowing up critics who pretend to the glory of 
having guessed its meaning” (23, 25).  
 Nature’s ambiguity when it comes to clearly defining the subject-object relationship 
Emerson believes is inherent only intensifies throughout Emerson’s later work. More 
specifically, because problems identifying and naming the object of “original relation” persist, 
the lucidity of what constitutes both object and subject becomes questionable as one moves from 
Nature to the later writing. Emerson remains consistent in his insistence that the actualization of 
this original relation to the universe is possible for all individuals (though most especially for a 
visionary figure he calls “the Poet”); and later when that possibility is tempered by age and 
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experience, the essays still maintain the hope that a person can find the ever-elusive “original 
relation,” whatever that relationship may be. The difficulty in Emerson’s late essays comes not 
from his shifts in voice or tone, but from the fluidity of the subject-object relation those essays 
describe. Without clear demarcations, the subject bleeds into the object and vice versa, making it 
difficult to discern who or what is seeking whom or what. Forming a relation, original or 
otherwise, necessitates distinct definitions of the parties involved. Because Emerson’s subjects 
and objects flow into one another, definition and demarcation that would make an “original 
relation” legible to an individual are withheld because of the fluidity for which this same 
relationship calls.   
 The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. In the first part, I demonstrate the ways in which 
the subject-object relationship introduced in Nature becomes confused and even paradoxical as 
Emerson’s ideas develop.7 Such a demonstration will then yield a set of terms for better 
articulating, in part two, the problems produced when subjects and objects are not fixed but 
rather fluid so that one cannot determine what constitutes the other. Finally, using these terms 
alongside of the essays “Nominalist and Realist,” “Illusions,” and “Fate,” I argue in the third part 
of the chapter that Emerson’s idea of an original relation to the universe can be translated as a 
condition of consciousness—what he terms and I refer to as double consciousness—that 
necessitates suffering, and sometimes even the complete decimation of the self, for the individual 
who strives to experience it. 
                                                 
7 There has been a tendency in Emerson scholarship to differentiate between an “early” Emerson and a “late” and 
more “mature” Emerson. Though Emerson’s voice does shift between something like Essays: First Series (1841) 
and The Conduct of Life (1860), I tend to agree with Michael Lopez that “there exists, from his first book to his last, 
a fundamental, unchanging Emersonian psychology/philosophy” (247-48). For a thorough discussion on the critical 
tendency to locate different Emersonian voices in his early and later work as well as why such a differentiation is  
problematic, see Lopez’s “The Conduct of Life: Emerson’s Anatomy of Power.”  
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2.1 Dissolving Subjects and Flowing Objects  
Emerson most clearly articulates the untenability of attaining an original relation to the 
universe in “Experience.” Bemoaning the failure of a “mood” such as grief to orient an 
individual into “reality,” Emerson, in an uncharacteristically pessimistic moment, admits that 
“souls never touch their objects” (472).8 Even grief, for which Emerson describes as a mood that 
courts “suffering” and that would ideally, because of its intensity and profound effect on the 
individual experiencing it, move a person towards the original relation to the universe, is 
impervious to that relation and does not “carry” that person “one step into real nature” (473). 
Instead, grieving for Emerson is just as shallow as any other mood or perception; grief simply 
“plays about the surfaces” and does not help to penetrate Nature who “does not like to be 
observed” (473). Though specific to Emerson’s grief over losing his son, Waldo, the problem 
this passage addresses is one of distance and more specifically the inability to traverse the 
distance between what constitutes the subject and what constitutes the object in order to “find 
reality” of an original relation.  
 Emerson goes on, still more pessimistically to say that “I take this evanescence and 
lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our fingers then when we clutch the hardest, 
to be the most unhandsome part of our condition” (473). In other words, when persons attempt to 
move beyond the surface and penetrate the depth of the object, the object evades understanding. 
Moreover, this unhandsome condition requires that we enter into a particular state of 
consciousness that necessitates a penetration of the self beyond surface moods in order to attempt 
to move closer towards the object even as the object moves further from the person. Stanley 
                                                 
8 “Experience” reflects upon the nature of grief—what Emerson refers to as a mere mood in the essay—following 
the death of Emerson’s son Waldo. For more on the significance of Emerson’s particular grief, see Sharon 
Cameron’s “Representing Grief: Emerson’s ‘Experience’” in Representations 15 (1986): 15-41.  
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Cavell, however, argues that “What is unhandsome is, I think, not that objects for us, to which 
we seek attachment, are, as it were, in themselves evanescent and lubricious; the unhandsome is 
rather what happens when we seek to deny the standoffishness of objects by clutching at them, 
which is to say, when we conceive thinking [. . .] as grasping something, say synthesizing” (117). 
Cavell seems to be saying here that the unhandsome situation in which we find ourselves is not 
due to the elusive nature of the object, but rather to the fact that the person becomes conscious of 
the object’s evasion and then tries even harder to make a move towards it. He goes on to say that 
“Clutching’s opposite, which would be the most handsome part of our condition, is I suppose the 
specifically human form of attractiveness—attraction being another tremendous Emersonian 
term or master-tone, naming the rightful call we have upon one another, and that I and the world 
make upon one another” (117).9 Nature’s call for and promise of an original relation to the 
universe demonstrates this attraction, or handsome condition, as a person “acts it as life” before 
developing a consciousness about the truth of such an attraction or relation. The ideal condition, 
for both Emerson and Cavell is one in which subject and object move towards one another 
naturally—each acts or inhabits the “original relation”— and without the subject consciously 
trying to ascertain how much further he or she has to go to get the original relation. The 
consciousness—the thinking that makes our condition unhandsome, if we are to accept Cavell’s 
reading of this passage—however, makes us: our ability to think, it seems, is one of the things 
that differentiates us from the world, and subjects from objects.  Without the ability to think or to 
                                                 
9 Cavell’s reading of “Experience” attempts to position Emerson within a larger philosophical tradition that includes 
Nietzche, Kant, Wittegenstein, among others. “Experience” for Cavell is less about grief and its contradictions to 
experience as determined by critics like Cameron and Packer and more about the essay as “a work, or claim, of 
founding” a relation to philosophy (119). See “Finding as Founding: Taking Steps in Emerson’s ‘Experience’” from 
Transcendental Etudes.  
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know, the subject loses what distinguishes it from the object, which makes orienting oneself 
towards an original relation to the universe impossible.  
 What emerges in “Experience” is both a problem of distance and a problem of 
orientation; and the two are not mutually exclusive of one another, but rather—to borrow a 
phrase from Emerson—“part and particle” of a larger problem that has to do with consciousness 
and the way the human perceives or knows the original relationship. More particularly, the 
difficulties faced by subjects and objects trying to acquaint themselves with one another are 
largely due to the lack of a fixed foundation on which one can stand in relation to an object. And 
for Emerson, while the absence of a static perspective presents obstacles for the individual, it is 
also necessary for the possibility of an original relation.  
 In Nature, immediately following the call for an original relation to the universe and the 
promise that such a relation is possible if we would look within ourselves, Emerson attempts to 
characterize the subject and the object he wishes to unite. He says when considered 
philosophically “the universe is composed of Nature and the Soul” (8). We seek an original 
relation, in other words, to a totality composed of Nature and the Soul. Yet what exactly 
constitutes the Soul and Nature remains indistinct. Emerson clarifies: 
Strictly speaking, therefore, all that is separate from us, all which Philosophy  
distinguishes as the NOT ME, that is, both nature and art, all other men and my 
own body, must be ranked under this name, NATURE. I shall use the word in both 
senses;--in its common and in its philosophical import. In inquiries so general as 
our present one, the inaccuracy is not material; no confusion of thought will 
occur. Nature, in the common sense, refers to essences unchanged by man; space, 
the air, the river, the leaf. Art is applied to the mixture of his will with the same 
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things, as in a house, a canal, a statue, a picture. But his operations taken together 
are so insignificant, a little chipping, baking, patching, and washing, that in an 
impression so grand as that of the world on the human mind, they do not vary the 
result. (8) 
Here NATURE appears to encompass all the physical stuff that makes up the world like space, 
air, etc. as well as bodies and the wills those bodies house. For Emerson, defining Nature in this 
way causes no confusion because our desires and our effects on the physical world are 
“insignificant” when considered in the light of the larger impression everything makes on us. 
Though Emerson also calls this larger impression “the world on the human mind,” the reference 
to the world seems to imply that the impression is actually left by what is not defined as a natural 
object, which would be what Emerson elsewhere calls the Soul. This passage then confuses more 
than it clarifies. If Nature is all the stuff of the world, including persons, what then constitutes the 
Soul that apparently leaves such an impression upon us? The Soul seems disembodied from 
physical persons as well as Nature, but it also seems that if Nature is all the stuff that makes up 
the world, wouldn’t the Soul also make up Nature? Because Nature appears here as all 
encompassing, the original relation one seeks would seem like a natural state of being for the 
subject. Yet, Emerson’s call for such a relation problematizes this assumption and as a result 
implies a separateness between subjects and objects or at least between how subjects and objects 
know themselves. Paradoxically, this same separateness also prevents the distinctions required of 
subjects and objects in order to orient themselves toward one another. What constitutes the Soul, 
which impresses upon the need to achieve the totality of an original relation, still evades 
understanding and definition.  
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 Emerson’s answer to some of these questions appears a few pages later when he says that 
immersed in the natural world “all mean egotism vanishes. I become the transparent eye-ball; I 
am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or 
particle of God” (10). As it relates to the problem of orientation, Emerson equates subjects and 
objects because individuals dissolve into the “Universal Being” and as they become “part or 
particle” relate equally to the object. It is worth mentioning here that I am using Emerson’s terms 
of “Universal Being,” “God, “Over-soul,” “Nature,” etc. as they appear in Nature and throughout 
his writing as synonymous with “the universe” largely because I wish to argue that the opacity of 
the subject-object relationship translates to a condition of consciousness for particular persons to 
suffer.10 When subjects dissolve into objects, the necessity to seek an original relation to that 
object becomes obsolete because when subjects and objects are not only equally related, but also 
part and particle of one another, relation, let alone original relation, is impossible to establish. 
Subjects cannot locate what distinguishes them from the object in order to establish a position 
from which to begin orienting themselves towards the object.  
 What Nature provides then is not an identification of the subject and the object, or more 
plainly of the person and the universe, but rather an idea of what the original relation may look 
like once achieved: subjects and objects that fuse and flow together to unite beyond the confines 
of material personhood or the limitations imposed by definitions and names. This image recurs in 
“Self-Reliance,” “The Over-Soul,” and “Circles” with a series of epistemological abstractions 
that extend this fluidity and illuminates the difficulties of orienting the subject towards its object. 
Although Emerson advises in “Self-Reliance” to “Trust thyself” and “to believe” our “own 
                                                 
10 For interpretations of the specific meaning of these terms and their relationship to Emerson’s transcendentalism 
see Lawrence Buell’s Literary Transcendentalism: Style and Vision in the American Renaissance. Also of note are 
George Kateb’s questions about Emerson’s religiousness in Emerson and Self-Reliance.  
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thought,” he also asks “Who is the Trustee? What is the aboriginal Self, on which a universal 
reliance may be grounded?” (260, 268). “Intuition,” or the “essence of genius, of virtue, and of 
life” gives us the answer to those questions and appears in the form of “Spontaneity or Instinct” 
(269). In other words, if we trust ourselves by listening to our instinct or acting spontaneously 
from that instinct, we will discover our “common origin” and that the soul “is not diverse from 
things, from space, from light, from time, from man, but one with them from the same source 
whence their life and being also proceed” (269). The “aboriginal Self” then, because when acting 
according to “Intuition” we are not “diverse,” is both the self and the universe, or the subject and 
the object.  
This logic appears again in the “The Over-Soul.” There Emerson says:  
We live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime within man is 
the soul of the whole; the wise silence, the universal beauty, to which every part 
and particle is equally related; the eternal ONE. And this deep power in which we 
exist, and whose beatitude is all accessible to us, is seeing and the thing seen, the 
seer and spectacle, the subject and the object, are one. We see the world piece by 
piece, as the sun, the moon, the animal, the tree; but the whole, of which these are 
the shining parts, is the soul. (386) 
Where Nature fails to clarify its terms, these passages, I think, succeed. They make evident that 
while the Soul, along with NATURE, constitutes the universe, it is also distinct from it. An 
original relation to the universe offers the person an escape from physical personhood, which 
limits and confines us in order to merge into the universe that—according to the logic of these 
essays—already resides within the person as the Soul. On one hand, distinguishing the Soul 
reconciles the difficulty in determining the subject because it is inherent within us: it resides then 
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in the physical body of a person. On the other hand, these passages confuse what constitutes the 
person if the Soul inherently exists within the person, but the person must still try to orient 
himself towards an original relation. According to Emerson’s logic in Nature then, the person 
would already possess the totality of an original relation as he is composed of both the Soul and 
Nature. To put it more simply, these passages prompt one to wonder how one can have an 
original relation to the universe if he or she simultaneously contains and is contained by that 
universe? Persons are both the container and the contained just as they are both subject and 
object.  
 Emerson continues in “The Over-Soul” that “the soul in man is not an organ, but 
animates and exercises all the organs; is not a function [. . .] is not the intellect or the will, but the 
master of the intellect and the will; is the background of our being [. . .] an immensity not 
possessed and that cannot be possessed” (387). It seems that Emerson nullifies Nature’s call for 
an original relation to the universe here because man—understood as the corporeal body and the 
personality—cannot possess the soul though the soul possesses man. Such a claim renders the 
problem of orientation inconsequential. But Emerson also argues that “We do not yet possess 
ourselves, and we know at the same time we are much more” because “of this pure nature”—the 
universe’s possession of us—“every man is at some time sensible. [. . .] we know that it pervades 
us and contains us” (391, 387). To possess ourselves seems to imply that we enter into our 
original relation to the universe first by recognizing the Soul inherent within us and then 
allowing it to possess and pervade through us so that our persons dissolve back into the universe. 
The resulting paradox is thus that in order to possess ourselves we must first escape ourselves—
corporeally and personally—in order for the very thing that constitutes (and initially proscribed 
the limitations we must escape) to possess us.  
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 Intrinsic to this paradox is a problem of limits and limitlessness. The idea of the person 
serving as the container for that which it contains prohibits the subject’s orientation towards the 
object precisely because of the limitlessness that is inherent within this orientation. When objects 
compose subjects, and when objects flow into and out of persons, we cannot possibly find a 
foundation on which to stand in order to orient ourselves toward the object to which we form a 
relation. Though the universe gives the person limitations, its internal existence within the person 
renders those limitations plastic, even immaterial, resulting in a type of limitlessness that cancels 
out distinguishing features of both subject and object.  
The essay “Circles” addresses the necessity of such limitlessness. “There are no fixtures 
in nature,” we are told, “The universe is fluid and volatile. Permanence is but a word of degrees” 
(403). On one hand, this statement reaffirms the limitless possibility/potential of the individual 
for which one version of Emerson has become famous. If nothing is permanent, then the self-
reliant individual has the potential, because he or she is not contained to one version of him- or 
herself, to achieve what Emerson calls for in essays such as “The American Scholar” or “The 
Poet.” On the other hand, such a statement also poses a challenge for the individual trying to 
orient him- or herself to the universe to determine his or her original relation. And the person 
seeking this relationship is, ideally, the self-reliant individual so that we arrive back at our 
original paradox. Because “Circles” extends the logic of “Self-Reliance” and “The Over-Soul,” 
the moment in which a person starts to “possess themselves,” or gains some sort of 
knowledge/understanding of him- or herself to begin determining his or her relation to the 
universe, the universe shifts as a new circle is created. This then forces the individual to find 
some sort of new knowledge about the self, and to start the process of orienting him- or herself 
towards the universe all over again. Thus, a person cannot “apprehend” knowledge of him- or 
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herself or of the universe as “truth” because both self-knowledge and the relationship are always 
in flux (Nature 7). Moreover, because the self and the universe partially compose one another, 
they too are fluid and always moving in and out of one another. True possession or knowledge of 
the self in its original relation to the universe seems impossible.  
“Circles” avoids the disappointment found early in “Experience” by redirecting our 
attention from the limits imposed by limitlessness to the necessity of engaging in the process of 
living, that is to say an active life of progression and forward movement. “Circles” assures us 
that our lives are an “apprenticeship to the truth” as “there is no end in nature” because “every 
end is a beginning” but also that every person must be “an endless seeker, with no Past” at our 
backs (403, 412). Emerson argues that “which builds is better than that which is built” (404). By 
establishing not only a lack of permanence but also the necessity of our own fluidity through his 
emphasis on process towards- rather than on the product of the original relation, Emerson avoids 
addressing the practicality of attaining such a relationship. Advocating a process towards 
orientation instead of orientation itself underscores the fact that the subject cannot possibly orient 
itself towards the object since both are fluid and therefore unstable.  It also ignores the fact that 
without limits or distinguishing features, the subject and object are undifferentiated, which 
further prevents orientation. For Emerson, fluidity is not a problem if we are always moving 
forward, past our current circles, in order to continuously develop ourselves even if that 
development never gets us to our end goal. Thus, participating in the process, trying to orient 
one’s self towards the universe, allows us to “act” the relationship out, even if we cannot quite 
figure out how to “apprehend it as truth.” Knowing and understanding this relationship is 
secondary to living the relation. Yet the limitlessness of the relationship between universe and 
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person, or object and subject, keeps us living “amid surfaces” and moving forward, living a life 
in “succession” (“Experience” 478, “The Over-Soul” 386). 11  
When Emerson says in “Experience” that “Gladly we would anchor, but the anchorage is 
quicksand” and that “Our love of the real draws us to permanence, but health of body consists in 
circulation, and sanity of mind in variety [. . .] We need change of objects,” he refers to the lack 
of permanence established in “Circles” (476).  The limits imposed by personality and physicality 
give us a false sense of “the real” or “permanence” because they act as containers that in turn 
provide a certain degree of stability. This stability, though temporary, gives the person a platform 
or a place to anchor in which to orient him- or herself. The confines of the container allow the 
person to possess, or to have a transitory knowledge of himself, but this knowledge does not 
extend beyond the confines of the physical and material world. More importantly this knowledge 
of self is partial as Emerson says in “Experience”: “Life is a train of moods like a string of beads, 
and as we pass through them, they prove to be many-colored lenses which paint the world their 
own hue, and each shows only what lies in its focus” (473). Moods, because they are dictated by 
personality and particular experience, like the corporeal body, limit our ability for full self-
possession. We can only see or know what our mood allows which prevents complete knowledge 
or a relation to the universe. The mood, like the body, provides a false sense of anchorage for an 
orientation to the universe. Paradoxically though, they also, because we “pass through them,” 
provide the “change of objects” Emerson says we need as every object may appear different 
depending on our mood.12 
                                                 
11 In “Paths of Coherence through Emerson’s Philosophy: The Case of ‘Nominalist and Realist’,” Russell B. 
Goodman notes that “‘Succession’ means that we find ourselves in a temporal world, where nothing lasts. ‘Surface’ 
means that we live far from the center of things, that we slide from one thing to another without grasping or 
absorbing them” (54). 
12 For a more complete interpretation of Emersonian moods, see Cavell’s Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes where 
he discusses an “epistemology of moods.” Drawing on Cavell’s work, Branka Arsić offers a reading of Emersonian 
moods as they pertain to the essay “Intellect” in “Brain Walks: Emerson on Thinking” from The Other Emerson. 
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These essays leave the reader with an overwhelming sense of confusion because subjects 
are made from and out of objects which they understand only via relation, because the qualities 
that make us both persons and constituent parts of the universe limit the possibility for an 
original relation, and because Emerson himself glosses over this impossibility by emphasizing a 
process towards this relation rather than the relation itself. One wonders not how to attain the 
original relation, but why bother orienting one’s self toward the universe in the first place? Why 
would one want to dissolve back into the universe? And why would the universe require such a 
dissolution of what it initially attributed to the individual?  
Resting easy within the containment of the physical body and the personality—playing 
amid the surfaces— is far simpler than trying to move beyond those confines towards something 
or someone that is always just beyond our grasp. Critics like Joel Porte argue that “it was not so 
much a solution” for which Emerson was searching, “but rather a clear awareness of the 
difficulty” of living a successive life that works towards the futile goal of achieving an original 
relation to the universe (43). By living life successively, a person will no doubt encounter and 
experience the difficulty of living; for Porte, Emerson’s interest lies not in solving the challenges 
of everyday life, but to recognize and accept those challenges as working towards a larger 
purpose. This notion indicates that one must acquire a process over product mindset when going 
about the business of life. Russell B. Goodman contends that Emerson’s emphasis on process 
rather than product is a “dedication to the ‘newness’ of the present moment,” is “essential for our 
moral development,” as it provides a “transition to new and better virtues,” even if it only gives 
us glimpses of an original relation rather than a “steady vision of things” (41-2).  Ideally 
engaging in the process of orientation, allowing for disorientation rather than stability, is better 
than the product of achieving orientation because the person grows, develops—morally for 
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Goodman and closer to transcendence for Porte—and gets closer to a life beyond the limits of 
personhood. Every step in the process of living an active life moves the person toward original 
relation by allowing the object to flow more fully through the person and expanding his or her 
limits.   
Glimpses of original relation, while they provide hope and motivation to keep engaging 
in the process articulated in “Circles,” are unsatisfying to the person promised the relationship in 
Nature and “Self-Reliance.”  By the time Emerson writes “Experience,” even he appears to find 
mere glimpses of an original relation wearisome. The lack of permanence and life’s constant flux 
that result in limitlessness as well as the individual’s particular limitations—failure to get at the 
“the real” or unite the physical person in order to reach the combination of the Soul and 
Nature—cause him to begin the essay by asking “Where do we find ourselves?” (471). He 
answers: “In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and believe that it has none” (471). 
We find ourselves in the middle of a successive life. Emerson likens this experience to being on 
a never-ending staircase: we can ascend and keep moving up toward something which is 
unknowable to us because it is always out of sight. As long as we are climbing, or trying to 
orient ourselves towards the original relation we seek, we are living. Although this process is 
exhausting, knowing the extremes of the series in which we live, much like the dissolution for 
which we are striving, implies an end, and a death of the self. For once one reaches the end of the 
staircase, there is nothing left for which to search: subjects escape their corporeal and personal 
limitations and flow wholly into the object. 
2.2 The Impersonal and Manifestations of the “Not Me”  
  Though extinguishing the self in order to achieve an original relation to the universe is 
troubling enough, Emerson’s obliquity poses two primary challenges for the individual who 
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attempts to locate such a relation. The first of these challenges has to do with the limits imposed 
by personhood and how one can expand the parameters of those limitations in order to move 
forward, as on the ascending staircase that opens “Experience.” The early essays, even an essay 
like “Self-Reliance” that seems to celebrate the individual, find fault with an individual’s 
inability to simultaneously embody and enact the totality of Nature and the Soul. While 
paradoxical because Emerson also claims that both stem from the same original source—the 
universe—Emerson’s promotion of an original relation to the universe seems to favor what 
Sharon Cameron has famously termed the “impersonal” rather than the particularity of the 
individual.13 In her reading of Emerson’s “Nominalist and Realist,” Cameron observes that “the 
essay equivocates between belief in individuals and disbelief in them [. . .] seeing this 
equivocation as a matter of shifting moods. But in the end Emerson’s point of view is 
unambiguous, in favor of acknowledging what [. . .] he names the ‘catholic sense,’ the ‘larger 
generalizations’ in effect the impersonal, called by him ‘the Over-Soul’” (4). Emerson’s 
preference for the catholic is “unambiguous” precisely because of the limitations that the 
particular or the personal imposes on a person and because for a person to wholly escape these 
limitations means to cancel out entirely the particular that defines the person.  
 It is important to note here the differences between Cameron’s use of a term like “the 
Over-Soul” and my own. Cameron uses the “impersonal” synonymously with “the Over-Soul” 
while I am equating most Emersonian references to a catholic entity that exists outside of a 
particular subject standing in relation to it. For example, because of Emerson’s often opaque 
definitions, I use Nature, soul, universe, “the Over-Soul,” and even God as synonyms for the 
                                                 
13 I am primarily drawing on Cameron’s explanation of this term from “The Way of Life by Abandonment: 
Emerson’s Impersonal” originally published in Critical Inquiry, 25.1 (1998): 1-31 and reprinted in The Other 
Emerson. All citations from this article are from the reprinted version that appears in The Other Emerson.  
39 
 
centrifugal force underlying his call for “an original relation to the universe.” Though similar in 
concept, my use of the impersonal, by encompassing all of Emerson’s terms for a larger 
governing force outside of a subject, attempts to remove the religious connotations that critics 
sometimes ascribe to these terms. Despite these differences, I would like to borrow Cameron’s 
term “impersonal” to describe the thing to which Emerson hopes we will form an original 
relation. The term is useful because it establishes clear demarcations between what constitutes 
the subjects and objects in question, whereas Emerson’s own terminology depends upon a lack 
of demarcation. This differentiation is vital to understanding the inherent problems of an original 
relation to the universe for the seeker of such a relation as well as the consequences that 
accompany this relationship.  
 Impersonality is, for Cameron, “the antidote for the egotistical, the subjective, the 
solipsistic.” She values the concept, “specifically because it refutes the idea that the mind is 
one’s ‘property,’ that one’s relation to being is that of ownership on the one hand, and separate 
identity on the other. From the perspective of truth Emerson advocates [. . .] subjectivity and 
egotism are delusions about personal identity” (4). The identity the subject claims to possess—
constructed by emotions, experience, personality, desires, individual actions, or the things that 
make a person particular from other persons—does not belong, or at least solely belong, to that 
subject. Cameron contends that “the private will is over-powered by a force”—the impersonal—
“that inhabits all” and renders ownership nonsensical so that it is “a mistake to call a talent, an 
idea, an achievement, or even a heart (and therefore a body) one’s own, as it is a mistake to 
entertain the more abstract idea that persons have discrete identities” (4). When Emerson says in 
“The Over-Soul” that “we do not yet possess ourselves,” he means that we cannot possess 
ourselves first because individual self-possession is not possible, and second that the notion that 
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one can be in possession of him- or herself is a construct generated to help persons to participate 
in the world (391).  
 Using the passage from “The Over-Soul” that says “the soul in man is not an organ, but 
animates and exercises all organs” Cameron observes that Emerson’s impersonal “makes itself 
manifest through particular persons, who act as its conduit” (“The Over-Soul” 387, Cameron 9). 
She says it is not “an entity, nor is it a property” though it may be called a “manifestation, even 
always a particular,” though not always the same, “manifestation” (9). The impersonal then is 
not “embodied” by the physical and particular person, but rather “becomes embodied” through 
“organs,” “functions,” and “faculties” so that it “inhabits, vivifies, or traverses the mind, the will, 
the heart, but it is not the mind, the will, or the heart” because each of those limits the power of 
the impersonal just as they limit the power of the particular person (10). Instead, the impersonal 
manifests itself “through recognizable particularities—through actions, emotions, properties, on 
through what is actual and even at times visible” in order to make “being palpable” (10). Our 
physical selves and all that comprises the “Not Me” in Nature then become the components in a 
mechanism through which the impersonal can manifest itself in order to demonstrate its power. 
In Cameron’s context, the impersonal manifests itself through particular persons which in turn 
makes it recognizable and explains Emerson’s claim in “The Over-Soul” that though we do not 
possess ourselves, we do know that we “are much more” (391). This process of manifestation 
likewise makes being a particular person possible even if that person mistakes the characteristics 
of being as his or her own. And because the impersonal requires a manifestation, and a particular 
manifestation, it then becomes possible to have multiple persons, who all have unique identities, 
wills, desires, etc. which distinguish them from one another and from the impersonal. 
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 Cameron’s conceptions of the “the Over-soul” provide more concrete borders for what 
constitutes the subject and the object in the original relationship to the universe without 
discounting the fluidity between the two that is fundamental to Emerson’s explication of this 
relation. The notion of the impersonal, rather than the ambiguity found in Emerson’s terms like 
unity, Nature, Soul, the Eternal One, the Over-soul, and God, more clearly articulates the ways in 
which this larger force can create, occupy, and be occupied by the physical person who hopes to 
dissolve back into it. More importantly, this conceptualization helps to better define the person’s 
inability to achieve such a dissolution because though the impersonal “is associated with the 
individual” that individual can have “no proprietary relation to it” (10). The greatest limitation of 
particular persons, for both Emerson and Cameron, is the mind’s tendency to “falsely identify” 
the powers of the impersonal “that inhabit it” (10). She argues, 
  The mistake lies in associating the Over-Soul with the self and particularly with  
  the voluntary self. It is associated with the person, but not as his property and not  
  through his will [. . .] These activities misrepresent the person not because they  
  are palpable [. . .] but rather because they are limited. In pointing to something  
  other than the experiential world of the fragmentary […]. Emerson is not 
  mystically gesturing to an alien nature that he domesticates, converting the not-me  
  into something with recognizable contours. The Over-Soul always remains other, 
while all the time being all-accessible. In fact it is precisely the point that we 
cannot relinquish our difference from it. [. . .] It is a matter of not-willing, of 
seeing what we are when the will stops executing its claims. [. . .] In seeing one’s 
true alliance is not with will or desire, not with anything piecemeal, but rather 
with the totality, the personal becomes the impersonal. [. . .] Thus in acceding to 
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the impersonal, one is beyond emotions, beyond the idea that identity is fixed. 
(10-11) 
In other words, the greatest mistake made by the person who embodies a manifestation of the 
impersonal as personal or particular—Emerson’s “Not Me” and the corporeal and mental 
limitations inherent within it—is to attribute and then to claim possession of these features as its 
own, independent creation. The mistake is for the subject to claim to possess or have control over 
its identity, which makes it possible for one to identify as a subject in the first place. Instead, 
though always “other” than the impersonal, the particular person is part of that larger and total 
whole. It is not that the impersonal evades the particular for Cameron, or for Emerson for that 
matter, but rather that the particular person prevents his or her own access to original relation by 
maintaining a proprietary claim on the self and its identity. For both Cameron and Emerson, 
acquiring access to the impersonal means to de-possess ourselves of our own subjectivity, which 
means to relinquish the knowledge of ourselves as selves and to sacrifice the will that governs 
that self. To recognize and know the impersonal seems to imply that we must not only relinquish 
the idea that our identities are our own, but also that identity belongs in a system of life that 
requires a fixed notion of ourselves and our lives.   
 So while the impersonal may be all-accessible precisely because it is “other” than the 
person and because it exists outside of and beyond the systemization that the person deems a 
requirement to live in the world, the particular person cannot acquire access because it is 
contained in what Cameron as well as other critics like Cavell and George Kateb refer to as the 
“social” system of life (Cameron 11). Within this system, to be a person means to have 
possession and control over one’s particularity or fixed identity and to exercise that particularity 
through desire, will, and motivation in order to participate actively within that system. In order 
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for a person to participate in the social world that comprises life, the person must have a 
particular identity thus allowing them to find a place within that system. To escape the system in 
order to come into the possession of the original relation (thus dissolving into the impersonal) 
means to relinquish one’s particularity and personality. That relinquishment comes with 
consequences: it also means that the person must give up its position within the social and stop 
participating in that system, which in turn means to stop “being” within the system of life. To 
knowingly give up the possession of one’s identity then means to cease to know oneself as a self. 
This logic causes one to wonder what happens to persons in the world when they stop being and 
acting as particular selves?  
2.3 Suffering Subjects and Double Consciousness 
 Because the subject’s greatest limitation in accessing the impersonal or arriving at the 
original relation that Emerson calls for in Nature is the very thing that allows us to desire and 
strive toward that relationship in the first place, what emerges is not a problem of access or 
attainment, but rather one of consciousness. The problem of how to attain an original relationship 
shifts into a problem of consciousness particularly in later essays such as “Nominalist and 
Realist,” “Fate,” and “Illusions.” More specifically, what emerges as a problem of consciousness 
in these essays is a problem with what I argue is the subject’s ability to know itself in two ways 
simultaneously: first as a particular person with a distinct identity who must participate in the 
social system of life in order to exist, and second as an entity that belongs to and of a larger and 
impersonal whole. In my readings of these essays, I call this a problem of double consciousness 
and demonstrate that it is a problem that for Emerson, and the other American authors who 
follow him, has no resolution but instead only painful and often fatal consequences for its 
subject. 
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 Cameron, for instance, argues that the impersonal can be understood in three ways. First, 
“it is something that appears through bodies (as visible in the eyes) as a critique of the personal.” 
Second, it manifests through “moods and mental states—the very moods that we might suppose 
to define our individual persons, but when scrutinized in Emerson’s representations rather 
contradict the idea of the personal (though not necessarily the idea of the individual, since one 
could be individuated by mental states that were not properly one’s own).” And third, “the 
impersonal is associated not with the body and not with the affective life of the mind but rather 
with a law [. . .] to which the ‘self’ adheres, disregarding as it were the conditions of body and 
mind” (14-15). Examining the second understanding in particular, Cameron notes “that in an 
essay like ‘Nominalist and Realist’ the impersonal calls into question the very self as a stable or 
predictable entity, for the moods that define our perceptions, beliefs, and thoughts are in effect 
only contingent on circumstance” (14). Because the impersonal uses mental states and moods to 
embody itself through the person, the person is governed through the moods and mental states of 
the impersonal. The physical body and the consciousness assigned to that body react, or rather 
live as a particular person within the system of life, according to the governance of the 
impersonal which controls it even if this iteration of the self thinks or believes it governs its own 
actions.   
 To understand as well as to accept the existence of the impersonal in this manner disrupts 
traditional conceptions of the subject in addition to how the subject becomes aware of itself. The 
distinction between the subject and the object in the original relation towards which we are all 
striving then becomes a distinction between the impersonal and the particular persons it governs, 
which can be reconfigured as a problem of consciousness. As Cameron points out, Emerson’s 
“Nominalist and Realist” calls into question the stability or fixed nature of particular identity 
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because all persons are subject to the law of the impersonal. Challenging the human or personal 
idea that an individual controls his own life through moods, emotions, and desires reveals that 
the stakes for Emerson’s original relation to the universe have more to do with how we know and 
understand that universe as particulars than how we actually form the relation. The real problem 
in achieving a relationship to the impersonal is an epistemological problem about how we come 
to know and define ourselves. Knowledge, and self-knowledge more importantly, represent the 
“solution in hieroglyphic to those inquires we put” in order to “enjoy an original relation” to the 
universe and to escape our past and current “condition” of life (Nature 7).  
 Emerson opens “Nominalist and Realist” with “I cannot often enough say, that a man is 
only a relative and representative nature. Each is a hint of the truth, but far enough from being 
that truth, which yet he quite newly and inevitably suggests to us” (575). He goes on to say that 
while “man momentarily stands for thought” he “will not bear examination” and that “we have 
such exorbitant eyes, that on seeing the smallest arc, we complete the curve” by filling in the 
blanks—using what our consciousness gives us based on particular and personal experience and 
knowledge (575). Yet, “when the curtain is lifted from the diagram which it seemed to veil, we 
are vexed to find that no more was drawn than just the fragment of the arc which we first beheld” 
(575). On one hand, this is reminiscent of the Emersonian dilemma found in “Experience”:  a 
particular person cannot get at or to the thing it desires even when the person thinks he or she has 
arrived at it. Despite our best attempts, our efforts—because they are based in a subjective and 
thus false reality—to see or to know an object, the world, and even other persons are often 
fictions created by the consciousness contained within the physical person. When a person 
moves successfully forward in order to advance on the arc of life, or to get closer to the object, 
46 
 
he is disappointed to find that what the consciousness projected into the unseen space is non-
existent and that he is not any closer to that object than he was upon first seeing the fragment.  
 Ostensibly, the real problem, however, is that an individual seems to naturally—that is to 
say without foresight or without real effort—fill in the blanks or make determinations based 
upon what they know. The person sees an object and creates its truth based on previous 
experience which has yielded a subjective form of knowing the world and contains the object as 
well as knowledge derived from personal feelings, desires, etc. This knowledge though is only 
representative: it represents the individual person on one hand, and on the other hand, a part of 
the truth it is trying to create and thus know. Yet, in keeping with the logic of the impersonal, the 
individual is doomed to fail because consciousness is unable to do anything more than know the 
fraction or particle of the truth for which the particular body and mind are mere representative 
surfaces.  
 Emerson goes on to argue that “Human life and its persons are poor empirical 
pretensions” and that “We are amphibious creatures, weaponed for two elements, having two 
sets of faculties, the particular and the catholic [. . .] Thus we are very sensible of an atmospheric 
influence in men and in bodies of men, not accounted for in an arithmetical addition of all their 
measurable properties” (577). This description attempts to rectify the problem that follows 
whenever a particular person attributes too much power to his own knowledge and thus becomes 
disappointed when that knowledge fails to meet his expectations or help him to arrive at any sort 
of truth.  The particular individual, for Emerson, is conscious of his person (body, mind, etc.) 
while at the same time sensing (and depending on which Emerson essay one is reading, only able 
to sense at specific and fleeting moments rather than all at once) the power of the impersonal 
contained or residing within him.  
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 Although a particular person may at moments have an awareness of his dual nature—an 
individual and a constituent part of something larger like the impersonal—he can only act and 
know according to the personal even as the personal is controlled and governed by the 
impersonal. Emerson still believes that despite this debilitating limitation, persons can still “burst 
into universal power” that “life will be simpler when we live at the centre, and flout the surfaces” 
(580).  To live at the centre is to accept and simultaneously know and act as both an 
individualized person and a mere facet of the impersonal. This dual knowledge, however, 
presents the impossible challenge of relieving the self of the burden of self-hood: that is to say 
the individual must acknowledge that its particularity is not its own but a byproduct of something 
much larger. To do this proves difficult for any individual because, according to Emerson’s own 
logic, the person must disavow the notion that he has any control or possession of his own 
consciousness. For a person to do this is to rid himself of the very thing that he knows himself to 
be and that provides him with a position and function in the world.  
 In “Nominalist and Realist,” Emerson goes on to say that he wishes to speak “with all 
respect of persons” but that “they melt so fast into each other, that they are like grass and trees, 
and it needs an effort to treat them as individuals” and that as a result “he must pinch” himself to 
“keep awake” (580). Not only do particulars tend to bore Emerson in this essay, he also cannot 
keep up with their particularity because they all eventually, and here quite rapidly, dissolve back 
into the universe for which they are already apart. “Nature will not be Buddhist,” he argues, “she 
resents generalizing, and insults the philosopher in every moment with a million fresh 
particulars” and that persons may be “one thing,” but that “nature is one thing and the other 
thing, in the same moment” (581). Nature will “not remain orbed in” any one particular person’s 
thought, but “rushes into persons; and when each person inflamed to a fury of personality, would 
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conquer all things to his poor crotchet, she raises up against him another person, and by many 
persons incarnates again a sort of whole” (581). In other words, the impersonal will destroy or 
devastate the person that ascribes too much power to his own particularity—his corporeal body, 
his personality, his consciousness—by inhabiting or residing within another particular or “Not 
Me.” Yet, if the impersonal here is one thing and the other thing and the impersonal (again in this 
essay) generates the personal, why would the particular not be allowed to know itself as a piece 
of that impersonal and why would the impersonal punish the individual who took ownership and 
control of his or her person as both are part and particle of each other anyway? This essay brings 
us back to the original paradoxes and tensions of the early essays.  
 And again, Emerson offers no real insight except to say “it is not the intention of nature 
that we should live by general views” and that if we were not “the victims of these details” of life 
and “if we saw the real from hour to hour,” we “should have been burned and frozen long ago” 
(581). He continues, 
  If we were not kept among surfaces, everything would be large and universal. [. .  
.] The universality being hindered in its primary form, comes in the secondary 
form of all sides: the points come in succession to the meridian, and by the speed 
of rotation, a new whole is formed. Nature keeps herself whole, and her 
representation complete in the experience of each mind. [. . .] Whatever does not 
concern us, is concealed from us. As soon as a person is no longer related to our 
present well-being, he is concealed, or dies, as we say. Really, all things and 
persons are related to us, but according to our nature, they act on us not at once, 
but in succession. We are made aware of their presence one at a time. (584) 
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This passage, perhaps, most clearly elucidates why the distinction between the particular and the 
impersonal is actually not one of access, but one of consciousness. Because the particular 
individual is not wholly separate from the impersonal, and because the partiality or particularity 
of the person is also necessary to and for the power and existence of the impersonal, the totality 
of the impersonal cannot not be fully known by its constituent parts—the personal cannot 
comprehend the “real” or the “truth,” it cannot do more than be a mere representation because of 
the already confounding relation between the two. Yet, persons tend to think of this 
representation as complete. Our consciousness, then, because of the power of the impersonal, 
becomes limited to what it can know and experience in the physical world rather than what may 
be possible outside of that world and its own physical person. The impersonal must be composed 
of many parts who only know their partiality rather than their contribution to the whole. 
According to this logic, the individual believes he knows and possesses himself as a type of 
defense mechanism against the impersonal so that he may function and participate in the system 
of life that the impersonal requires of its particular parts.    
 Emerson confirms this in “Illusions” when he says that “space and time” are simple 
forms of thought and the “material world is hypothetical and withal our pretension of property 
and even of self-hood” fades because “even our thoughts are not finalities” (947). In this essay, 
penetrating “the law of our shifting moods” is inconsequential because the moods we feel and 
the personality we claim “differ as all or nothing” and are merely an “eggshell which coops us 
in” (947). Emerson goes on to say that “the illusion of time” allows the that the “world exist[s] 
from thought” but that “thought is daunted in the presence of the world” because “what seems 
the succession of thought is only the distribution of wholes into causal series” (946). The 
consciousness “sees that every atom carries the whole of Nature; that the mind opens to 
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omnipotence; that, in the endless striving and ascents, the metamorphosis is entire, so that the 
soul doth not know itself in its own act” (946). Thought, time, and personality are all constructs 
that require forward motion—successive living—despite the fact that this forward motion 
ultimately keeps the particular person from whole or full knowledge of the impersonal as well as 
the self. One’s person or “self-hood” is continuously, to use Emerson’s terminology, fading as 
the eggshell grows old and begins to crack. The limitations of the person shift and transition with 
the succession of life and as a result are confined by new ways of knowing. What we believe and 
what we think of as final or complete is not, but rather in a transitional state that keeps the 
impersonal in motion; and though this transition moves us forward, it does not allow for 
complete knowledge of the self or of the impersonal because time is an illusion and anything not 
necessary to us suffers concealment.  
 Consequently, the impersonal protects the person by prohibiting one’s ability to possess 
knowledge of the “centre of things.” Instead, the individual flouts about surfaces of personality 
in order to serve its purpose in the composition of the impersonal. While fleeting moments may 
bring a sense of something more as in “Experience,” to fully know and understand the whole 
would destroy the person. If all the parts of the whole are non-existent, so too is the whole. The 
impersonal, like one’s original relation to the universe, must be revealed gradually and in small 
moments. But this too, as the passage above demonstrates, has troubling consequences for the 
person. These consequences appear in the form of concealment—concealment of other persons 
and objects that are not necessary to the individual in his or her current state of being.  The fact 
that these other particularities are concealed does not mean they no longer exist or are no longer 
necessary to the impersonal or even to particular persons, but they are no longer temporally 
necessary to particular personalities that make up the impersonal. Moreover, because life is lived 
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successively—as in “Experience” when we try to move upward on the never-ending staircase—
when the other personalities are concealed for the benefit of a particular person to participate in 
the various systems of life, concealment may feel like or imply a type of death to the personal. 
This concealment can feel like death for the loss of the personal that moves in and out of a 
particular individual’s life, but more importantly the particular individual affected by this 
movement of other persons and objects must adapt to the changes. This adaptation requires a 
shift in perspective and in how one knows and understands the world, relationships, etc. As one 
shifts one’s thinking to reflect his current state of existence, this shift in thought requires a 
corresponding shift in consciousness. To know oneself differently is to know oneself in a new 
way and thus requires the letting go of previous knowledge of the self and its way of living in the 
world to reposition oneself in his existing state. Concealment renders concurrent states of 
knowledge of the self—as it previously and currently exists—impossible. Likewise, to live life 
successively means that a repositioning, perhaps even repurposing of the self must occur: that is 
to experience the impersonal in its “secondary form” and to feel its power from a new and 
different side in an effort to ultimately reach the center or the “primary state” of being. The 
consequences also produce a figurative death for the person—to move forward and to accept 
concealment of other persons and objects not necessary to the present and thus to know the self 
differently is to devastate previous versions of that self that are no longer necessary or relevant. 
It could even be argued that the impersonal possesses, destroys, and then repossesses the 
particular person and imbues him or her with new motivations, feelings, and knowledge.  
 The ideas inherent in this passage from “Nominalist and Realist” suggest that though we 
enjoy a limited capacity to know the impersonal and that those limitations are not prohibitive but 
rather vital to both particular persons and to the impersonal exposes a fundamental problem of 
52 
 
consciousness. The essay argues that “If we cannot make voluntary and conscious steps in the 
admirable science of universals, let us see the parts wisely, and infer the genius of nature from 
the best particulars with a becoming charity” (585). Emerson concludes that “the end and the 
means, the gamester and the game, --life is made up of the intermixture and reaction of these to 
amicable powers, whose marriage appears beforehand monstrous, as each denies and tends to 
abolish the other. We must reconcile the contradictions as we can, but their discord and concord 
introduce wild absurdities in our thinking and speech” (585). While Emerson may describe these 
two experiences of consciousness as “amicable,” he also recognizes the inconsistencies and 
contradictions caused by an impersonal that gives consciousness only to limit that 
consciousness’s ability to wholly and concurrently know itself as subject as well as every other 
thing within that subject’s world. So while an individual is “justified in his individuality” 
because of these limitations, he is so because he is working out in a “disguise” the “universal 
problem” assigned to him by the universe. (586).  
 Since the impersonal rushes into persons on all sides successively rather than all at once, 
the “Not Me” and all that it contains—consciousness, corporeality, etc.—is erratic and evolving 
rather than stable and fixed. In “Illusions” Emerson says, “In this kingdom of illusions we grope 
eagerly for stays and foundations. There is none”; instead, “we transcend the circumstance 
continually” and that particular lives are “identical” and differ only in our “manipulations [. . .] 
or in our thoughts” (949). Emerson makes this point again in “Fate” when he says, “In different 
hours, a man represents each of several of his ancestors, as if there were seven or eight of us 
rolled up in each man’s skin [. . .] and they constitute the variety of notes for that new piece of 
music which his life is” (773). The features said to compromise a person are not identical and 
unique to the self nor are they fixed to a particular self—all persons, because they are possessed 
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and inhabited by the impersonal, are the same and only differ in how they enact the 
consciousness that the impersonal provides. Identity then has the ability to alter several times in 
the course of a lifetime as a person attempts to move successively towards the impersonal until 
the person dissolves completely into the original relation. I think, however, that “Nominalist and 
Realist” and “Illusions” suggest that individuals are subjected to moments of overlap in which 
they are aware not only that “they are so much more” as Emerson says in “The Over-Soul,” but 
that they perceive and recognize themselves as the impersonal enacts concealment and 
succession.  
 These moments of overlap are what I am calling double consciousness, and I am using 
the term to refer specifically to a person’s ability to know themselves simultaneously in two 
ways. As the idea of double consciousness emerges in Emerson’s later essays, it is important to 
note that for him it seems to be an ideological problem that prevents a person’s access to an 
original relation. However, I argue that by articulating the problems of an individual person 
trying to know himself in two ways in one world, despite the fluidity of that world, what 
Emerson conceptualizes is actually a condition that individuals suffer as they participate in life 
while attempting to achieve an original relation to the universe or a full and comprehensive 
knowledge of the self.  
 Emerson’s writing often tends to posit dual modes of knowing; his ideas about both the 
individual and the impersonal often appear as binary oppositions that simultaneously depend 
upon and antagonize one another. He does, however, specifically employ the term double-
consciousness twice in his writing. In his 1842 lecture “The Transcendentalist,” he attempts to 
define the differences between what he calls “Materialists and Idealists.” He says that 
“Materialists” believe in “experience” and think “from the senses” while “Idealists” rely on 
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“consciousness” and “perceive that the senses are not final” but rather give us “representations of 
things” despite being unable to really know what the things themselves are (193). Though these 
features differentiate the two, Emerson concludes that “every materialist will be an idealist; but 
an idealist can never go backward to be a materialist” (193). The idealist can never go backwards 
for two reasons. First, we must live a life of succession as previously discussed; second, once the 
materialist becomes an idealist he has escaped the confines of the “Not Me,” which includes the 
consciousness that allowed him to attribute meaning to his sensory experience. Emerson says of 
the idealist that “His thought,--that is the Universe. His experience inclines him to behold the 
procession of facts you call the world, as flowing perpetually outward from an invisible, 
unsounded centre in himself, centre alike of him and of them, and necessitating him to regard all 
things as having a subjective or relative existence, relative to the aforesaid Unknown Centre of 
him” (195). This passage suggests that the idealist cannot go backwards to the thinking of a 
materialist because he has already sacrificed his consciousness of the personal in order to find 
what is here called the “Unknown Centre.” By sacrificing individual consciousness, the 
materialist dissipates and no longer exists for the idealist.  
 Emerson goes on to advocate “patience” for the materialist, because though this 
individual knows the world through what he senses, he also implies that the materialist senses 
something beyond sensory experience is possible. This sense results in what he calls double 
consciousness. At the end of the essay, he says, “These two stages of thought diverge in every 
moment and stand in wild contrast”—the thinking of the materialist and that of the idealist—and 
the “worst feature of this double consciousness is, that the two lives, of the understanding and of 
the soul, which we lead, really show very little relation to each other, never meet and measure 
each other: one prevails now, all buzz and din; and the other prevails then, all infinitude and 
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paradise; and, with the progress of life, the two discover no greater disposition to reconcile 
themselves” (205-06).  
 Emerson’s optimism, typical of much of his early writing, appears in “The 
Transcendentalist” despite his acknowledgement that recognizing or knowing oneself in two 
ways is irreconcilable. One cannot know oneself as both a materialist and an idealist 
simultaneously, in other words, though one will occupy each position at different points in life. 
This essay and these particular passages are noteworthy not only because they include Emerson’s 
first uses of the term double consciousness, but also because “The Transcendentalist” starts to 
define the problem of relation between subject and object and explore questions about our 
orientation towards the universe in terms of consciousness. Emerson compartmentalizes 
individual consciousness into two distinct ways of knowing and existing in the world. The 
individual can and must know the world through experience as a materialist, but that experience 
is limited and “subjective” so that each person will know the world differently.  
 Though the terms “Idealist” and “Materialist” take other forms, the emergence of 
knowing the self in two ways can be seen throughout Emerson’s writing. However, Emerson 
again uses the term double consciousness in the 1860 essay “Fate.” In contemplating “How shall 
I live?” Emerson writes, “One key, one solution to the mysteries of the human condition, one 
solution to the old knots of fate, freedom, and foreknowledge, exists, the propounding, namely, 
of the double consciousness. A man must ride alternately on the horses of his private and public 
nature” (769, 792). As in “The Transcendentalist” an individual’s capacity to know the world is 
dualistic, if not pluralistic, so that a person must alternate between what here appears as the 
public and the private self. We cannot simultaneously be both our public and private selves, 
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which is to say we cannot know ourselves as public and private entities at the same time—and 
must alternate between the two accordingly. 
 These two iterations of double consciousness simplify the problems of consciousness that 
I have been working to articulate; however, they also help to establish the variety of binary 
oppositions that Emerson uses throughout his writing as a trope for human consciousness and in 
its ability to reconcile multiple versions of self-knowledge. This trope, at its core, is a mimetic 
representation of the difficulties of trying to attain an original relation to the universe if one is 
composed of and by that universe. The limitations imposed on human consciousness prevent a 
true state of double consciousness whereby an individual knows himself in two ways at once 
(regardless of what form that knowledge may take: public self vs. private self; past self vs. 
present self; Idealist vs. Materialist; Nominalist vs. Realist; etc.). For one to achieve double 
consciousness, he or she would reach the center of the whole and see him- or herself as part and 
particle of the impersonal. The individual would see the impersonal as both creator and creation 
and as such would dissolve into the totality or wholeness of that knowledge: the person would 
cease to exist as his particularity would transcend the confinement of existence within the 
physical body of the person and the physical world.  Put more simply, to attain a state of double-
consciousness, requires a sacrifice of particularity and personality and thus a cessation of life in 
the corporeal world. To know the impersonal in its wholeness means to no longer require the 
“disguise” of particularity.  
 Emerson expresses the dilemma of double consciousness most eloquently in “Fate.” 
Early in the essay, he notes that the individual comes “upon immoveable limitations” which are 
the restraints imposed on the personal (769). He says, “the population of the world is a 
conditional population, not the best, but the best that could live now” and that “Man is the arch 
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machine, of which all these shifts drawn from himself are toy models. He helps himself on each 
emergency by copying or duplicating his own structure, just so far as the need is” (775-76). 
Nature, or the impersonal, on the other hand “does not cosset of pamper us” and does not “mind 
drowning a man or a woman” (773). The impersonal is the “immoveable limitation” which keeps 
the individual as a representation and conditional to his times. However, for Emerson “a man’s 
power is hooped in by necessity, which, by many experiments, he touches on every side, until he 
learns its arc” (778). Fate, or nature, in this essay is the circumstance of life that a person cannot 
escape and cannot reconcile despite his attempts to see and to know the arc as in “Nominalist and 
Realist.” 
 Yet, Emerson says that the limitations of the person “refine as the soul purifies” which 
implies that as the person lives and participates as a particularity in the system of life, the 
limitations though still present, become less “brute and barbarous” and bring us closer to a union 
with the impersonal (778). The individual person, despite being composed from and of the 
impersonal, thus serves to “antagonize Fate” with power as he chooses to live life in succession. 
To live as oneself, to live the disguise of personality at the will of the impersonal, is also to 
weaken the constraints of that same particularity. Emerson goes on to argue that “nobody was 
ever cunning enough to find the two ends” of the “knot of nature” (787). When the “knots” that 
bind the person begin to loosen, the person gains the possibility of orienting him- or herself 
towards the original relation. Emerson contends that “If Fate follows and limits power, power 
attends and antagonizes Fate” by “a dragging together of the poles of the Universe” (779). 
Converted into a problem of consciousness, as an individual lives and sheds versions of himself 
that are no longer necessary, the distance between himself as a particle that composes the 
impersonal grows smaller—he gets closer to knowing himself as a constituent part of the whole 
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that also differentiated him from it in the first place. Power—to live—is the path towards double 
consciousness even if double consciousness cannot be wholly accessed as long as one still only 
identifies himself as particular person.   
 Rather, man must “confront fate with fate” so that “our atoms,” or personalities, “are as 
savage in resistance” (780). By acting out or possessing our particularity, even though that 
particularity is not created by us, is “The revelation of Thought” that can take “man out of 
servitude into freedom” so that “We rightly say of ourselves, we were born, and afterward we 
were born again, and many times” (781). Thinking, knowing, and being in a world that is not 
concealed from us draws us closer to a complete or full knowledge “so important, that the new 
forgets the old” in order for the “inward eye” to open “to the Unity in things” so that “It is not in 
us so much as we are in it” (781). “Successive experiences” then allow the individual person the 
opportunity to shed outdated forms of self-knowledge and to harness new power in order to 
continue to exist as a particular within the system of the impersonal.  
 Emerson says that “relation and connection are not somewhere and sometimes, but 
everywhere and always” so that the impersonal is nothing more than a “name for facts not yet 
passed under the fire of thought;--for causes which are unpenetrated” (784).  Even when 
concealed and unknowable to the person, the particular still maintains a connection and relation 
to the impersonal. The problem here, however, in terms of consciousness and self-consciousness 
is that despite our advancement in transcending the polarity and disparity between the particular 
and the impersonal, particular persons, no matter how refined or fractured their limitations are or 
how much power they harness through new modes of knowledge necessary for specific temporal 
moments in their life, cannot unite these polarities and still maintain the dichotomy necessitated 
for this connection or relation. Emerson argues,  
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Fate involves the melioration. No statement of the Universe can have any soundness, 
which does not admit its ascending effort. The direction of the whole, and of the parts, is 
toward benefit, and in proportion to health. Behind every individual closes organization [. 
. .] Liberation of the will from the sheaths and clogs of organization which he has 
outgrown, is the end and aim of this world. (786) 
To be free of the confinement of selfhood, as previously stated, is the end goal of all particular 
persons. Liberation from all thoughts and thus consciousness and the power Emerson advocates 
in “Fate” becomes the reason to live life in succession. The challenge, however, as Emerson 
notes in earlier essays but specifically emphasizes in “Fate” is the idea that this liberation can 
happen concurrently with the experience of personhood. Although Emerson notes that there is no 
point where a person cannot find a thread or connection between fate sliding into freedom and 
freedom sliding into fate because “Nature is intricate, overlapped, interweaved, and endless,” he 
also notes in “Fate” as well as in his other work that the eye cannot fully open wide enough to 
recognize and thus know this connection (787). The personal in its false possession of will and 
knowledge functions in a type of “long sleep” over the course of a lifetime and does not awake 
until what characterizes the individuated person disappears completely (787). There is no co-
existence or co-knowledge (despite the fact that the particular person acts as a container for the 
impersonal) of the particular and the impersonal. There are only moments of transition that 
initiate the process of double consciousness, even though full double consciousness cannot be 
fully realized.  
 Emerson states that “Every solid in the universe is ready to become fluid on the approach 
of the mind, and the power to flux it is the measure of the mind. If the wall remain adamant, it 
accuses the want of thought” (790). Ironically enough, consciousness and knowledge, part of 
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what distinguishes particular persons from the impersonal and therefore keeps the person from 
wholly actualizing knowledge of the impersonal, is the one tool an individual has to eventually 
realize the connection between himself and this centrifugal force. When one does not allow 
himself fluidity in his thought and action, when he does not allow his person to adapt to what the 
universe reveals or conceals at a given moment, when he ascribes too much possession to his 
person, he prohibits forward motion in order to gain access to the impersonal: he remains static 
and fixed within the system of life. And this, for Emerson, is tragic in spite of the fact that to 
move forward means to break the barriers established by the impersonal simply for the 
impersonal to destroy the person. Emerson concludes “Fate” by affirming the impossibility of a 
reconciliation or amelioration between the personal and the impersonal, the subject and the 
object, while an individual is alive and conscious. Yet, he trivializes the destruction of the 
personal because man is “to rally on his relation to the Universe, which his ruin benefits” and 
eventually leaving the “dæmon who suffers” (personality) is to “take sides with the Deity who 
secures universal benefit” from his loss (793). Persons should “build altars to the Blessed Unity,” 
he argues, “which holds nature and souls in perfect solution, and compels every atom to serve an 
universal end” (793).  
 Though now put in different terms, “Fate” articulates the nuances of the tensions 
produced by Emerson’s call for an original relation to the universe in Nature. These tensions are 
largely relegated to a person’s ability to know the self as concurrent subject and object. To 
possess this knowledge would be to achieve a state of double consciousness, which according to 
Emerson’s own logic is an impossibility so long as the subject retains possession of the self as a 
subject that differs from other persons as well as the universe. In simpler terms, dual 
consciousness, though a state each particular person tries to achieve throughout life, comes with 
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the expectation that the individual person must sacrifice consciousness and the particular identity 
that he or she has come to possess in order to participate in life. Double consciousness thus 
mandates the destruction of the person; and for Emerson this is all for the benefit of the larger, 
impersonal whole.  
 Two problems arise from this line of thinking. First, because identity is not stable and 
fixed, but remains in a constant state of flux that moves with the impersonal’s concealment of 
other persons as well as objects, those who aspire to double consciousness must sacrifice how 
they know and identify themselves several times over. On one hand, this sacrifice of the self 
benefits not only the impersonal, but also the person as he or she gets closer to the state of double 
consciousness and achieves an original relation to the universe. On the other hand, to reconstruct 
knowledge of one’s self over and over again means to dismiss and destroy versions of one’s 
identity. The ideological benefits of this process may seem to outweigh any consequences, but 
for an actual person experiencing and participating in the various systems that organize and 
govern a practical life, this process necessitates continual, vertiginous shifts in identity. This 
fluidity makes functioning in a tangible life impractical. It would require that all of the organized 
systems in a practical world (government, relationships, etc.) recognize and make allowances for 
the fluidity of personhood so that the individual could continually reposition himself within those 
systems without devastating consequences either to the individual or the system. Emerson thus 
requires a type of double consciousness from both the person and the system—both need to 
adjust and recognize change as it occurs. In the real world, where life consists of multitudes of 
particular personalities and often strict governance to maintain order and function, this is 
impractical. Either the individual and/or the system in which it participates will experience 
disruption through this shift. The disruption will then have consequences that directly or 
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indirectly impact the particular person or the other personalities that also participate in that 
system. This sort of successive movement and constant re-knowing of one’s self, though a 
performance of the impersonal’s power and will, never escapes real-world implications. These 
implications are destructive, and sometimes even fatal, to the particular individual who must 
undergo a transformation of the self. As such, living life in succession devastates the 
individual—even as living a successive life also works to protect us from this devastation—and 
thus becomes a condition suffered by individual persons rather than just an ideological goal.  
 Second, not only does the state of being that constantly works toward reinvention of the 
self pose practical consequences in life, the actual state of double consciousness once achieved 
literally requires the loss of consciousness, the physical body, and all of the other distinguishing 
features of the particular. In other words, a person must cease to live in order to have complete or 
full knowledge of the way the impersonal works throughout life: that is, to have an original 
relation or to know the self as both subject and object is to stop being a particular person, is to 
die. The person must fully sacrifice the self in order to dissolve back into the universe. And 
though the impersonal generates new particulars according to Emerson, relinquishing one’s 
personhood seems a counterintuitive goal for consciousness and, for many, an intolerable 
account of what it means to live.  
 Understanding the tensions produced in Emerson’s writing as a problem of consciousness 
and more particularly in terms of a type of double consciousness not only emphasizes the 
consequences such a state of knowing renders to individual personhood, it also helps to 
understand the ways in which other American authors interrogate the logic of relationality 
between a particular person and something like the impersonal. More particularly, in the 
moments of transition, where an individual finds himself as close to double consciousness as he 
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can possibly get, Emily Dickinson, Henry James, and Robert Penn Warren nuance what a 
constant redefinition of self and identity means for the individual as well as the devastating 
effects such a state of being can have on both individual lives and the worlds that they inhabit.  
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3 CHAPTER TWO: “BETWEEN THE FORM OF LIFE AND LIFE”: CONDITIONS 
OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE POETRY OF EMILY DICKINSON 
Emerson’s call for an original relation to the universe was no doubt familiar to Emily 
Dickinson and his influence on her thinking has been examined extensively by scholars.14 
Although Dickinson never explicitly refers to this call or to Emerson himself in her poems, her 
poetry experiments indirectly with the problems Emerson faces in distinguishing between a 
subject and an object in order to achieve what he calls “original relation.” Dickinson posits this 
relationship as one between the human and the natural—or what Emerson would call Nature, the 
Over-Soul, the universe, etc., and what I have termed earlier the impersonal. Determining the 
relationship between Emerson’s subject and object allows Dickinson to make transparent what 
Emerson leaves opaque. Dickinson often stages contacts between human subjects and natural 
objects, in other words, that privilege consciousness even at the expense of Emersonian 
impersonality.  
However, in order to position double consciousness as a condition of human experience, 
Dickinson establishes a metaphor of absorption and containment that demonstrates the 
limitations of human consciousness in a temporal and finite world. This metaphor effectively 
creates a space of unknowability or indeterminacy that looks surprisingly similar to Emerson’s 
conceptualization of double consciousness; in fact, Dickinson, through this indeterminacy, 
                                                 
14 Several critics note Dickinson’s familiarity and sometimes admiration of Emerson’s work. Though Dickinson’s 
reading habits and biography are fascinating, they are beyond the scope of this project. For more on Dickinson’s life 
see Richard B. Sewall’s The Life of Emily Dickinson, Harvard UP, 1972. For more on Dickinson’s connection to 
Emersonian language and thought, see Frank Davidson’s “This Consciousness: Emerson and Dickinson” in The 
Emerson Society Quarterly, 44 (1966): 2-7, Cristanne Miller’s Emily Dickinson: A Poet’s Grammar, Harvard UP, 
1987, and Robert Weisbuch’s Emily Dickinson’s Poetry, U of Chicago P, 1975. For a thorough discussion on 
Dickinson’s familiarity with a philosophy of consciousness, see E. Thomas Finan’s “‘Captivity of Consciousness’: 
Consciousness and its Revisions in Dickinson’s Poetry” from The Emily Dickinson Journal, 24.2 (2015): 24-45. For 
more on Dickinson’s poetry as a reflection of culture and American identity, see “Emily Dickinson and American 
Identity” in Shira Wolosky’s Poetry and Public Discourse in Nineteenth-Century America, Palgrave MacMillian, 
2010, 15-30. 
65 
 
depicts double consciousness as a condition with deleterious consequences for the individual 
who suffers from it. Dickinson’ “poetry of consciousness,” to borrow E. Thomas Finan’s term, 
posits double consciousness not only as a condition that requires suffering through the sacrifice 
of self, but also as an unrelenting sensation experienced throughout one’s life. Because 
Dickinson’s poetry takes the idea of double consciousness and transforms it into a lived 
experience, she is able to experiment with the condition as a way for persons to test their relation 
to the world that exists outside of and beyond physical personhood and particular identity. But 
these tests involve a distinct violence to the person performing them and often emphasize the 
restrictive nature of consciousness.  
3.1 Feeling Consciousness 
Poems such as “I felt a Cleaving in my Mind” (FR 867) and “I felt a Funeral, in my 
Brain” (FR 340) take the Emersonian idea of double consciousness and imagine what it might 
look and feel like for a person actually experiencing it.15 More particularly, these two poems 
demonstrate the pain subjects undergo as they enter into this condition. “I felt a Cleaving in my 
Mind” reads: 
  I felt a Cleaving in my Mind - 
  As if my Brain had split -  
  I tried to match it - Seam by Seam -  
  But could not make them fit –  
 
  The thought behind, I strove to join 
  Unto the thought before -  
  But Sequence ravelled out of Sound -  
  Like Balls - opon a Floor –  
 
                                                 
15 Emily Dickinson, The Poems of Emily Dickinson, ed. R. W. Franklin (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
UP, 1998). All subsequent citations refer to Franklin’s numeration and appear parenthetically as FR.   
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Because we tend to associate the brain and the mind as symbolic of consciousness and our ability 
to think, Dickinson’s speaker demonstrates what the psychological tension characteristic of 
double consciousness feels like as the individual starts to enter into this transitional state. Helen 
Vendler notes that the splitting of the “Brain” occurs because it is forced “to contain more than it 
can bear” (357).  The experience of double consciousness necessitates a splitting, not of the 
physical brain, but of the mind as it requires a repositioning or expansion of the bounds of 
consciousness. In this moment of expansion, Dickinson’s speaker becomes severed, or cleaved, 
from the self. E. Miller Budick argues that this cleaving process achieves “true” meaning of 
selfhood. He states that once this true or complete meaning—knowledge of the self—has been 
reached that “the supposedly analogical halves of the brain can no longer be made to ‘fit’ 
together [. . .] The knowledge that is contained between the halves is not, the narrator discovers, 
a synthesis or a compromise between two separate parts” (234). I would counter that “true 
meaning” cannot be wholly reached so long as the individual is alive, but rather only felt or 
experienced in fleeting moments; yet these moments fracture or split the consciousness. When 
the speaker attempts to seam together the fractured portions of her psyche, she repossess her 
consciousness and returns to a temporal life.  
Once Budick’s moment of “true meaning” vanishes, the individual is left to try to heal or 
repair the fracture such a moment produced. The speaker here cannot “match” the fragments that 
result from the “Cleaving,” that the fragmented consciousness cannot expand to incorporate “true 
meaning” of the self because the self exists in a physical and temporal world: so long as the mind 
is contained by a physical and active brain—essentially the body of the person—piecing together 
the consciousness “Seam by Seam” is impossible. To reach the whole version of self Budick 
finds in this poem would mean that the fractured psyche would match and it would be seamless. 
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The inability to match the fragments, and the remaining seams, like bruises or scars, indicate the 
remnants of a fracture or a dispossession. Once a new version of knowledge is made apparent to 
an individual consciousness, the individual in possession of that consciousness cannot return or 
re-possess wholly the old version of the self as only fragments remain.  
The second stanza makes this clear as the speaker notes that she tries to bind “The 
thought behind” with “the thought before.” In other words, the individual with a fractured mind 
tries to piece together previous versions of the self made available to consciousness with current 
versions but also future versions. Sharon Cameron notes the importance of temporality in the 
poem when she reads the last stanza: “The rupture of temporality depicted as if beginning, 
middle, and end of ‘Sequence’ were a circumstantial rather than integral order, an arrangement 
that cannot be gleaned out of context, suggests so much distrust of the temporal scheme [. . .] that 
we translate its own past into a present or continuous action” (164). This, I think, further 
emphasizes the restrictive and confining nature of human consciousness. Because the individual 
experiencing the transitory state of double consciousness cannot grasp the condition to assimilate 
the particular with the impersonal completely, and because this condition necessitates a 
fracturing of the consciousness that was previously available to the individual, it seems only 
natural that once returned to the temporal world in which we live the now fractured 
consciousness of the person would distrust its temporal and physical confines. To put this 
problem another way: how can one trust conventional self-knowledge after glimpsing the 
possibility of something larger and greater like infinitude or the impersonal, or after becoming 
aware that the same self cannot contain that greater force, but still must experience the pain of 
trying to attain it? The return to temporality and the confines of one’s own particularity, despite 
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the new expanse of the consciousness, only exacerbates the confusing and painful ramifications 
not only of experiencing double consciousness but also of simply being a person.  
The attempts to join past versions of the self with current and potential versions of self 
are not only impossible but also produce anxiety as the simile of “Sequence ravelled out of 
Sound-/Like Balls - opon a Floor - ” suggests. The person’s inability to order versions of 
identity, or what he has perceived as his identity,—past, present, and future—in a sequential 
order prevents the desired totality of knowledge or complete assimilation with the impersonal. 
This inability makes the possibility of full assimilation questionable and requires the particular 
individual to take it on faith that such a relation (or immersion into the infinitude as it appears in 
Dickinson’s poems) is ultimately achievable even if that relation requires the sacrifice of self. In 
other words, once a self regains possession of its consciousness, that consciousness now able to 
contain new and alternate ways of knowing in order to keep participating through the process of 
living cannot perceive, imagine, or experience how past, present, and future versions of the self 
will exist within the expanse of the impersonal. There is a cognitive dissonance between what the 
individual desires and what it knows as itself. Cameron confirms this when she says, “the 
unraveling of ‘Sequence’ is a disaster as inaudible (‘out of Sound’) as ‘Balls –’ of yarn, which 
cannot be heard and therefore cannot be reconstructed” (164). Instead, consciousness, unable to 
recreate past perceptions of self-awareness and identity, is forced to re-define and thus come to 
terms with new forms of self-awareness within the temporal confines of physical life.  
Dickinson laments this sacrifice of self and the return to the temporal after an experience 
of double consciousness in “I felt a Funeral, in my Brain.” The speaker of this poem says, 
  I felt a Funeral, in my Brain, 
  And Mourners to and fro 
  Kept treading - treading - till it seemed 
  That Sense was breaking through 
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  And when they all were seated,  
  A Service, like a Drum - 
  Kept beating - beating - till I thought 
  My mind was going numb - 
 
  And then I heard them lift a Box 
  And creak across my Soul 
  With those same Boots of Lead, again, 
  Then Space - began to toll, 
   
As all the Heavens were a Bell, 
  And Being, but an Ear 
  And I, and Silence, some strange Race, 
  Wrecked, solitary, here  
  And then a Plank in Reason, broke, 
  And I dropped down, and down - 
  And hit a World, at every plunge, 
  And Finished knowing - then - 
 
The “Funeral” in the speaker’s “Brain” signals the moment that the consciousness becomes 
aware of something other than the individual identity it possesses. The funeral then symbolizes  
the experience of double consciousness as this transitory condition necessitates the sacrifice of 
one version of self-knowledge over another: when the confines of human consciousness are 
pushed beyond their existing limitations, the existing consciousness must figuratively die in 
order to make space for new forms of self-knowledge and for the person to continue participating 
in the temporal and physical world. This expansion and re-definition of self is the mourners 
“treading” about until “Sense” breaks through—the particular person is relieved from the 
transitional state of double consciousness and returns to sensory experience and particular 
identity. However, because the speaker has experienced this “Funeral” in the first place, she 
returns to sensory experience and self-awareness differently than before the experience of double 
consciousness occurred. Cameron calls this return to the sensory world “a parallel confusion 
between unconsciousness and death” as the “persistent downward motion of the poem” 
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resembles a burial” of “something in the mind” whereby the self tries to bury or reject what it 
saw while engaged with the condition of double consciousness (97).  
The remainder of the poem explores what happens during an experience of double 
consciousness as the speaker hears the “Service” that sounds “like a Drum” beating until the 
individual’s “mind” goes “numb.” Drum beats are a system of measurement that can be used to 
keep time while the consciousness is disengaged from the speaker’s current self-knowledge. In 
the speaker’s numbness—her separation from the consciousness that she possessed prior to the 
“Funeral”—she can hear the funeral process and sense the gap between the two ways of knowing 
herself; it is within this space that full self-awareness occurs and the confines of the 
consciousness expand so that the speaker becomes conscious of the fact that she is “some strange 
Race” separate from, “wrecked” and “solitary” from the mourners and a self that can exist in the 
temporal sphere. When she occupies the space created by the condition of double consciousness, 
the speaker cannot be contained by her physical body and thus cannot exist in the temporal 
world; thus, she cannot exist as the self she was or in the alternate form she perceives, while in 
this condition. These lines demonstrate the limitations of consciousness to perceive and know the 
self as anything distinct from the person it embodies in the physical world.  
Vendler notes that this process, which I am calling a momentary experience of double 
consciousness, allows Dickinson’s speaker “to name the location of her suffering.” The speaker 
begins “at ‘Brain’ (line 1) and mutated into ‘mind’ (line 8), then ‘Soul’ (line 10), then ‘Being’ 
(line 14), enumerating first a corporeal lodging, then an intellectual one, then a spiritual one, and 
finally a totality including all the others” (143). The suffering Vendler describes is the awareness 
that the individual must return to the temporal world and the physical self because the 
consciousness cannot grasp the totality of selfhood—a full assimilation of the particular identity 
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with the whole of the impersonal. Finan argues that “In Dickinson’s poems, our consignment to 
consciousness also means our fatedness to the possibility of disruption—to reworking and 
reorientation of this consciousness” (41). When the “Plank in Reason” breaks for Dickinson’s 
speaker, she descends back in the “World” to which she previously belonged; and though she 
“finished knowing” the consciousness has not stopped knowing altogether which would imply 
literal death, but that she has “finished knowing” both the totality of selfhood she desires, and 
also her previous sense of selfhood in order to reorient and re-know herself after this experience. 
A particular individual experiences a disruption of self-knowledge through the condition of 
double consciousness and this disruption results in a figurative death as the confines of the 
individual’s consciousness expand so that the self can come to know itself in a new, different, 
and more relational way to its current position in life. Identity is reconfigured from the 
experience of the “Funeral” in the “Brain” and from recognizing that there is space and time that 
exist outside of conscious experience, but that cannot be traversed by the person. The speaker 
ultimately mourns that she must return to selfhood and that her “Being” cannot be “but an Ear” 
for which to hear “all the Heavens” unless she wants to fully sacrifice her particularity.  
Not only do “I felt a Cleaving in my Mind” and “I felt a Funeral, in my Brain” transform 
the Emersonian idea of double consciousness into an actual felt experience, but they also 
successfully depict the violent and painful ramifications of having knowledge of the self as more 
than a particular identity. Moreover, they better demonstrate the temporary nature of this 
condition as a person must choose one sort of knowledge over the other in order to prevent a 
total dissolution of the particular and physical self. Budick argues that an individual “can know 
directly, immediately, either stasis or motion, not both” so that a person can remain in the space 
of double consciousness and cease to exist or to return to the confines of particularity and 
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consciousness in order to continue living (234). “Yet, since neither time nor eternity has absolute 
meaning for us and both are defined only in relation to each other,” he continues, “it is possible” 
and even necessary that “the two realms” remain separate and are only perceived as relational 
states of being (234). Because double consciousness is temporary, these poems imply the 
continual nature of double consciousness: a person will experience this painful state of being 
again and again as he or she progresses through life until the physical body deteriorates, 
consciousness is extinguished, and, what Emerson calls, the Soul wholly contains what was the 
particular. While they demonstrate the temporary and painful ramifications of the felt experience 
of double consciousness, they also raise questions about the ways in which consciousness is 
limited and consequently produces this condition.  
3.2 “The one the other will contain”: The Problem of Containment and Absorption  
Dickinson questions the limitations of individual consciousness through an extended 
metaphor of absorption and containment. In poems like “The Brain - is wider than the Sky” (FR 
598) and “I thought that nature was enough” (FR 1269) she employs this metaphor to translate 
the problematic subject-object relationship that we find in Emerson into an experience of 
individual consciousness as a person struggles to ascertain knowledge or meaning of the self and 
the world he or she inhabits; and, it is in this struggle that we can better identify how and why 
both time and physicality limit consciousness. The problem of what determines the subject and 
the object manifests as a problem between what constitutes the human, which in Dickinson we 
can read as a version of Emerson’s subject, and the natural, or Emerson’s object, in “The Brain - 
is wider than the Sky.” For Dickinson’s speaker, 
  The Brain - is wider than the Sky - 
  For - put them side by side - 
  The one the other will contain 
  With ease - and You - beside – 
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  The Brain is deeper than the sea - 
  For - hold them - Blue to Blue - 
  The one the other will absorb - 
  As Sponges - Buckets - do - 
 
  The Brain is just the weight of God - 
  For - Heft them - Pound for Pound - 
  And they will differ - if they do -  
  As Syllable from Sound – 
 
Dickinson distinguishes the subject from the object by using an analogy that governs the relation 
between human perception—“The Brain”—and the natural world that it apprehends—“the Sky” 
and “the sea.” When placing human perception or consciousness alongside features of the 
natural, “the one the other” would “contain/With ease” because it is only through consciousness 
that subjects can make meaning and generate systems of measurements like the sky’s width or 
the sea’s depth. In the first two stanzas then, the person contains elements of the natural which 
exist outside of the self and its particularity. Individual consciousness contains and absorbs that 
which is separate from it in order to make sense of and meaning from it so that a person can thus 
differentiate and then possess its selfhood. Rather than understanding the differences between the 
subject and the object as “part and particle” of something larger as Emerson does when calling 
for an original relation, the first two stanzas in this poem imagine what a relation between the 
two might actually look like for a conscious person.  
The third stanza, however, challenges how this relationship works as it equates the 
particular person’s perception to the “weight of God.” I am reading “God” in this poem in the 
same way I read it in Emerson’s writing—as a centrifugal force that governs the world—rather 
than as a specific religious entity and as such will refer to it as the impersonal. Because “God” 
symbolizes the impersonal in my reading, it generates and contains features of the natural world. 
In this stanza, when consciousness is placed alongside of the impersonal, the systems of 
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measurement in the earlier two stanzas break down as the weight of the two differs—“if they do 
at all”—“As Syllable from Sound.” Vendler notes that the “first two stanzas here are 
unremarkable in their Romantic claim that the Brain is capable of containing or absorbing 
knowledge, in its fullness, not only vast natural phenomena (Sky, sea) but also of the human 
being perceiving those phenomena [. . .] But the first two stanzas clearly exist for the sake of the 
third” because Dickinson abandons “metaphors of containment and absorption” to turn to the 
“significant power of each of her two entities: the Brain and God” (17). Vendler implies, that 
because these two entities show very little, if any at all, difference in weight, that the power the 
consciousness held by containing the natural in the first two stanzas diminishes; the particular 
individual’s power to apprehend the impersonal then is similar to the power the impersonal holds 
over particular persons. If the power of either differs, as Vendler notes, it is only through 
something like language because “God, through Nature, utters Sounds, but human language 
alone is voiced in Syllables” (18).  In other words, human consciousness as it perceives and 
experiences the impersonal attempts to make meaning of it by articulating it through language. 
However, like a particular person is “part and particle” of the impersonal, the articulation that the 
person ascribes to the impersonal is merely syllables derived from sounds provided by the 
impersonal.  
Dickinson here, consistent with the Emersonian logic of double consciousness, 
demonstrates the inextricable relation between particular persons and the larger, impersonal 
whole. While the first two stanzas illustrate the ways in which human consciousness tends to 
privilege itself through the circumscription of things outside of the self, the third stanza, because 
the consciousness cannot differentiate itself from the impersonal when hefted “Pound for 
Pound,” produces a sense of indeterminacy whereby the consciousness cannot perceive or make 
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meaning of the personal as separate from the impersonal. The poem establishes indeterminacy as 
the power of the consciousness declines and the systems it used earlier to measure and thus 
contain “the Sky” and “the sea” dissolve. Indeterminacy thus reduces the exceptionalism 
produced in the first two stanzas when the consciousness was absorbing, containing, and thus 
trying to make sense of and know the impersonal as distinct from the self. More importantly 
though, this sense of indeterminacy better elucidates the limitations of human consciousness as it 
tries to enact its power by containing the impersonal or “God,” but finds this power ineffective as 
the two are equal in weight.  
“I thought that nature was enough” further investigates the limitations of human 
consciousness as it tries to absorb and contain something which it comprises and is comprised 
by. In the first stanza, the poem opens with a transition from innocence to knowledge only made 
available through a human interaction with the impersonal: 
  I thought that nature was enough 
  Till Human nature came 
  But that the other did absorb 
  - As Parallax a Flame – 
 
This poem replicates the differentiation between the human and the natural as well as the 
privileging of the human consciousness that we found in the first two stanza’s of the “The Brain 
- is wider than the Sky.” The speaker believes that the natural is “enough” until consciousness, or 
“Human nature” enters the equation. When the speaker becomes aware of consciousness, she 
becomes aware of herself as a self and recognizes difference between herself and the natural. 
Once in possession of the consciousness and the individual becomes aware of the self, he or she 
taints the innocence of the natural through organization and categorization in order to know and 
thus articulate the difference between all of “nature” and “Human nature.” In other words, 
particular persons who are in possession of their consciousness—persons claiming an identity 
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and living in the temporal world—“absorb” nature “As Parallax a Flame” in order to make 
meaning of it. The use of “Parallax” as a simile for this absorption further produces another 
instance of indeterminacy that works to illustrate the confines of consciousness once possessed 
so that a person cannot go back to knowing that “nature was enough.”  
This simile produces indeterminacy in three ways. First, the simile implies that a person 
may know the natural world in a variety of ways, as if through a parallax. To “absorb” something 
as a “Parallax does a flame,” is to see or know the thing differently dependent upon one’s 
position or perspective. A person may look at the same feature of the natural at different points in 
his or her life and see the very same object, and thus make meaning of that object, based solely 
on the particular moment in which they are seeing and trying to make sense of it. The features of 
the natural will never look the same to the individual trying to absorb it because of the temporal 
and linear fashion of life. According to Emersonian logic, the very process of living necessitates 
this variation (and variation, for Emerson, is necessary for the individual).  
Second, the simile implies that the world does not look and cannot look universally the 
same to multiple persons. Because individual minds possess consciousness, no two persons can 
see or experience nature or the world in the same way. Just as consciousness allows a person to 
know the self as a self and thus distinguish that self from the world, consciousness also allows 
the person to distinguish itself from other persons. As such, consciousness makes selves distinct 
from one another so that when perception absorbs any thing outside of the self, that thing will be 
experienced, viewed, and known differently to the particular consciousness doing the absorbing. 
This prevents a common or collective experience or type of knowledge. The inability for 
multiple persons to wholly experience and know a thing in the exact same manner effectively 
works to create a degree of isolation among people.  
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Finally, the isolation between persons that the idea of absorption through a parallax 
creates also highlights the third way in which the simile produces a sense of indeterminacy. The 
speaker says “But that the other did absorb.” Though the reader may assume that “Human 
nature” absorbs “nature” because “nature was enough” until the consciousness entered, that 
assumption just replicates the human tendency to privilege the consciousness over something 
like the natural as in “The Brain - is wider than the Sky.” The poem itself does not specify 
whether nature absorbs “Human nature” or vice versa. And since no two consciousness know or 
experience the same thing at the same time, there can be no point of reference in order to 
determine what exactly does the absorbing. Because the reader is left unclear as to what or who 
absorbs what or who, and because the consciousness absorbs experiences differently from other 
consciousness’s and depends upon an indvidual’s place in life, the consciousness appears in this 
first stanza as limited and lacks the fulfillment that nature provided when it “was enough.”  
The second stanza further demonstrates the limitations of consciousness and more clearly 
illustrates how indeterminacy produces a condition of double consciousness for a particular 
individual. 
  Of Human nature just aware  
  There added the Divine 
  Brief struggle for capacity 
  The power to contain 
  Is always as the contents 
  But give a Giant room 
  And you will lodge a Giant 
  And not a smaller man 
 
On the surface, this stanza confirms the initial assumption that human consciousness has the 
ability to contain as the “Divine” is “added” to the consciousness that in the first stanza made the 
self aware. It is worth noting here that as in “The Brain - is wider than the Sky,” I am reading the 
“Divine” here as akin to an impersonal force that governs the world and thus acts generates and 
78 
 
contains the features of the natural world that appear in the poem’s initial stanza. Thus, these first 
two lines complicate the earlier indeterminacy—brain or god, “Syllable” or “Sound”—by  
refiguring it not as a challenge of knowing the difference between the consciousness and the 
natural, but as a challenge of knowing the difference between the particular individual in 
possession of the consciousness and the impersonal that contains things outside of that 
consciousness.  
Read in this light, the first two lines complicate the surface reading that human 
consciousness has the ability to contain something as vast as the impersonal. The “Brief struggle 
for capacity” indicates that a particular consciousness struggles to absorb and contain the 
impersonal. This struggle for capacity recalls the diminished power of the consciousness to 
contain and make meaning of things outside the self as it comes into contact with the impersonal 
in “The Brain - is wider than the Sky.” In “I thought that nature was enough,” once the particular 
and the impersonal are combined, they struggle to contain and absorb one another and 
differentiation between the two becomes difficult further establishing an indeterminate relation 
between entities said to absorb or contain one another.  The next lines confirm the indeterminacy 
that is produced when a particular consciousness comes into contact with the impersonal as “The 
power to contain/Is always as the contents.” Since the contents, or participants, of this struggle 
are both the particular and the impersonal, the power of the two to absorb and contain the other is 
equaled once they come into contact with one another.  
This indeterminacy reinforces the idea that one’s particular consciousness and the 
impersonal are linked and cannot be separated from one another. It also reinforces the limited 
capacity of the consciousness to contain and absorb the impersonal in all of its magnitude: if the 
consciousness did not have limitations then there would not be a struggle of any sort. This 
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struggle, however, gives “a Giant room” to be lodged rather than “a smaller man.” Although the 
particular consciousness seems to be limited in its singular capacity to contain and thus know the 
impersonal as distinct from the self, once the individual consciousness and the impersonal are 
involved in this struggle they create a space large enough to house a “Giant.” I read the “But” in 
this stanza as an indication that despite the limitations imposed by consciousness and the struggle 
that ensues, the struggle itself has positive implications for an individual because it brings the 
consciousness into contact with the same magnitude of the impersonal that limits it. I mean here 
that though the individual consciousness is limited in its ability to know the self as distinct in this 
moment, it expands and becomes larger—it becomes as immense and as powerful as the 
impersonal. This contact makes the particular consciousness and the power it yields seem small 
in comparison.  
 “The Brain - is wider than the Sky” and “I thought that nature was enough” employ 
metaphors of absorption and containment to link what constitutes a particular person and what 
comprises that person’s attachment to what exceeds the confines of consciousness through an 
unstable and inscrutable logic. More importantly, these two poems, demonstrate both the 
limitations of a particular consciousness but also how a particular consciousness expands those 
same parameters as it comes into contact with the impersonal and makes an attempt to absorb 
and contain it. To return to Dickinson’s analogy of sponges absorbing water, for example, the 
water becomes part of the sponge’s constitution causing an increase in the sponge’s weight and 
shape (at least until the sponge is wrung out). During this struggle, a particular consciousness 
expands and experiences what it would be like to assimilate into the impersonal.  
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3.3 “Extatic Need”: The Experience of Double Consciousness 
Through the absorption/containment metaphors in “The Brain - is wider than the Sky” 
and “I thought that nature was enough” Dickinson outlines the parameters of an individual 
consciousness as it possesses a person but also as it tries to possess things outside of the person 
as it experiences them. This determines that subjectivity is a relational experience and better 
elucidates why an experience of double consciousness may occur multiple times throughout 
one’s life as indicated by “I felt a Funeral, in my Brain.” Dickinson’s poetry of consciousness, 
however, goes one step further in illustrating what the experience of double consciousness may 
feel like for a particular individual by interrogating what occurs during the “Brief struggle for 
capacity” when a particular consciousness comes into contact with the impersonal and the 
confines of that consciousness must expand to house a “Giant.”  
Dickinson’s “Between the Form of Life and Life” (FR 1123) describes this experience in 
terms accessible to the consciousness that is being expanded. The poem reads: 
  Between the Form of Life and Life 
  The difference is as big 
  As Liquor at the Lip between 
  And liquor in the Jug 
  That latter - excellent to keep - 
  But for extatic need 
  The corkless is superior - 
  I know for I have tried  
The “Form of Life and Life” can be read as two, albeit similar, versions of the problem of 
subjective experience. In one sense, to be “Between the Form of Life and Life” suggests that 
Dickinson’s speaker is simultaneously theorizing what it means to be a living subject and what it 
means to be an actual person subjected to the emotional, intellectual, and physical implications 
of living in the material world. In another sense, the notion that the speaker is “Between the 
Form of Life and Life” suggests that the speaker idealizes a version of life beyond subjective 
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experience, which will allow her access to the impersonal while also not requiring that she 
sacrifice her subjectivity, and being tasked with the ordinary and mundane act of living as a 
person who must possess while also contained by individual identity and consciousness. Again, 
each of these readings are nuanced versions of the same problem about what it means to live in 
the world as a person and as such it is important to note that Dickinson’s speaker is “Between” 
two forms.  
 I argue that because the speaker is “Between” two forms of “Life,” she is dispossessed 
from her individual identity and not fully absorbed by the impersonal; instead, she is caught 
between or suspended from each of these two forms of knowing life (not unlike the speaker in “I 
felt a Funeral, in my Brain”). This suspension from inhabiting either “Form of Life,” allows the 
speaker to contemplate the differences and requirements of each form. In this space, she notes 
that the difference between the two are “as big/As Liquor at the Lip between/And liquor in the 
Jug.” This simile emphasizes the differences between the two forms of living. Subjectivity and 
consciousness limit the person’s ability to live fully—to know the self as an individual and 
simultaneously know itself as part of the impersonal—much like a jug must contain and confine 
quantities of liquor. Likewise, access to something outside of subjectivity enables the person to 
live freely without restrictions or containment and thus expand beyond the requirements of 
personhood to experience the impersonal just as liquor passes between the lips once uncorked 
and released from its container.   
 In this suspended state between either a contained form of life and a free flowing form 
(between individual experience and communion with the impersonal), the speaker evaluates 
these two forms of living. Dickinson’s speaker determines that “The latter”—the form of life 
analogous to “liquor in the Jug”—is “excellent to keep” despite the fact that “the corkless” form 
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is “superior.” The speaker, in “Between” both forms, has “tried” to live as a person who 
uncontained by consciousness in order to experience the “uncorked” containment and absorption 
of the impersonal. However, when her consciousness is not confined, though she may get to 
experience the impersonal, it is only the restrictions imposed by her consciousness that allow her 
individual subjectivity in the world. Without the confines of consciousness, the speaker must 
give in to the form of life that she idealizes, but without the luxury of retaining possession of her 
identity. There is an “extatic need” to exist in this idealized way of life where persons get to 
connect to the impersonal without any sort of sacrifice of individuality and because it is the ideal 
state of living—not unlike Emersonian transcendence—it is the “superior” option. Yet, in order 
for the speaker to reach this idealized “Form of Life,” where she is absorbed by the impersonal, 
she must first return from the experience of “Between” and live within the confines of 
consciousness. In other words, Dickinson’s speaker finds the form of life involving containment 
“excellent to keep” because it is the only way to attain a “Form of Life” where access to the 
impersonal becomes possible. She must live life as an individual person and proceed through the 
task of living a linear and progressive life.  
The “Brief struggle for capacity” where the particular person is “Between the Form of 
Life and Life” not only characterizes what results from indeterminacy, but in the process 
positions double consciousness as an ideal state for the individual experiencing and feeling it. 
Though to be between forms of knowing is ideal because it is the only place where a person can 
entertain multiple versions of self-knowledge, the poem “This Consciousness that is aware” (FR 
817) illuminates the negative ramifications of occupying this space. The first two stanzas read: 
  This Consciousness that is aware 
  Of Neighbors and the Sun 
  Will be the one aware of Death 
  And that itself alone 
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  Is traversing the interval 
  Experience between 
  And most profound experiment 
  Appointed unto Men – 
 
Here Dickinson’s speaker notes that her particular consciousness “is aware/Of Neighbors”—
particular persons—as well as “the Sun”—that in its magnitude can be read as a symbol of the 
impersonal—but that this awareness also leads her to become “aware of Death” that can result 
from occupying the space of the “Brief struggle for capacity” for too long. Joy Ladin argues that 
“The first line puts consciousness [. . .] center stage. However, the second line, grammatically a 
direct extension of the first line, shifts our focus to the eternal objects of consciousness: 
‘Neighbors and the Sun’ so that ‘death heightens consciousness’” (34-35). Though I disagree 
with her reading of “Neighbors and the Sun,” I do agree with the idea that “death heightens 
consciousness” for particular individuals.16 In other words, if the person occupies the space 
between forms of life for longer than necessary to simply expand the confines of consciousness, 
the person in possession of that consciousness will inevitably be absorbed by the impersonal as 
its magnitude is greater than that of consciousness alone. The self in other words will dissolve 
back into impersonality, the state before consciousness where “nature was enough.” The 
knowledge that comes from what initially appears as an ideal state of being comes with an 
awareness of the power of the impersonal to destroy particularity.  
Perhaps more importantly, the awareness that the impersonal can effectively kill 
individual persons, because it relies on relation and temporality as indicated by the “Parallax” in 
“I thought that nature was enough,” causes the person in possession of the consciousness existing 
                                                 
16 For more on Ladin’s argument about the ways in which Dickinson’s poetry allows people to name and thus come 
to terms with the act of dying, see her essay “‘This Consciousness that is Aware’: The Consolation of Emily 
Dickinson’s Phenomenology” in Wider than the Sky: Essays and Meditations on the Healing Power of Emily 
Dickinson (2007). 
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between the forms of life to see the solitary nature of this condition: the self is “alone” and 
“traversing the interval/Experience between.” While various persons in possession of their 
consciousness come into contact with the impersonal, they do not do so at the same time and 
because consciousness makes the self aware of the self as distinct from other selves, they also 
cannot share the experience of what this contact looks or feels like. It is an experience unique to 
each particular person. This isolation becomes the “most profound experiment/Appointed unto 
Men” because the person inhabited by the consciousness that is aware cannot be absorbed by the 
impersonal if it wants to maintain any sort of particularity and go on living in the temporal world 
nor can it commune wholly with other persons because those persons cannot share or know this 
same experience. Moreover, because this experience expands the bounds of individual 
consciousness, the person occupying this space starts to feel awareness as a burdensome, solitary 
task with negative ramifications no matter how the struggle for capacity ends. The consciousness 
is isolated from other persons as well as itself. Double consciousness may be an ideal state 
because the consciousness can occupy a space where all forms of knowledge co-exist, but 
coming into this experience also makes one aware of the isolation and possible destruction of his 
or her identity that a full awareness of the impersonal necessitates.  
The second two stanzas of this poem demonstrate that the consequences of awareness 
cause the speaker to find particularity sufficient in order to maintain her individual identity and 
to go on living. They read: 
  How adequate unto itself 
  It’s properties shall be 
  Itself unto itself and None 
  Shall make discovery – 
 
Adventure most unto itself 
  The Soul condemned to be - 
  Attended by a single Hound 
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  It’s own identity 
 
The speaker finds the self’s “properties”—the identity it comes to possess through 
consciousness—“adequate unto itself.” Though possession of the consciousness and thus coming 
to reoccupy personhood requires a sacrifice of knowing the self as a self and “part and particle” 
of the impersonal, it allows the person to retain fully his or her individual identity and return to 
the process of living where it can interact with other persons in a physical and material way. This 
possession of consciousness is “adequate” for the person because it allows him or her 
particularity; though this possession is “adequate,” it is far from satisfying as the state of double 
consciousness was because as a particular consciousness the person still remains distinct not only 
from the impersonal but also from the consciousness’s of other persons, since “None” can make 
“discovery” of one another’s properties beyond the selves that contain the consciousness. This 
becomes an “Adventure” in and of itself, because though physical persons may interact and 
connect as individuals, each remains isolated from their “Soul,” which comprises the impersonal. 
Instead, persons are attended by the “single Hound” of their own identities. Finan argues that this 
hound suggests “a kind of perpetual confinement for the soul in chase” where a particular 
consciousness cannot assimilate individual identity with the soul it chases through the act of 
living (39).17 In other words, particularity and personhood, though they are meaningful in a 
physical world, damn us to solitude as they prevent communion with the soul.   
All of these poems interrogate and attempt to ascribe to subjects a felt experience that 
points towards Emerson’s idealized state of double consciousness. They work to define the 
painful consequences of existing in a prolonged state of consciousness as well as the pain 
                                                 
17 For other compelling interpretations of the role of the “Hound” in this poem, see Charles R. Anderson’s “The 
Conscious Self in Emily Dickinson’s Poetry,” American Literature 31.3 (1959): 290-308 as well as the previously 
cited work from Budick, Cameron, and Finan.  
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associated with recognizing how an individual consciousness becomes aware of its own 
limitations. To exist fully in this state and thus to retain a holistic sense of self as an individual 
person means suffering a paradoxical relation between the personal and the impersonal. In the 
process, Dickinson also traces the patterns according to which double consciousness insists so 
that “the search” for a full identity, one that merges particular personhood with the soul “is 
forever unfinished” so that whole “self-definition is always as yet impossible” (Grabher 224).18  
Persons must thus experience double consciousness again and again, or “traverse” its “interval,” 
as they maintain their particularity and try to define themselves as whole: they must experience 
the isolation of being hounded by their particularity as well as the continual “Cleaving” of the 
self.  
3.4 “Covered Vision”: The Paradox of Choice 
Inder Kher claims that the “suffering involved in the process of self-finding” is vital and 
that the only solace an individual can take in such suffering is the recognition that “we must 
continue to add to the holdings of the self” through living as particular and distinct selves (267). 
In other words, each time a person experiences double consciousness and the limitations of his or 
her particular consciousness expands, he or she adds to their particular identities in order to exist 
in the world—the physical self grows, ages, etc. all in relation to whatever place he or she 
occupies on the spectrum of life. For Kher, adding to the holdings of the self through this process 
should be entertaining for the person rather than merely a source of pain (263). Yet, entertaining 
one’s self with the process of continual remaking and redefining of the self in order to only find a 
true relation to the impersonal only after particular identity has been destroyed can be as 
                                                 
18 See Gudrun Grabher’s “Dickinson’s Lyrical Self” in The Emily Dickinson Handbook, U of Mass P, 1998, 224-239 
for an interesting argument about the process of self-invention as it involves the dichotomous relationship between 
Dickinson’s lyrical and biographical selves. 
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unsatisfying for Dickinson as it can be for readers of Emerson’s emphasis on process over 
product in “Circles” and “Experience.” Of course Dickinson’s disdain for the confines of 
consciousness and the necessity of retaining particularlity in order to live can be found in a 
number of her poems. In poems like “Before I got my eye put out” (FR 336) and “Renunciation - 
is a piercing Virtue -” (FR 782), however, she demonstrates with unusual poignancy that the 
condition of double consciousness repeatedly suffered by individuals is not only painful in and of 
itself, but also requires we make an impossible choice again and again. These poems reflect what 
Kher calls a “total commitment and constant striving on the part of one who seeks to merge with 
his or her being” beyond the corporeal body that houses consciousness and that the repetitive 
“realization of self or identity” over the course of a lifetime “constitutes man’s ultimate struggle 
to be himself,” which is a “quest” involving “infinite suffering” (231). The constant choosing of 
one’s particularity rather than total immersion into the impersonal causes a type of suffering in 
which the conscious self must remain finite while embodying the infinite. For Kher, this amounts 
to a discipline necessary if one eventually wants to achieve the “arduous task of grasping the 
experience of existence as a whole” (233). For Dickinson, it often means blinding oneself in 
order to see. 
In “Before I got my eye put out,” Dickinson demonstrates the choice an individual makes 
to return to particularity after the experience of double consciousness. In the first stanza the 
speaker replicates the absorption and containment metaphor found in “The Brain - is wider than 
the Sky” and “I thought that nature was enough”: 
  Before I got my eye put out - 
  I liked as well to see  
  As other creatures, that have eyes - 
  And know no other way –  
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The speaker here likes to see the world as every other living thing: that is to say she liked well 
enough to see only as much as her individual consciousness allows and desires no other way of 
seeing or knowing the world. By the second stanza, however, this knowledge is no longer 
enough for her: 
But were it told to me, Today, 
  That I might have the Sky 
  For mine, I tell you that my Heart 
  Would split, for size of me – 
 
Suddenly, when an alternate form of seeing and knowing the world presents itself, the speaker’s 
“Heart” would “split” because the physical body—kept alive by the heart—can only contain 
consciousness in its particularity. The speaker, because she is confined to a physical body and an 
individual identity made available through consciousness, cannot experience beyond those 
confines lest she should suffer a split or a fracturing of her selfhood.  
As the poem continues into the remaining stanzas, the speaker becomes aware that an 
alternate manner of perceiving and experiencing the world exists. She says: 
  The Meadows - mine - 
  The Mountains - mine - 
  All Forests - Stintless stars - 
  As much of noon, as I could take - 
  Between my finite eyes – 
 
  The Motions of the Dipping Birds - 
  The Morning’s Amber Road - 
  For mine - to look at when I liked, 
  The news would strike me dead – 
 
  So safer - guess - with just my soul 
  Opon the window pane 
  Where other creatures put their eyes - 
  Incautious - of the Sun – 
 
This news, however, that there is a different way of existing in the world—as one with all of 
these natural elements because to have knowledge of them would be to assimilate into their 
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constitution, thus making them hers—“would strike” the speaker “dead.” More importantly, the 
speaker can only take the news of this different way of knowing—which ultimately is to know 
life outside the confines of personhood and to merge with the impersonal—“Between” her “finite 
eyes.” This indicates that consciousness still limits her ability to make sense of and attain full 
knowledge of this alternate way of seeing because she exists in the temporal world and as such 
must abide by the restrictions of such an existence: she cannot fully possess this way of knowing 
while retaining her particularity though the possibility of doing so seems to excite her and recalls 
the “extatic need” from “Between the Forms of Life and Life.” In the third stanza, the use of the 
analogy “As much of noon, as I could take” suggests that access to the possibility of a 
knowledge of the impersonal occurs only during the middle period of one’s life, once the 
confines of an individual consciousness have been expanded several times over through lived 
experience. I would argue, however, that the noon period represents an alternate place between 
the beginning and the end of physical life where one experiences the condition of double 
consciousness. 
Read in this context, the last stanza represents the choice between the limitations of 
consciousness and existence in the temporal world with that of deathly assimilation into this 
newfound manner of knowing the world—a knowledge that negates particularized selfhood. The 
last stanza has the speaker deciding that it is “safer” she guesses, “with just my soul” because her 
finite perspective, despite its temporal and physical limitations, preserves identity and awareness 
of the self as a person. She can only “Opon the window pane” watch “Where other creatures put 
their eyes -” unaware and “Incautious - of the Sun” because they haven’t yet encountered the 
space of “noon” and glimpsed the possibility of the world as theirs or themselves as constituent 
parts of that world. The speaker’s choice, after the moment of double consciousness, is to 
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preserve her sense of self despite the restrictions of that self and in spite of her apparent desire to 
know the world as hers as well as to have the world know—or absorb—her.  
To choose one’s particularity rather than existing in spaces between forms of life and 
submit to absorption by the impersonal is even more pronounced in “Renunciation - is a piercing 
Virtue -”: 
  Renunciation - is a piercing Virtue - 
  The letting go 
  A Presence - for an Expectation -  
  Not now - 
  The putting out of Eyes -  
  Just Sunrise - 
  Lest Day - 
  Day’s Great Progenitor -  
  Outvie 
  Renunciation - is the Choosing 
  Against itself -  
  Itself to justify 
  Unto itself -  
  When larger function -  
  Make that appear -  
  Smaller - that Covered Vision - Here - 
Vendler calls this a “double poem,” where the phrase “Renunciation - is” begins one poem and 
then repeats in the tenth line to signal the beginning of a second (330). The recursive structure 
works to at first to define, though a common enough term, the abstract act of renunciation. By 
line five, the act of renunciation requires the “putting out of Eyes” or the blinding of the self 
because to do so is a “Virtue.” Once one puts out her eyes—her way of seeing and knowing the 
world—she becomes able to let go of worldly knowledge and expectations for the expectation of 
something greater than just a “Day” or a “Sunrise,” which are only constructions of a 
consciousness. The return to “Renunciation - is” in line 10 moves from an attempt to define the 
act of renunciation to an attempt to describe the experience of renunciation for particular 
persons: in other words, the second half of the poem works to explain how blinding the self of 
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what it knows and can grasp in the world for an expectation feels like. Vendler calls the second 
half “a very painful narration of Renunciation” for one particular “soul” (330). This experience is 
described as a “Choosing/against” the self that knows itself as an individual subject in the 
material world for the “Expectation” of a “larger function” beyond the physical self and the 
temporal world. This “Expectation” becomes a justification for the violent act of the “putting 
out” of one’s “eyes.” 
 Cameron argues that the “voice” of this poem is one “aware of the situation’s 
complexity” as it “is the tone of someone trying to convince herself of something she finds both 
difficult and imperative to believe—that renunciation is a virtue; that it is piercing she knows” 
(40). Vendler adds that the speaker in the first three lines generalizes the experience of 
renunciation and gradually gets more specific to an individualized experience of renunciation in 
line 10 (330). It seems that the speaker’s awareness of the complexity of the situation in which 
she finds herself is what allows her to generalize the “piercing” and virtuous qualities of 
renunciation. Although abstract, this initial renunciation is both piercing and virtuous because it 
requires particular persons to let go of a presence in order to be replaced by an expectation.  
 Vendler’s interpretation that this is a generalized view of renunciation seems particularly 
apt as she also notes that the speaker says “the letting go” rather than “to let go.” She says, “‘The 
letting go’ creates an overarching untensed Idea that can be chosen over and over again” and that 
the first instance of renunciation is “the foregoing of a Presence (which one passionately values) 
for an Expectation (not yet fulfilled)” (331). Because the act of renouncing is a continuous 
action, the opening lines may signify the position individuals find themselves in as the 
consciousness and its presence in the temporal world—the thing that the person doing the 
renouncing “passionately values”—in order to accept the possibility that something else is 
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possible and even desirable. And though this renouncing will surely look differently for each 
individual faced with this choice of letting go, it is still piercing because it requires the 
dispossession of the self that it values for only the possibility of something like knowledge of the 
impersonal. Similarly, the continuous action of “the letting go” implies that particular persons 
will renounce more than once over the course of a lifetime as knowledge of the self is relational 
and requires constant re-definition. 
 What though makes this renunciation virtuous? The lines that follow indicate that once 
one renounces the limitations of consciousness by “The putting out of Eyes” all he or she 
sacrifices is his or her own ability to see the world or “Just Sunrise.” As a reward for this 
piercing and even deleterious renunciation, “Day’s Great Progenitor – ”—the impersonal—will 
eventually “Outvie” or overtake the particular person. In other words, a person must continue to 
renounce itself, even if the result is the remaking of that same self to exist within new confines 
and limitations, eventually the renunciation of self will give way and dissolve into the 
impersonality that provides particularity and temporality in the first place. Likewise, Cameron 
notes that while the speaker remarks that this renunciation may be virtuous and even necessary 
for the maintenance of an identity in the physical world, that she “exhibits a clear preference for 
this world” (41).  
 As a result, “Renunciation – is the Choosing/Against itself –” whereby, despite one’s 
individual desire to maintain existing versions of one’s sense of self, the self that wants to move 
forward through the temporal life to achieve an assimilation into the impersonal must choose 
against that self. In this sense, to renounce the self could also be virtuous because it requires that 
a person acknowledge his own limitations of consciousness in order to expand those boundaries 
to make room for new versions of selfhood, even as the past self becomes anxious or 
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uncomfortable in this moment of double consciousness. This then becomes a justification to the 
individual: dispossess the self of self-knowledge in order to redefine that self so that it can return 
to the temporal world and ultimately arrive at a “larger function” that makes all previous forms 
of knowledge or “Covered Vision” appear small in comparison to the self’s ultimate dissolution 
into the impersonal. Each time a person makes the choice to renounce, even though it truly 
requires a figurative death of the self, her consciousness expands and makes previous ways of 
knowing and experiencing seem smaller and more limited than the new way of knowing until 
eventually the consciousness has expanded to the point that it exceeds all corporeal and temporal 
restrictions. In other words, as Cameron points out, renunciation as a “matter of one’s best 
interest is a convoluted idea involving, as the lines [ten to thirteen] literally do, several iterations 
of the concept of self: the sense in which renunciation is an act that violates the self; the sense in 
which it is an act that legitimates the self; and the sense in which the self stands as ambivalent 
arbiter between the two” (41).   
 Cameron goes on to argue that Dickinson’s speaker “clearly indicates with the eyes she 
now has”—which I interpret to mean eyes that, while still limited by temporality and 
consciousness, are and have been remade through several instances of renunciation—that “a 
presence looks better than an expectation” (41). While this may be true for Dickinson’s speaker, 
and it certainly aligns with the logic of “Before I got my eye put out,” the speaker inevitably 
finds herself in an impossible situation where in order to preserve her sense of self she must also 
denounce and choose against herself. Moreover, this positing the self against the self in order to 
choose an expectation requires a violent—the putting out of one’s eyes—sacrifice of selfhood 
despite its eventual deliverance to virtue through assimilation into the impersonal. This choice is 
a direct consequence of the fleeting moments of double consciousness that persons find 
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themselves faced with over the course of a temporal life. While Cameron argues that Dickinson’s 
speaker demonstrates a preference for a “presence” rather than an “expectation” not because it is 
the better choice, but because it is what she has the capability to know now, Kher argues that this 
choice is necessary because “the human mind is the container” for “man’s identity” and “if the 
mind is dissolved or disintegrated” the being “cannot be located” by or locate the impersonal 
once the temporal life ends (258). This is an important distinction because the choosing for 
Cameron reflects the self’s desire to make a different choice while for Kher the choosing reflects 
a desire to avoid the deleterious consequences that come with choosing the impersonal. I think, 
however, that both readings point to the painful and violent condition of double consciousness, 
though fleeting, must be experienced by individuals even as the consequences of this experience 
necessitate the painful, sometimes violent, sacrifice of particularity each time the person comes 
into contact with it. Even in the context of Cameron’s choosing, for the self to make a choice it 
does not necessarily want comes with the sacrifice of the other choice which it does.  
 Though double consciousness emerges as an ideal state of being in Emersonian thought, 
it presents as a continual and painful condition which individuals must suffer in order to 
paradoxically sacrifice self-knowledge in order to maintain an awareness of that self in the 
temporal and physical world. Such a condition causes critics like Finan to view “Dickinson’s 
poetry of consciousness” as “experiments in subjectivity” that facilitate “how consciousness can 
limit us and how it can facilitate its own disruption” (24). Dickinson’s poetry thus “turns to 
dispossession; self-reference, which” ultimately “allows consciousness to unify” and become “a 
tool for interrogating our cognitive assumptions and for surrendering old certainties” to 
ultimately yield a tool for exploring the human consciousness’s relation not only to the self but to 
all other things that exist beyond the self (25). Double consciousness thus looks here like a 
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condition that allows individuals to test this relationality to other systems of organization beyond 
the particular self that govern and organize the temporal life in which it must participate.  
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4 CHAPTER THREE: ECONOMIES OF DEVASTATION IN HENRY JAMES’S THE 
BOSTONIANS AND THE WINGS OF THE DOVE 
 While Emily Dickinson takes the Emersonian idea of double consciousness and positions 
it as an actual condition that—although temporary due to one’s finitude—must be suffered by 
persons multiple times over the course of a lifetime, Henry James in The Bostonians and The 
Wings of the Dove explores the consequences of this condition by examining how it affects and 
is affected by the systems of organization that govern the temporal and corporeal world. More 
specifically, in these novels James investigates how an individual’s social intercourse—that is, a 
person’s interactions with other embodiments of personality and a person’s participation in the 
events of the physical world—influence one’s ability not only to attain access to a relationship 
with the impersonal but also to sustain that relationship within the confines of a system of 
relation (to others and to the world). Where Emerson and Dickinson see a condition unique to 
each particular person, James looks outward to examine how an interaction between singular 
individuals and the impersonal contexts that govern their lives impact other particular 
individuals, resulting in what I will call an “economy of devastation.” James configures this 
economy of human relationships by taking the concept of double consciousness and applying it 
beyond a particular subject to demonstrate how, when the subject comes into contact with the 
impersonal even temporarily, the confines of consciousness expand not only to devastate our 
particular notions of self-hood, but to threaten the coherence of our intersubjective attachments 
as well. Ostensibly, social relationships indirectly force particular persons into a state of dual 
consciousness at some point during the span of the relation. When a person is forced into the 
condition of double consciousness, his or her particular identity is suspended and eventually 
transformed in order to participate in a successive life. More importantly though, especially in 
97 
 
these novels, the experience of double consciousness initiated by one’s social relationships also 
transforms and eventually destroys those same relationships in the process.  
 James offers the main characters of The Bostonians and The Wings of the Dove, Verena 
Tarrant and Milly Theale respectively, as sites that are easily accessible to the impersonal 
because they lack a stable and fixed personality. Though to varying degrees, Verena and Milly 
are characters who demonstrate little self-awareness or particularity and thus the confines of their 
consciousness are not limited by the same constraints as the other characters in each novel. 
Verena and Milly function as the centers of their respective novels in which the other characters 
form a “circumference.” In other words, Verena and Milly serve as central points around which 
the other characters negotiate their conflicts,19 but the narrator grants the reader very little access 
to either’s particular consciousness. In fact, their centrality to their respective novels, despite 
their lack of narrative representation, depends upon the fact that they depict little-to-no 
consciousness or self-awareness. Though critics like Susan Wolstenholme and Martha Banta 
argue that Verena and Milly must appear as empty vessels in order for characters like Olive, 
Basil, Kate, and Merton to develop their own personalities and consciousness, their lack of 
personality and particularity are what allow them to function as points of entry for the 
impersonal in order to initiate states of double consciousness for themselves as well as the other 
characters in the novel. It should be noted, however, that I am not arguing that Verena and Milly 
are sites of impersonality for each is still limited by her corporeality as well as the confines of 
                                                 
19 James specifically mentions this “circumference” in the Preface to the New York Edition of Wings when he refers 
to Merton Densher and Kate Croy as “successive centres” (8). Though he never explicitly states that Basil and Olive 
form a circumference around Verena, the narrative structure of The Bostonians where Verena’s conscious is rarely 
reflected in favor of Basil’s or Olive’s resembles the structure that James describes in his Preface to Wings. Like 
Milly, Verena is “superficially so absent” from much of the novel and instead of having a distinct essence of her 
own, serves as the site for which the action of the novel unravels and the plot depends (8). All citations from The 
Wings of the Dove, including those from the Preface are from: Henry James, The Wings of the Dove, Norton Critical 
edition, 2nd ed., eds. J. Donald Crowley and Richard A. Hocks (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2003).  
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whatever consciousness she might possess, though each might be unaware of that consciousness. 
However, because each lacks a fixed identity, within their social spheres, they offer James the 
opportunity to more successfully illustrate what a state of double consciousness may look like 
than either Emerson or Dickinson as well as allow him to examine the external conflicts 
produced by this condition.  
 Although Verena and Milly experience little narrative representation of their 
consciousness compared to the other characters in each novel, their positions at each novel’s 
center actually generate multiple modes of self-knowledge that are not easily integrated or 
mediated into complete selves. In the most provocative representations of self-knowledge, 
Verena’s and Milly’s struggle with the condition of double consciousness also replicates the 
devastating consequences of this condition for those with whom they are intimately involved. 
Verena and Milly thus enable to James to represent the limitations imposed by human 
consciousness as Dickinson does, but also depict how those limitations are partially influenced 
by other conscious beings outside of the self as well as by the impersonal to which all persons 
and things are “part and particle.” The innocence that Verena and Milly first present with—their 
utter lack of self-consciousness—transforms over the course of the novels as they experience and 
participate in relationships with people who have a more stable and fixed sense of self. What 
results are external influences—Basil, Olive, Kate, and Merton primarily—that work to shape 
the consciousness of Verena and Milly as they start to see or know themselves as reflected by the 
other characters.20 As these particular persons start to influence and redefine the bounds of 
                                                 
20 Knowledge and self-knowledge is often described as something to “see” or has having a “light” in the work of 
Henry James. Sharon Cameron’s Thinking in Henry James provides a compelling argument for the external nature 
of knowledge or consciousness as something that is seeable as does George Butte in “Henry James and Deep 
Intersubjectivity,” The Henry James Review, 30(2), 129-43, and Peter Rawlings in “The Painful Production of 
Verena Tarrant: John Locke and The Bostonians from his chapter in Becoming Visible: Women’s Presence in Late 
Nineteenth-Century America.  
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Verena’s and Milly’s consciousness with deleterious consequences, Verena and Milly 
subsequently force these external influences into states of double consciousness whereby the 
original relationships they formed are devastated but so too is the particularity that other 
characters embody, thus creating an economy of devastation where all particular individuals 
suffer in some capacity.  
4.1 Sites of Double Consciousness: Verena’s and Milly’s (Self)-Possession  
Verena 
While Olive Chancellor’s and Basil Ransom’s desire for control over Verena drives The 
Bostonians, Verena’s consciousness is absent from much of the novel. Philip Page calls this “the 
first peculiarity of the narration” and that this lack of narrative access keeps the reader as well as 
the narrator “distanced from her and therefore excluded from direct exposure” to her thoughts 
about her role in “the central action of the novel” (375-6).21 It is likely that the absence of 
Verena’s thoughts from the narrator has caused critics to regard her as little more than the 
“empty vessel” awaiting possession by the novel’s stronger personalities. Wolstenholme adds 
that Verena is “empty” because she has “no anchoring point,” which “James underscores  
[. . .] by making her virtually rootless rather than a representative of any of the societies in the 
novel, Boston, New York, rural New England, and the South” (590). Irving Howe notes that 
Verena “has little but her promise, and her promise consists of little but her malleability.” He 
                                                 
21 Page’s argument about the narration of The Bostonians stems from earlier arguments, primarily made by Irving 
Howe and Lionel Trilling, that the novel reflects the social chaos of post-war society in America. Page extends the 
notion that the novel reflects a disjointed society void of the “social cohesion” typically provided by art, family, 
tradition, and community” which yields characters who feature “disoriented personalities” and a narrator that doubts 
“his ability” to describe the irregularity of the fictional world of the novel (374-6). Interestingly, the narrative 
distance noted by Page is what Howe considers a remarkable feat of the novel in that the pictorial descriptions rather 
than interior musings of the characters allow James to satirize Boston as he is “much less concerned than in his other 
novels with getting to the ‘essence’ of his characters and situations” so that he might focus on placing a “higher 
value on the outer grain and texture of experience” (xv). Another interesting interpretation of the narrative difference 
between The Bostonians and James’s later novels can be found in Janet A. Gabler’s article “The Narrator’s Script: 
James’s Complex Narration in ‘The Bostonians” (The Journal of Narrative Technique 14.2 (Spring, 1984): 94-109.  
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adds that “If James meant Verena as the one ‘positive’ moral force, the one figure toward whom 
our response should be more sympathetic than ironic, he failed; for she is unable—she simply is 
not interesting enough—to assume so crucial a role” (xxi). Banta refers to Verena as “pretty,” 
“sweet” and as “rather vapid and rather a bore” (180). Lynn Wardley even goes so far as to 
describe Verena as “adaptable, accommodating, assimilative, and absorptive” and containing 
“the voice of a ventriloqual body” that is “potentially indistinguishable from the alien, the 
crowd” (645, 647). Inherent in these interpretations of Verena as empty, malleable, and 
subservient is the notion that Verena lacks personality or essence and is without consciousness or 
self-awareness.22 In effect, these interpretations render Verena without any real particularity or 
differentiation from the crowds of people she addresses.  
Verena’s introduction into the novel is marked by an air of impersonality. After the 
narrator’s brief description of her as “very pretty, though she had red hair,” the people gathered 
in Miss Birdseye’s drawing room encourage her to speak about the current state of women in 
place of the great Mrs. Farrinder (60).23 Verena pleads with Mrs. Farrinder to go first in order to 
give her “an atmosphere” (77). The narrator notes that Verena makes this request as if it were “a 
lesson rehearsed in advance” though she had a “strange spontaneity in her manner, an air of 
artless enthusiasm, of personal purity” (77). Verena’s need for an “atmosphere” indicates that in 
order for her to express herself she needs external influence or inspiration. The narrator’s 
reflection that Verena’s manner is simultaneously contrived and innocent suggests that Verena is 
at least minimally aware of her own lack of particularity. As her mother, Mrs. Tarrant, talks to 
                                                 
22 In Truth in American Fiction, Janet Gabler-Hover counters traditional interpretations of Verena by arguing that 
she has an essence of “benevolent love,” which is demonstrated over the course of the novel by Verena’s “good faith 
and innocence,” her “intuitively benevolent emotion,” and an “optimistic interpretation of experience” (170).  
23 All citations from The Bostonians are from the following edition of the novel: Henry James, The Bostonians, ed. 
Charles R. Anderson (New York: Penguin Classics, 1986).  
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Mrs. Farrinder about her daughter’s great capacity for speaking in support of their collective 
cause, Verena insists that “‘It isn’t me, mother’” (79). Finally, when Mrs. Farrinder demands that 
Verena speak, her father, the mesmerist-healer, Selah Tarrant, acquiesces to her demands and 
provides the “atmosphere” by laying his hands on Verena without embarrassment because “any 
success that he and his daughter might have had was so thoroughly impersonal” (79). The 
narrator notes that “he and Mrs. Tarrant and the girl herself were all equally aware it was not she. 
It was some power outside—it seemed to flow through her [. . .] She let it come out just as it 
would—she didn’t pretend to have any control” (80).  
The reader’s initial encounter with Verena is significant not only because it marks her 
entrance into the novel, but also because it demonstrates her belief that she must have an external 
influence to possess her in order for her to become aware of herself and the task at hand. Verena 
is characterized by her ability to deliver speeches, and primarily speeches concerned with the 
issue of women; yet that ability is entirely dependent on an external force over which she has no 
control. Whether or not that force is her father’s hands or Mrs. Farrinder’s atmosphere is 
irrelevant—Verena cannot speak without someone else influencing her. Without someone else’s 
influence, Verena has little to distinguish her from any other person. Because public speaking 
defines Verena, she is rendered without a distinct identity when judged or characterized outside 
of this role and instead perceived by readers like Howe, Wolstenholme, and Banta as simple, 
empty, and uninteresting. Without her vocal abilities and without Olive or Basil fighting to 
possess her, Verena, based on her lack of representation by the narrator, is void of any 
personality or distinguishing features of her own. She thus functions, as Basil will later point out 
to her, as a puppet in need of a master. Moreover, Verena’s insistence upon an external influence 
to create an “atmosphere” and essentially embody her is reminiscent of Sharon Cameron’s 
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description of the impersonal as previously outlined in my discussion about Emerson; and it is 
this desire in conjunction with Verena’s lack of self-awareness that allows her to function as a 
point of access for the impersonal and thus allows her to experience a state of double 
consciousness.  
Peter Rawlings argues that “Verena Tarrant spends most of her time in The Bostonians in 
forms of confinement not of her own making and in realms of visibility organized on her behalf” 
(230). To confine Verena means that her consciousness is contained—she cannot have 
knowledge of her self, even of her own inabilities, lest she should self-reflect and come to know 
herself in a way that is different from how her parents, Basil, and Olive know or see her. 
Verena’s early recognition that it is not her that delivers her speeches is not a signal of Verena’s 
consciousness or self-awareness, but rather a self-knowledge built from her family’s knowledge 
of her. In other words, they tell her that she is not responsible for the messages she gives voice to 
and she internalizes their knowledge as self-knowledge. If being a person depends upon one’s 
knowledge of herself as distinguishable from other persons, then in this scenario Verena is 
indeed void of personality.  Consequently, Verena manifests the impersonal even as she provides 
a personality to the masses through the delivery of her speeches. She has no direct experience 
with subjugation or oppression, but rather becomes, in Wolstenholme’s terms, a “medium” who 
speaks on behalf of a community of women and thus provides a particular face or image to a 
collective cause and an impersonal mass. Because she is a blank slate, so to speak, she is likely 
to give voice to any cause that concerns not a particular person, but of persons more generally. 
She is the ideal speaker for such causes because she can represent any cause so long as the cause 
is in the “atmosphere.”  Her sole existence, according to this logic, relies upon a certain degree of 
impersonality required for the performance of her role as representative of a movement.  
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Verena’s ability to become the personality of the women’s movement is what draws 
Olive to her. Paradoxically, this ability depends upon Verena’s lack of self-awareness, but that 
scarcity of awareness also distinguishes her from everyone else, most especially—Olive, Mrs. 
Farrinder, and Miss Birdseye—the champions of this particular cause. Olive, for example, 
though she claims to Mrs. Farrinder that she has “no self-possession, no eloquence” and despite 
her secret hope that she “might be a martyr and die for something,” possesses herself well 
enough to know that her “taste” and appreciation for the material pleasures of life prevent her by 
“suffering” in the same ways other, more common women do (63, 43). Though Olive tries “to 
kill that nerve” and to “persuade herself that taste is only frivolity in the disguise of knowledge,” 
she simply does not share a common consciousness about life with the women she so desperately 
wants to liberate because of her personal preferences, desires, etc., (57). Olive cannot speak for 
them because she doesn’t quite understand them. On the other hand, as a site of entry for the 
impersonal, Verena is void of the confines of consciousness that Olive exhibits and is therefore 
able to construct a common consciousness with whomever she is representing through her 
speech. Verena’s lack of fixed identity ironically separates her from the masses she represents 
and thus particularizes her.  
The inherent paradox in Verena’s characterization indicates that the issue of her 
consciousness is more complex than the assertion that she doesn’t have one at all and thus 
available for Olive or Ransom to possess. After the scene at Miss Birdseye’s, the narrator 
remarks that “Verena took life [. . .] very simply; she was not conscious of so many differences 
of social complexion” and that she “had no vivid sense that she was not as good as any one else” 
(97). And when learning more about Verena, Olive notes that “she was only supremely innocent” 
and that “she didn’t understand, didn’t interpret” (127). She also reflects that Verena is “too 
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rancourless, too detached from conventional standards, too free from private self-reference” 
(183). These passages indicate that the problem of Verena’s consciousness in The Bostonians is 
not that she is completely void of consciousness—as a corporeal entity in the world, she cannot 
be—but that there is little evidence that she exhibits any sort of self-reflection. As a result, this 
prohibits her consciousness from developing on her own terms through knowledge acquired by 
her experience. Without self-reflection, Verena must construct knowledge of herself based on 
what the people in her life know her as in order to perform as a particular person with a distinct 
personality in the other characters’ lives. She is sweet, innocent, and talented then because the 
narrator, Olive, Basil, and her parents tell her she is so; she meets their expectations by 
performing the ways in which they know/see her and in the process comes to recognize herself 
only as they do. When Mrs. Farrinder or Mrs. Burrage meet her with suspicion, she is 
unsusceptible because the larger consensus is that she does in fact have something to say and 
because so many people believe in her gift, Verena naturally assumes she is gifted. But because 
her assumption is rooted in knowledge derived from outside of her own consciousness, it appears 
to the narrator and to others as “naturally theatrical.” The self Verena presents to the world is not 
wholly her own, but rather a composite of others’ assertions about that self: Verena is at once 
spontaneous and innocent, but also performative and, in the terms of Rawlings, “framed” by the 
ways in which others view her (232).24 
Since she lacks the self-consciousness that determines individuals as particular and 
separate from one another, Verena’s relationships with Olive and Basil are primarily responsible 
for the ways in which she becomes conscious of herself. As Verena’s and Olive’s relationship 
develops, Olive opens “Verena’s eyes to extraordinary pictures, made the girl believe that she 
                                                 
24 Rawlings argues that Verena’s consciousness must be framed because “all seeing is partial” so that however 
“freely seen” a person wants to be, they must be framed by the sight of someone else (232). 
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had a heavenly mission” and sparks in her “quite a new measure of the interest of life” (125). 
Verena responds by taking “all that was given her and was grateful, and missed nothing that was 
withheld” (125). Olive sees Verena as “an exquisite creature,” that despite her crude upbringing, 
was a girl “who had some natural light, some divine spark of taste,” and who was “fresh from the 
hand of Omnipotence” and “far from common” (133). Olive even assures Verena that while she 
“must be saved,” her saving will “come from the growth of” her own perception and “seeing” of 
things herself “sincerely and with conviction,” so that she will certainly come to know life “in 
the light in which I see them” (152). Olive promises Verena a certain amount of freedom by 
promising that her conscious will develop on its own without her influence, though she is sure 
Verena will come to recognize Olive’s knowledge as truth. Seeing herself through Olive, Verena 
is quick to assimilate into this version of herself—it is a prettier version than the one the 
Tarrant’s had already given her— and believes that the truth she “wanted to know” was clearly 
in Olive’s keeping (163). So when Olive asks Verena “to give up” or to “renounce” the idea of 
marriage in favor of their cause, Verena happily does so at least partially because Olive’s “tone 
worked a spell, and she found something to which at least a portion of her nature turned with 
eagerness in her companion’s wider knowledge” (153). She can renounce marriage with ease 
because knowledge of herself in a committed heterosexual and romantic relationship that exists 
solely for personal reasons has been withheld from her experience. As Verena begins her studies 
with Olive (and thus her relative isolation in Olive’s Beacon Street home), the narrator remarks 
that the “fine web of authority, of dependence” that Olive had “woven about her, was now as 
dense as a suit of golden mail” and that Verena was now “thoroughly interested in their great 
undertaking” (178). We are told Verena’s “former attitude had been girlish submission, grateful, 
curious sympathy” and though she “had given herself” because of “Olive’s stronger will,” that 
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over the course of their interaction she was “no longer passive, purely appreciative” but now 
“passionate” as she believed “ardently” in their cause (178).  
Despite this assertion from the narrator, it isn’t entirely fair to say that Verena has 
developed a stake in their joint cause wholly on her own accord as Olive originally promises. 
Olive reflects early in her training of Verena that there were “so many things that she hadn’t yet 
learned to dislike” in spite of Olive’s efforts to teach her (137). The fact that Olive teaches 
Verena to like or dislike anything at all indicates that Olive is constructing a version of Verena 
that relies upon her own knowledge, experience, and perceptions. Verena’s likes and dislikes are 
of little consequence to Olive, though she is always telling Verena that she is at liberty to do as 
she pleases. And yet Olive isolates and immerses Verena, “her listening and responsive friend,” 
by presenting her worldview “again and again” so that “there was no light in which they did not 
seem to palpitate from the truth” until Verena is “immensely wrought upon” and “a subtle fire 
passed into her” (191). By the time they leave for Europe, Olive has inculcated Verena with her 
truths about feminism until Verena “quite agreed with her companion that after so many ages of 
wrong [. . .] men must take their turn, men must pay!” (191). Janet Gabler-Hover argues that in 
scenes such as these Olive “compels Verena to renounce her essence” of benevolence so that she 
may exploit her in public as a champion for feminism (176-77). Wolstenholme, on the other 
hand, notes that Verena acts as a medium for Olive in that Olive, through their intercourse, is 
“quite literally absorbing Verena” and subsequently “inhabiting her ‘form’” (583). Regardless of 
her motivations or intentions, in terms of Verena’s consciousness, Olive possesses Verena by 
indoctrinating Verena with the version of herself that Olive has concocted: a Verena that—at 
least intellectually—mimics Olive but maintains all of Verena’s original charm, innocence, and 
vocal talent. Olive essentially subsumes Verena with her own consciousness to the point that 
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Verena dismisses any sense of particularity that she may have had and, as Rawlings argues, is 
confined to the point that she cannot recognize her own consciousness from that of Olive’s.  
Though it seems for much of the novel that Olive is successful at transforming Verena, 
Verena is partially aware of her own transformation. When Basil Ransom visits Verena at her 
parents’ house in Monadonc Place, Verena tells Basil that Olive “makes” her speeches because 
she tells her “what to say—the real things, the strong things” and that “It’s Miss Chancellor” as 
much as it is her (230). Verena also tells him that “I advocate equal rights, equal opportunities, 
equal privileges” and “So does Miss Chancellor” (233) before she finally says to him “Miss 
Chancellor has absorbed me – there is no doubt about that” (234). Verena’s ability to 
communicate to Basil that Olive has “absorbed” her indicates that she is not incapable of self-
reflection. Limited though her conscious may be, Verena is capable of recognizing the influence 
Olive has in developing “her” opinions and thoughts.25  
In fact, there are several moments early in The Bostonians that portray Verena as at least 
partially self-aware, which complicate traditional readings of her simplicity. Soon after Verena’s 
introduction, the narrator recounts a conversation where Verena and Mrs. Tarrant discuss Olive 
and he says Verena “had her own ways of thinking of it, which were not her mother’s, and if she 
lent herself to this lady’s extensive considerations it was because that was the best way of 
keeping her thoughts to herself” (124). Here Verena knows herself enough to decipher that her 
way of thinking about Olive differs from her mother’s, but by keeping her thoughts to herself she 
limits her ability to internalize and intellectualize these thoughts and thus her ability to allow her 
consciousness to alter according to her will. Instead, by keeping her thoughts to herself, Verena 
                                                 
25 It is important to note here, however, that Verena does not distinguish between her thoughts and Olive’s—they 
both promote equal rights, etc. to the same extent and even Verena’s speeches are not differentiated as her own, but 
as an amalgamation of her voice put to Olive’s beliefs. 
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maintains a degree of malleability, and thus allows others to shape and manipulate the ways in 
which she gains knowledge of herself. Similarly, in the scene mentioned above, Verena reflects 
that Basil’s visit “was very agreeable” to her though her “pleasure was mixed with other feelings 
or at least with the consciousness that the whole situation was rather less simple than the 
elements of her life had been hitherto” (235). Though Verena cannot clearly articulate how the 
visit with Basil will complicate her life, she is conscious that the visit will affect her. Moreover, 
as they tour Harvard’s Memorial Hall and she contemplates what keeping the meeting a secret 
from Olive might mean, Verena demonstrates a desire for the particular and the personal. When 
she considers not telling Olive, Verena evinces a conscious desire for autonomy—she wants to 
be and have knowledge outside of their relationship. Because she does not tell Olive until much 
later about the visit, Verena withholds knowledge from what is quickly becoming a common 
consciousness between her and Olive. This distinguishes Verena from that collective 
consciousness; she possesses individual knowledge that is not privy to Olive’s judgment and 
control. The distance Verena establishes from Olive by keeping her meeting with Basil a secret 
makes accessing her consciousness on her own terms a real possibility. This distance initiates a 
state of double consciousness that will plague Verena for the remainder of the novel.  
Basil’s visit and Verena’s secret from Olive is significant in two ways. First, because it 
demonstrates her capability to think, know, and experience on her own terms without an external 
influence. This becomes the first time Verena makes a conscious decision and acts out of her 
own free will. Gabler-Hover argues that “[i]n James’s fiction, the sharing between two persons 
of a secret truth that excludes the rest of the world initiates [. . .] a heightened sense of self. As 
one perceives the difference between oneself and the rest of the world [. . .] consciousness 
becomes more defined” (179). Although these moments of self-reflection and awareness are 
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limited because Verena does not give voice or articulate her own thoughts to the other characters, 
they still depict her as a person with the ability to think and to know for herself. For instance, she 
feels a small amount of guilt at keeping her secret from Olive, but keeps it all the same. By 
having knowledge that differs from Olive’s knowledge, Verena accesses her consciousness on 
her own terms and begins to distinguish herself beyond the limits of their relationship. This 
complicates the earlier emptiness of her character for which the other characters vie for 
possession.  
Second, this meeting with Basil initiates his influence over and desire to possess Verena’s 
consciousness. Like Olive, Basil views Verena as “constantly simple” though “her candour 
seemed to him preternatural” (248). Again, and James reemphasizes the point when Basil 
questions Verena on Olive’s role in designing her speeches, Verena is viewed as outside of and 
different from people more generally and characterized as simple and without thoughts of her 
own. Her simplicity renders her without personality and available for possession in the minds of 
both Olive and Basil. The narrator, for example, tells us here that Basil enjoys “her visible 
hesitation” and “was slightly conscious of a man’s brutality – of being pushed by an impulse to 
test her good-nature, which seemed to have no limit” (248). Basil is aware of his influence over 
her and this scene marks the beginning of his struggle to control Verena’s consciousness in order 
to win her essentially from Olive’s “fine web of authority.” 
Verena helps Basil do this unknowingly, because at this point in the novel she is still only 
partially self-aware, by inviting him to her first New York speaking engagement at the 
Burrage’s. Upon hearing her speech Basil reflects that it “had about the value of a pretty essay, 
committed to memory and delivered by a bright girl [. . .] it was vague, thin, rambling, a tissue of 
generalities that glittered agreeably enough” (269). He also notes the “importance of the speech 
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was high” because of the fact that the voice was “not the voice of Olive or Adeline” but Verena’s 
(269). He “rejoices” in the fact that “she was so weak in argument” and that “she counted as a 
factor only because the public mind was in a muddle” as it “was a proof that her apostleship was 
all nonsense, the most passing of fashions, veriest of delusions” (269). Basil’s reception of the 
speech indicates to him that Verena “was meant for something divinely different – for privacy, 
for him, for love” (269). The fact that Basil wants Verena for a private life confirms Lynn 
Wardley’s assertion that “Ransom fears what will take place when Verena enters the public 
domain” (639). His struggle to possess or affect Verena’s consciousness then is one that may or 
may not derive from real love; instead, as critics like Howe, Gabler-Hover, and Rawlings note, 
Basil’s desire to possess Verena is rooted in an ideological struggle about controlling how others 
know and see Verena.26 Ironically, though Basil wants Verena to exist in his private realm 
beyond the reach of public exposure, the same lack of particularity that renders Verena 
susceptible to public exploitation makes Verena susceptible to his view that she and her abilities 
belong in a privatized space.  
 Basil’s view of Verena as something for private possession eventually sways her from the 
image of herself with which Olive has presented. After her speech at the Burrage’s, Basil meets 
Verena and convinces her to walk in Central Park with him. She has a sense, even after that early 
visit in Cambridge, that “his interest in her was personal, not controversial” and though she has 
convinced Olive that her interest in their cause “would transcend any attraction” or personal 
relationship, Verena still hesitates to accompany him (312-313). Verena hesitates because she 
has no experience or knowledge with personal relationships not involved directly with her’s and 
Olive’s crusade. Verena only goes with him though when he declares he wants to talk to her of 
                                                 
26 The exact nature of these competing ideologies run the critical gamut but most often takes the form of 
dichotomies such as the public realm vs. private spheres, North vs. South, aristocracy vs. democracy, etc.  
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the differences between them for that “was not personal” in nature (318). The narrator, though 
this knowledge is not privy to Verena herself, notes that as “the nature of her reflections [. . .] 
softly battled with each other,” that going with Ransom also signals “that the struggle of yielding 
to a will which she felt to be stronger even than Olive’s was not of long duration” (322). 
  Once in the park, Basil vies for possession of Verena by providing her with an alternate 
image of herself. He tells her: “You stand apart, you are unique, extraordinary; you constitute a 
category by yourself [. . .] you are outside and above all vulgarizing influences” (330). This 
iteration of Verena as different and separate from other people, as able to transcend the crude 
influence of personalities, is reminiscent of Olive’s characterization of her. Basil continues:  
your connexion with all these rantings and ravings is the most unreal, accidental, illusory 
thing in the world. You think you care about them, but you don’t at all. They were 
imposed upon you by circumstances, by unfortunate associations, and you accepted them 
as you would have accepted any other burden [. . .] it isn’t you, the least in the world, but 
an inflated figure [. . .] whom you have invented and set on its feet, pulling strings, 
behind it, to make it move and speak, while you try to conceal and efface yourself there. 
Ah, Miss Tarrant, if it’s a question of pleasing how much you might please some one else 
by tipping your preposterous puppet over and standing forth in your freedom. (330) 
 Confronted with this version, Verena always “deeply attentive” springs to her feet and turns 
away from him though she felt “as if he felt the whole thing to be an absolute certainty – which 
partly scared her and partly made her feel angry” (330-1). Basil essentially assaults Olive’s 
construction of Verena’s consciousness by starting with some of the same distinctive qualities as 
Olive and with the same certainty or “truth” that Verena had originally found so persuasive. As 
Basil watches her for a response, Verena who had “been commended of old by Olive for her 
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serenity ‘while exposed to the gaze of hundreds’” was “now unable to endure the contemplation 
of an individual” (331). Faced with a new knowledge of who Basil thought she was or could be, 
Verena is uncomfortable and unfamiliar occupying such a personalized space for someone else 
as her current self-knowledge is only as a voice of a larger and impersonal collective and not as a 
singular person meant for private relationships. Basil’s version of who she could be further 
forces her into a state where she becomes aware of knowing herself in multiple ways at once.  
 Up until this point in The Bostonians, Verena has remained relatively passive as the other 
characters present their perceptions of her because most of these perceptions largely coalesce. 
Basil’s is the first image she has of herself outside of the impersonal and public sphere relegated 
to her by Olive and her parents.  Integrating her parents’ knowledge of her with Olive’s, for 
instance, was relatively simple as those versions of who she was and would be shared many 
similarities. Rawlings asserts that as a result “Verena is largely unconscious, and therefore 
without much of a personal identity” until this moment in Central Park with Ransom when she 
begins “to develop a sense of normative, or conventional privacy, and hence notions of 
interiority and consciousness” (232, 234). Her interactions with Basil are and continue to require 
privacy and secrecy from Olive precisely because they involve an alternate construction of her 
selfhood. Basil, like Olive before him, immerses and indoctrinates Verena with his image of her 
as he continues his pursuit of her in Marmion until she is convinced that it is the better version.  
 As a consequence of experiencing double consciousness, Verena’s instinct is to defend 
and cling to the image of herself that Olive and her parents have provided. The confines of her 
consciousness and more importantly her self-awareness expand in these moments with Basil and 
thus assault the notion of herself that she does possess. She finds that Basil’s “description of 
herself as something different from what she was trying to be, the charge of want of reality, 
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made her heart beat with pain” (331). In response, she questions Basil about his perception of her 
“gift”: “I presume, from what you say, that you don’t think I have much ability” (331). The 
knowledge she has of herself relies so heavily on her ability to represent the masses that this 
becomes a desperate attempt to keep the identity formed by her speaking intact.27 Basil replies 
that he thinks her ability is actually “genius” though it should be used “in a very different line” 
such as the “realm of family life and the domestic affections” (331). His reply only further 
confuses matters for Verena as it does not nullify her gift and therefore her identity altogether, 
but rather places it in another sphere for which she has had no exposure. More specifically, 
Ransom’s version of her particularizes her away from the masses and requires a singular 
personality of which she has no possession. She becomes uncomfortable under his gaze and 
wishes “to lead him off again into the general” with which she is not only familiar, but an expert 
at navigating through talk. Despite her discomfort, Verena recognizes that “at any rate, it was her 
real self that was there with him now,” though “she oughtn’t to be” because it contradicts and 
challenges every part of who she knows herself to be (331). 
 Rawlings is correct in his assertions that the scene in Central Park is the first time where 
Verena accesses her consciousness as her own. However, this access is not solely due to the 
privacy she must maintain about her encounters with and subsequent feelings for Basil. Instead, 
Verena’s cognizance and self-awareness in this scene, for the first time, challenges her 
knowledge of herself with a competing image. Basil’s version is even more problematic because 
it too relies on her gift of speaking, but places that ability in a private and personal realm for 
which Verena has no experience. This moment yields a sense of double consciousness for 
                                                 
27 It is worth noting here that though this scene is the first where Verena seems most in touch with her conscious, it 
is not the first time she has struggled to maintain this identity in the company of Basil. Earlier when they are touring 
the grounds of Harvard, she randomly, after a long period of silence, remarks to him that her travels in Europe 
“showed” and “proved” she  had “a great use” (242). 
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Verena because she has access to two competing modes of self-knowledge: one as a point of 
access for the impersonal so that she may represent and particularize issues of concern for the 
masses and the other as a particular person not required to give voice to the collective, but to be 
possessed by one particular person. What confounds the condition of double consciousness for 
Verena is that neither version of herself is rooted in her own awareness of the self.  
 Naturally, because she withholds Basil’s image of her as well as her feelings from Olive, 
Verena distances herself from Olive and from the knowledge Olive has instilled in her. This 
distance provides space for Basil’s version of her access to inform and influence her 
consciousness.  Because Verena grapples with two competing modes of self-knowledge, she 
becomes aware of the consequences posed by choosing one over another, which once again 
demonstrates that she is not merely an “empty vessel” as she has some cognizance of herself 
beyond that which others provide her. For example, when Ransom first appears at Marmion “a 
mortal chill” creeps over her as she must now explain Ransom’s presence to Olive (361). The 
description of Verena as experiencing a “mortal chill” is significant to the notion that she is 
suffering from double consciousness because, according to the Emersonian ideal, to know 
oneself in two ways is impossible without some sort of painful consequence.  She knows to 
admit her secrets and deceptions will hurt Olive but also will tarnish her promise to renounce and 
thus her identity as committed to their cause. She also knows to refuse to see Basil will sacrifice 
“the real” and liberated part of herself that she experienced with him earlier in Central Park. 
Choosing either Olive’s version or Basil’s version will come at the cost of renouncing some 
aspect of a self that she has been made to believe are both her.  
 The distance that Basil’s perception of Verena creates between her and Olive allows 
Verena to develop and practice self-reflection more concretely than she was able prior to this 
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point. Because Basil offers her a new and decidedly different option of knowing herself, Verena 
comes “at last to believe” and allows herself to transform into his version. His knowledge kindles 
“a light in which she saw herself afresh” and “she liked herself better than in the old exaggerated 
glamour of the lecture-lamps” (374). She admits to herself that “the truth had changed sides” and 
that “Instead of being constituted by nature for entertaining that sentiment in an exceptionally 
small degree (which had been the implication for her whole crusade, the apparent warrant of her 
offer of old to Olive to renounce)” was now constituted for that “largest range, the highest 
intensity” which was the love she felt “in every throb of her being” (374). Basil frames Verena as 
a particular person meant to have personal relationships based in emotion rather than a being 
designed simply to give voice to the causes of other particular persons. Verena knows that 
assuming this version of herself means to be “a partner of his struggle, of his severe, hard, unique 
stoicism” and that she must suffer in this way as a “condition to her happiness” (376). Rawlings 
argues that the “truth” or knowledge changes sides for Verena because “she realizes that her 
selfhood, or the reflection that constructs it at least, is other-directed, and contingent on 
sentiment” so that “to see herself reflected is to encounter a reflection and to become, in turn 
reflective.” And as she reflects on her love for Basil, “she discovers a sentiment that qualifies her 
to enter social and human realms as distinct from those of the puppet theaters and drawing room 
platforms” that she previously occupied (Rawlings 236).  
 The idea that Verena sees herself as “other-directed” is important here because it does 
reflect her most self-aware moment in the novel. I would like to suggest, however, that this self-
awareness is not initiated by emotional sentiments, such as love for Ransom or loyalty to Olive. 
Rather, Verena more concretely demonstrates self-reflection because she has access to a 
consciousness that is all her own. Though this consciousness is only made accessible to her 
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through the opposing versions of herself that are provided via Olive and Basil, the sentiment she 
really finds appealing is not really as that of lecturess speaking on behalf of a collective or a part 
of a more particularized relationship that Basil offers, but is one where she acknowledges her 
own will and desires. The secondary image of herself that Basil provides forces Verena to 
distance herself cognitively from Olive’s. This distance not only allows room for Basil’s 
knowledge to occupy a space within her conscious, but it forces Verena to acknowledge her own 
desires in order to choose either Olive’s construction of herself or Basil’s. The narrator notes that 
as the truth changes sides for Verena she recognizes her own desire “to keep on pleasing others” 
as well as her immense “desire to please herself” and consequently feels “strained and aching” 
and wonders how far it “was necessary to go in the path of self-sacrifice” (376). Though Verena 
will remain torn between Olive and Basil for the remainder of the novel, in this moment she 
acknowledges and gives voice to a consciousness separate from their influences.  
 What Verena “loves” then is not necessarily Basil, but the sense of self she gains access 
to as he initiates the condition of double consciousness for her. Basil’s declaration and 
subsequent courtship provoke Verena to acknowledge competing versions of herself, but they 
also require she confront her feelings about each version. As she gives herself over to Basil’s 
version—and I would argue here that she only accepts this version above Olive’s because it is 
both new and different as well as allows her the freedom to recognize her own agency—she must 
penetrate who she is outside of each version. And Verena is a person who likes to please others 
even at the cost of herself.  
 Her desire to please others causes her to lose herself to the consciousness of others. At 
the end of the novel, Verena appears “glad” that Basil has “rescued” her from her public speech 
at Boston’s Music Hall. The narrator, however, notes “though she was glad” she was also “in 
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tears” and that “It is to be feared that with the union, so far from brilliant, into which she was 
about to enter, these were not the last she was destined to shed” (432). These final lines indicate 
that the cost of Verena’s condition of double consciousness is not necessarily knowing herself as 
either the voice of Olive’s cause or a possession of Basil’s, but as a particular person at all. 
Basil’s success at influencing Verena’s consciousness occurs because he provides an opposing 
image of her to that of Olive’s, and this difference necessitates that she distance herself from 
Olive’s image in order to entertain both versions of herself. Once she does this, she reaffirms her 
early malleability and because of Basil’s persistence, like Olive’s before him, his version 
overtakes Olive’s and thus he wins her over. Yet, in that brief moment of space where both 
versions were competing, Verena becomes aware of herself and her desires outside of each 
construction of herself.   
 Verena’s actual condition of double consciousness amounts not to a choice between 
knowing herself either as Olive does or as Basil does, but to a kind of knowledge comprised of a 
self understood impersonally through external constructions and a self understood through her 
own experience, beliefs, and desires. When she taps into her consciousness, she allows herself to 
become a particular person with a distinctive personality. She thus functions as a site on which 
James tests the limitations of a consciousness forced to choose between her self-knowledge and 
the knowledge of self as constructed by others. In Marmion, when she feels something akin to 
love for Basil, Verena formulates knowledge of herself on her own terms. Her newly acquired 
self-knowledge that she is a people-pleaser causes her turmoil because she wants to please both 
Olive and Basil. Yet, their versions and desires for her are so dichotomous that she must 
ultimately choose because they cannot coexist. The reason Verena cries at the end is not because 
she feels doomed to a life of domesticity or because she left the world of public-speaking behind, 
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but because she has failed to please Olive when she pleases Basil; and though she pleases herself 
by choosing Basil, this pleasure is only temporary. What Verena realizes and cries over at the 
end of novel is that by choosing either Olive or Basil she chooses against herself and denies her 
growing particularity and personality.  
 The problem with the figuration of the condition of double consciousness in The 
Bostonians is that Verena is left with no option but to choose against herself—her self-
knowledge until the moment in Marmion is entirely constructed by others, which renders her 
unaware of herself as a particular person with a fixed personality in the corporeal world. When 
she does experience true self-awareness it is only after someone else has offered her a different 
pre-constructed version of herself. Her only access to self-knowledge is granted only after Basil 
paints her in a new and different light. Her choice to go with Basil at the end of the novel is one 
that reflects his connection to the access his version grants to her consciousness rather than any 
real belief or desire to inhabit the form of herself he constructs. Olive’s austerity and 
indoctrination, as well as the fact that her version of Verena resembles previous notions, denies 
this access by forcing Verena to commit and renounce. Olive denies Verena the very liberty she 
promises and thus prohibits any exploration of consciousness outside of her established 
parameters. Verena’s choice to move from one construction of herself to another, or from one 
“union” to another remains outside of her own possession of her self: neither allows her to 
transcend that identity in order to exercise her own consciousness nor to become a particular 
person with a personality, and a mind, of her own.  
James’ characterization of Verena thus demonstrates the limitations of paradigms for 
consciousness that requires knowing oneself in a variety of ways. James employs the condition 
of double consciousness to demonstrate the consequences of knowing oneself in different ways 
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as Verena must ultimately choose against her desire to know herself outside of the constructions 
of self imposed upon her. In effect, Verena denies herself as a self. By allowing Verena to 
choose between Basil and Olive at all, James limits the potential of her particularity and thus her 
personhood as he has done throughout The Bostonians. Her choice, and the narrator’s subsequent 
fear that the union will cause more tears, reflects the limits James imposes on Verena’s 
consciousness as she cannot ever fully possess herself because she chooses between two 
preconceived ideas of self. Her self-knowledge then is limited by these pre-existing versions of 
who she is, versions in which she has no real opportunity to reconcile Olive’s and Basil’s 
knowledge of her, and no means for integrating how they know her with her own growing sense 
of self. Rawlings argues “unless there is pain, there can be no consciousness” and this is certainly 
true for Verena (238). The pain of having to choose between not just Olive and Basil but 
between their ideas of her self and her growing self-awareness both grants and destroys her 
consciousness.  
 Although the idea that double consciousness is a destructive condition that causes 
suffering predominates in The Bostonians, James has difficulty demonstrating the extent of its 
devastation for an individual because of the ways external constructions of Verena’s 
consciousness limit her ability to develop true “self-knowledge.” Verena does adequately 
demonstrate the limitations of human consciousness when affected with multiple modes of 
knowing the self, but the consequences of these limitations are only implied by the novel’s final 
lines rather than explicitly portraying the often-catastrophic effects to the self that such a 
condition imposes. Where James fails with Verena in this sense, he succeeds with Milly Theale 
in The Wings of the Dove.  
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Milly 
 James’ reader is indirectly introduced to Milly Theale in Book Third of Wings by her 
Bostonian chaperone, Susan Shepard Stringham. What the reader knows about Milly then is 
merely what Susie knows about Milly, which “as she believed” was “knowing much more about 
Milly Theale than Milly herself knows” (76). Susie sees Milly as the “the real thing, the romantic 
life itself” even though she feels uncertain as to why Milly “was real” (79). Milly’s realness 
causes Mrs. Stringham “very consciously, from the first, to give something up for her” and so 
she gives up all—her life as a writer in Boston— in order to accompany Milly abroad (81). Mrs. 
Stringham, a “woman of the world,” views Milly as a “princess, the only one she had yet to deal 
with” and this “made all the difference” (86). Milly “was the biggest impression” of Susie’s life 
and “Mrs. Stringham by this time understood everything, was more than ever confirmed [. . .] in 
her view that it was life enough simply to feel her companion’s feelings” (81, 83).  
 For the others, Milly functions as “a light” in “which to be read,” and Susie attempts to 
read Milly over the course of the novel never really knowing her as fully as she thinks she does 
(84). Because Susie describes Milly as an impression she can feel, her actual knowledge of 
Milly’s consciousness is limited and thus “darkened” (76). She feels Milly as “the real thing” 
without knowing what makes her so much more real than any other person. What Susie does 
know of Milly is not knowledge of Milly herself—that is Milly’s consciousness—but rather how 
the rest of the world configures Milly. In other words, Susie knows Milly in the roles she plays 
for the other characters: Milly is Susie’s princess, Kate’s dove, and Densher’s and Lord Mark’s 
American girl.  
This darkened knowledge of the “real” Milly does not belong exclusively to Susie. In 
Book Sixth at Mrs. Lowder’s dinner party, in Milly’s absence, Mrs. Lowder and Kate applaud 
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Densher for having “known” Milly first. When Susie rises to Milly’s defense by telling Densher 
he knows nothing, “not the least little bit” about Milly, he replies with “I certainly don’t know 
much [. . .] She’s beautiful, but I don’t say she’s easy to know [. . .] I didn’t forget her. One 
doesn’t forget an impression” (209-10).  Kate then replies to this with: “You’re right about her 
not being easy to know. One sees her with intensity—sees her more than one sees almost any 
one; but then one discovers that that isn’t knowing her and that one may know better a person 
whom one doesn’t ‘see,’ as I say, half so much” (211). Millicent Bell argues that Milly “is 
problematic and inscrutable, someone who others try, unsuccessfully, to bring to definition,” that 
James wished to “propose or to test the value of her indefiniteness” as “she is observed and 
reflected on by all the other characters.” Bell goes on to argue that “their problem with Milly is 
James’s own [. . .] the problem of defining human individuality in relation to its living acts” 
(314). Despite frequent encounters with Milly, neither Susie, Kate, nor Merton can know her 
consciousness completely, because Milly is always conscious of how they “see” her. There are 
no common terms for which to define Milly except for the roles which the other characters 
assign her (princess, dove, American girl) which renders her undefinable and unknowable. 
Similarly, Milly’s limited consciousness replicates her appearance in the novel: the reader only 
really has full knowledge of Milly’s consciousness when she is featured alone and these 
moments are restricted through the novel’s narration. When Milly shares moments with Susie, 
Kate, Densher, or even Lord Mark the narrator mediates her consciousness by depicting her 
awareness of how the others see her. This is perhaps best demonstrated by Milly’s initial 
encounter with Lord Mark during her first dinner party at Lancaster Gate. The narrator notes 
Milly’s awareness that Lord Mark had traveled to New York and his trips had “helped him to 
place her, and she was more and more sharply conscious of having [. . .] been popped into the 
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compartment in which she was to travel for him” (105). The narrator goes on to remark that most 
girls would resent Lord Mark’s assumptions, but that Milly’s “kind of mind” was “made all for 
mere seeing and taking” which made her charming as well as such a success with the others 
(105). 
 Milly’s limited presence, and particularly the rare moments we see her fully conscious, 
cause critics like Virginia Fowler to argue that Milly, “unable and unwilling to create an identity 
of her own,” accepts the roles the other characters “envision for her” such as Kate’s dove and 
Susie’s princess (60). Isolated cognitively from the other characters and thus a victim to their 
schemes, Milly, like Verena, does not possess any sort of self-knowledge. What Fowler doesn’t 
account for are the scenes where Milly appears to not only have a clarity of her own 
consciousness but also some sort of possession over it, such as in the Bronzino portrait scene or 
when she goes to Regent’s Park alone after her second visit with Sir Luke. Gary Kuchar’s 
argument that “Milly’s consciousness is conveyed in conditional and hypothetical terms, 
effecting a profound sense of distance between herself and the other characters, as well as herself 
and the reader” seems more apt at describing not only these moments where Milly appears to be 
in full possession of herself, but also those in which the narrator mediates her consciousness by 
describing her awareness of how the other characters view her to the reader (179). Kuchar also 
notes that the distance between Milly’s consciousness and the reader “will begin to narrow as she 
moves towards greater self-awareness” (179). These moments, in other words, feature less 
intervention on Milly’s behalf by the narrator or the other characters and more direct access to 
Milly’s thoughts as they occur to her. 
 Presented as a series of ebbs and flows, Milly’s consciousness restricts how much the 
reader (or the other characters) can possibly know Milly while simultaneously leaving the 
123 
 
impression or feeling that we do in fact have complete knowledge of her. But limitations 
imposed on others’ knowledge of Milly does not necessarily correspond to what Milly knows of 
herself. Despite her limited presence in the novel, Milly seems to know herself far better than 
either of the “successive centres” that James suggests make up her “circumference” know 
themselves, as Kate and Densher spend countless pages considering who they are and 
contemplating their own actions as their plot is unraveled (this is especially true in the case of 
Densher).  
James features Milly not only as his “fixed centre” but also as a character whose 
consciousness is often impenetrable to those around her even as she exhibits qualities of a person 
who knows herself and allows that knowledge to develop with her. I am suggesting that Milly 
succeeds where Verena fails. Milly’s function in the The Wings of the Dove is to serve as site in 
which a version of Emersonian double consciousness is enacted in order to demonstrate the 
destructive consequences such a consciousness can have not only for individual persons, but also 
for those intimately involved with that person. Emersonian double consciousness refuses the 
reconciliation or integration of dual modes of knowing the self. The lacunae that prevent access 
to Milly—Kate’s and Densher’s inability to fully “see” her, the reader’s convoluted introduction 
to her state of mind—demonstrate the irreconcilability at the heart of Emerson’s concept.  
 In addition to the untenability of double consciousness, another characteristic of this 
Emersonian ideal is the awareness that two competing modes of self-knowledge exist. In 
Emerson’s writing, these competing modes often take a variety of forms such as: understanding 
vs. the soul, the public vs. the private (the version presented in The Bostonians), the material vs. 
the spiritual, and so on. What all of these dichotomies point to is a division between knowledge 
of the self as a particular person, and knowledge of the self as part of something much larger and 
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impersonal.  In Wings, Milly emerges as a figure who experiences the condition of double 
consciousness because she must confront a similar dichotomy: in order to possess or know 
herself, Milly must confront her imminent death and the effects that both her life and death have 
on her as a particular person, but also the effects (or lack thereof) that each will have on the 
world more generally.  
During the first dinner at Lancaster Gate in Book Fourth, we get our first glimpse into 
Milly’s consciousness. Here, with help from the narrator, we learn that Milly hopes to gain 
insight about the differences between her and Kate Croy from Lord Mark. When she does not, 
because he tells her that he has “failed” with Kate and does not “make her out,” Milly is glad 
because “explanations would in truth have taken her much too far” and that there were 
“probably, many things, as to which she would learn more and which glimmered there already as 
part and parcel of that larger ‘real’” in which she found herself upon arriving in London with 
Susie (109).28 In two important ways these thoughts reflect Milly’s developing consciousness 
and more importantly initiate her condition of double consciousness. First, she senses that she is 
“part and parcel of that larger ‘real,’” which in this particular instance represents her growing 
awareness of the complexities of London society. This recognition is significant, even if she 
cannot fully integrate exactly what it means to be a part of the larger real, because for the first 
time the reader sees Milly as seeing herself as more than just herself. Yet, to know oneself as 
more than just her particular self, according to the logic of double consciousness, requires a 
sacrifice of the self as previously known to the person; thus, Milly must come to first know 
                                                 
28 In Nature Emerson writes, “Standing on the bare ground,--my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into 
infinite space,--all mean egotism vanishes. I become transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the 
Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God” (10). This passage is significant to the 
discussion of Milly’s double consciousness because here Emerson notes that his personality or particularity vanishes 
and when it does, he is able to immerse himself and become part of the larger entity of God or the Universal Being. 
Likewise, Milly though she cannot access it fully at this point in the novel, recognizes that she may be privy to 
knowledge which will demonstrate to her how she will help compose “that larger ‘real.” 
125 
 
herself as a particular person and because at this moment in the novel she has not quite realized 
or possessed herself (as demonstrated through the narrator’s mediation as well as the other 
characters reflections on her without any direct access to Milly’s thoughts) she must come to 
knowledge of the role she plays in the “larger real” more carefully and gradually.  
Second, this scene is important because it exacerbates Milly’s double consciousness as 
she begins to become aware of the distance separating her from the other characters, especially 
Kate. Milly finds herself wondering in the very next chapter, after a more private encounter with 
Kate, why “she herself was so ‘other’” from Kate because they lack what James often terms a 
“common consciousness” and experience— a “failure of common terms” (123). Double 
consciousness emerges in these first unfiltered views of Milly because she senses her difference 
and otherness not only from Kate, but from English society more generally. She can’t quite 
explain her difference or particularity, but realizes that she is and starts to apprehend knowledge 
of herself as such. The feeling she expresses at Lancaster Gate that a more truthful or fuller 
explanation of these differences would have taken her too far because she has yet to 
acknowledge her own mortality, allow her to recognize herself in a manner that differentiates her 
from Kate (such as Kate’s cruel streak when she talks of Susie). Milly must come to this 
knowledge gradually because it will require her to sacrifice herself—a sacrifice she cannot make 
until she possesses or knows herself more fully.   
 Critics often treat Milly’s confrontation with the Bronzino portrait at Lord Mark’s 
Matcham estate, for instance, as the first time that she becomes fully aware of what Sheila 
Teahan calls her “abysmal otherness” (114).29 Milly is “looking at the portrait through tears” and 
                                                 
29 Teahan also argues that the first time the reader sees Milly’s “abysmal otherness” is when Susie sees Milly sitting 
on the edge of a cliff in Switzerland and wonders if Milly is about to throw herself off and then decides that for 
Milly “it wouldn’t be for a questions of a flying leap and thereby of a quick escape. It would be a question of taking 
full in the face the whole assault of life” (89). But because the reader does not have access to Milly’s consciousness 
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sees the woman in whom Lord Mark and Kate Croy find Milly’s likeness and thinks to herself 
that “she was dead, dead, dead” before exclaiming aloud that she “shall never be better than this” 
(139). Kristin Boudreau credits this exclamation to Milly’s realization not of her own mortality 
but of the realization of the “deadness of existence.” She says that what seems to trouble Milly 
most is not that she will die one day, but that “even during her own lifetime she will outlive her 
moments of transcendent thought and feeling” or her own subjectivity (105). Conversely, Kuchar 
reads Milly as recognizing her own death in the portrait and the moment when “the slowly 
connecting pieces of Milly’s consciousness begin to merge” because the portrait functions 
“prosopopoeiaically” for Milly as it “puts a face to something which” has been an absence for 
her (180). But it matters little what exactly Milly comes to recognize regarding her own mortality 
when viewing the portrait because whatever it is causes her to acquire some recognition, and thus 
knowledge, even if that knowledge is not made clear (or clearly accessible) to the reader at this 
point in Milly’s story.   
This newfound knowledge is another sign of her particularity in relation to Kate and the 
others; Milly’s viewing of the portrait simply makes her more conscious of this difference even 
as Milly struggles to name the difference. Milly tries to differentiate herself from the woman in 
the picture by telling Lord Mark that though the woman’s complexion is green, hers is “greener” 
and that her hands “are larger” (140). When he tells her but “surely” she must “catch” the 
resemblance, Milly retorts that “one never knows one’s self” (140). Yet, Milly is starting to 
know herself in this scene not only through whatever the portrait signifies to her—regardless of 
whether or not they reflect her growing awareness of her own mortality or her growing desire to 
live despite the “deadness of existence”—but also how the others look at her and she looks back 
                                                 
at this point in the novel, it is difficult to know whether or not this is indeed a moment where Milly starts to come to 
terms with her particularity.  
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at them with the portrait looming over her. It is here where Milly starts to wonder how Kate must 
look to Densher and how she compared. And because seeing or looking signifies knowledge in 
Wings, Milly starts to know herself as “other,” something separate from and different than Kate 
despite their budding relationship. 
In this moment, when Milly begins to come to terms with the multiple ways in which her 
conscious develops, the reader gains more access to her thoughts. Milly is most clearly visible to 
the reader in the fourth chapter of Book Fifth as she leaves her physician, Sir Luke Strett, and 
contemplates what she has learned from him—that she must do nothing but “live,” which 
signifies to her that she is in fact dying.  Her entrance to Regent’s Park finds her contemplating 
her meeting with the doctor and demonstrating more fully a duality of consciousness. When 
Milly first enters the park she thinks to herself that she is glad she is alone because “No one in 
the world could have sufficiently entered into her state; no tie would have been close enough to 
enable a companion to walk beside her without some disparity” (153). She feels that she must 
only be surrounded by “the human race at large, present all round her, but inspiringly 
impersonal” (154). Her visit with Sir Luke has “made a mixture of her consciousness—a strange 
mixture that tasted at one and the same time of what one had lost and what had been given her” 
(154). On the one hand, this mixture of consciousness demonstrates Milly’s knowledge that she 
will die, but it also comes with the knowledge that she now has the freedom to live if she so 
chooses. Superficially, this is one version of double consciousness—Milly “could live” if she 
“would,” but only if she “gives up” or “darkens” her knowledge of the fact that she is in the 
process of dying because she cannot simultaneously know herself as actively living and actively 
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dying according to the logic of Emersonian double consciousness (155).30 On the other hand, 
however, Milly’s “mixture of consciousness” is more complex than just her knowing herself as 
choosing to live even while she dies. Here Milly more completely recognizes her particularity 
and the particularity of her situation. To be in the company of someone close to her at this 
moment would mean that Milly would have to acknowledge and name her particularity as she 
recognizes her own mortality. For Milly that disparity is what she calls “the question of ‘living’” 
by both “option” and “volition” whereas Kate, Merton, and Susie don’t choose to live, they live 
because “they could” without thinking about or knowing what living means for them (154-5). 
Instead of being forced to name her difference or her particularity as an individual person, she 
prefers the impersonality of the masses in the park.  
This preference to be among the masses of London, in the “current” of life resembles the 
moment at Lancaster Gate in which Milly senses that she is part of some “larger real” that 
complete knowledge of would “have taken her much too far” without really knowing what it 
means to be a part of something impersonal or of what role she is to play in the “larger real.” 
Kuchar says in this scene “Milly realizes a profound ‘consciousness of relations’ through a 
recognition of her own mortality” (171).  Milly can come to terms with a “consciousness of 
relations” only after she comes to possess herself as an individual, which necessitates that she 
confront her mortality because it differentiates her from the other characters in Wings. 
Later in the Regent’s Park scene as she goes “into it further” she finds that “this was the 
real thing” and that “the real thing was to be quite away from the pompous roads, well within the 
centre” (155). To be a part of “the real thing,” to be immersed “well within the centre” for Milly 
                                                 
30 Several critics note the interesting juxtaposition of Milly’s “would live” “could live” thoughts. Among some of 
the most interesting are Sharon Cameron’s analysis in Thinking in Henry James and Sheila Teahan’s in The 
Rhetorical Logic of Henry James.  
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is to be “in the same box” and to share with the masses “their great common anxiety”—“the 
practical question of life” (155). “The main connexion” she shares with the masses is “the 
current” that moved among them and was “a current determined [. . .] by others” (168). The 
common anxiety connects Milly to other people and it is impersonal unlike the personality of the 
relationships she shares with Susie, Densher, or Kate. Her ability to immerse herself in the 
common anxiety results because she is not forced to name her difference to anyone else. More 
importantly, “the real thing” is a relief to this common anxiety and it too is impersonal. Life as 
merely a current that moves based on the determination of the wants and needs of others means 
that individuals have no real control over their particular life’s outcome; the current relieves the 
anxiety of being a particular person trying to exist within the confines the corporeal world. Thus, 
Milly’s death is out of her hands just as it is for the others with whom she finds herself sharing “a 
box” in Regent’s Park and this realization enables her to live through her own volition for as 
long as she can.  
This scene in the park then is the moment in which Milly is faced with “a mixture of 
consciousness” or double consciousness as she is forced to know herself not only in a particular 
and individual way—in that her life is limited—, but also in the impersonal way as she shares a 
common anxiety with the rest of the park’s inhabitants—that she, like them, will die and as a 
result will render her life as well as her death of little significance to anyone except those in 
which she maintains a personal connection. Kuchar argues that in this scene Milly “communes” 
with the world in front of her while at the same times knows herself “outside it” as she is “now 
able to distance herself from herself without the disturbing effects” of the earlier “self-
objectification” she experiences during the Bronzino scene in order to become “genuinely 
otherwise” and “whole” (183). Sharon Cameron, on the other hand, argues that Milly’s “self is 
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liberated from any fixed mental state by the novel’s treating that state as if it could be understood 
by analogy to frames of mind dissociated first from one’s own person and then, further, from 
actual persons” (147). The analogies to frames of mind in which Cameron refers is to the 
thinking of mortality that the other park-goers are doing, which enables Milly to dissociate from 
her person in order to see her own as well as their thinking as externalized. Read in the context of 
double consciousness, however, these different interpretations of the Regent’s Park scene are less 
at odds than they at first appear and work jointly to highlight the scene’s significance to the rest 
of the novel. Because Milly comes to know herself as both particular person and part of 
something larger and impersonal in this scene she does in fact become “whole” as Kuchar notes. 
In other words, in this moment Milly becomes aware that she is conscious of herself in two ways 
and that these two modes of knowledge often compete with one another especially when she is in 
the presence of the other characters. Likewise, it is because Milly experiences this wholeness or 
moment of double consciousness that she is able to be “liberated from any fixed mental state,” 
and release herself from singular knowledge: that is to know herself solely as particular person or 
part of something more general and impersonal. 
Milly’s wholeness or liberation is not sustainable. Recalling Emerson’s warning that 
personal and impersonal aspects of a dual consciousness are irreconcilable, it should come as no 
surprise that after this scene in Wings the reader has very limited access to Milly’s consciousness 
before the narrator completely removes her from the novel altogether, even as the plot twists rely 
upon her. Aside from Milly’s brief walk through her Venetian palace, she is rarely present 
though often discussed by the other characters until she ultimately “turns her face to the wall” 
and gives up her “volition” to live (334). In the Preface, James determines that “Milly’s situation 
ceases” after this scene in Regent’s Park to be “‘renderable’ in terms closer than those supplied 
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by Kate’s intelligence, or, in a richer degree, by Densher’s, or, for one fond hour, by poor Mrs. 
Stringham’s” (12). As Milly attains double consciousness, by recognizing herself as both 
particular and impersonal to embody “the real” as Susie designates her early on, Milly has 
limited contact with the other characters for the rest of the novel. And though Milly functions as 
the site on which double consciousness is tested, double consciousness as a condition replicates 
the untenability of the Emersonian idea: the reader as well as the other characters are unable to 
contain Milly’s consciousness for any substantive period of time. The direct access we had to 
Milly and her thoughts in Regent’s Park is fleeting. Instead, we are granted access to her 
indirectly: through either the narrator, Kate, Densher, or Susie. Likewise, the characters 
themselves very rarely have any direct access to Milly and her state of mind; instead, they 
themselves maintain mediated relations with her either through one another or through Eugenio, 
her hired Venetian concierge.  
Ostensibly, Milly dies after receiving the knowledge that Kate and Densher are engaged 
from Lord Mark and she begins to “see” herself as “part and parcel” of their manipulations to 
both acquire her fortunes and give her the love she so desires before her death. Here again, we 
see Milly attaining double consciousness as she recognizes her particularity as a part of Kate’s 
and Densher’s larger and quite impersonal scheme. And just as Milly is, as Sheila Teahan terms 
it, “effaced” and “erased” from the novel’s narrative as a result of her double consciousness 
(118), she must also be, as Leo Bersani notes, “renounced insofar as she is a distinct individual” 
(144). Just as Verena must choose between Olive’s, Basil’s, and her own perception of self for 
The Bostonians to move forward, Milly’s death is necessary for the plot of Wings to finally 
unfold and for the narrative to continue, but also for James to demonstrate how destructive a 
condition of double consciousness can be for a particular person. As such, Milly must die 
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because one cannot simultaneously know herself as both particular and impersonal without some 
sacrifice or loss to the self. Thus, Milly’s death effectively demonstrates the contradictory terms 
of double consciousness: as soon as she becomes wholly conscious of herself, she is inaccessible 
to every other person including the reader.    
 Consequently, Milly is a more successful test site for the condition of double 
consciousness than Verena. Though it is true that Milly experiences moments where she 
considers how others “see” her, Milly possesses her consciousness, albeit temporarily, through 
knowledge she gathers based on her own experience. Verena’s knowledge of herself is second-
hand and derived from those with whom she is closest. What Verena possesses at the end of The 
Bostonians is not necessarily a consciousness all her own, but rather an awareness that she has a 
consciousness that has (or had as the case may be) the potential to know first-hand and that 
awareness is stifled by her acquiescence to Basil’s version of her. Though both women have 
significant moments of self-awareness in their respective park scenes, Milly, because she has 
more agency over her conscious and its development, experiences a more specific condition of 
double consciousness with knowledge of herself as a particular as well as a constituent part of 
the impersonal. Verena cannot fully enter into this state because her consciousness is possessed 
by others and not wholly her own. This difference in the possession of each woman’s 
consciousness correlates to her respective end: Verena does not fully experience the potentially 
devastating consequences of double consciousness through a literal death as Milly does. Instead, 
what results from her multi-faceted knowledge of her consciousness is a loss of control or 
possession of that consciousness following from her acceptance of Basil’s construction of her (or 
Olive’s if her choice had been different). Verena’s ending is unsettling not necessarily because 
her union with Basil means that she will be relegated to a domestic space and perhaps oppressed 
133 
 
by his will, but because she loses control of her own ability to develop knowledge of herself 
without external influence. Milly, on the other hand, because she possesses her consciousness 
internalizes multiple modes self-knowledge, faces the consequences of such a condition via her 
literal and figurative removal from the novel.   
4.2 Economies of Devastation 
But there is also more at stake in the articulation of double consciousness than the 
question of Verena’s happiness or Milly’s death. James uses Verena and Milly to demonstrate 
the disastrous consequences of double consciousness for the individual who attempts and attains 
such a state of mind, but he also demonstrates the destructive possibilities for those involved 
with and in relation to such an individual. John Carlos Rowe argues of Wings that “Milly Theale 
ultimately brings the characters of the novel to a consciousness of one another, forcing them to 
recognize the distance that separates their respective desires,” and this is no less true for the 
characters of The Bostonians as Verena grapples with her self-awareness (174). Verena’s 
recognition of her consciousness as an entity of its own in addition to something constructed and 
possessed by the influence of others as well as Milly’s double consciousness force the central 
characters of each novel to become conscious of themselves. The knowledge the other characters 
gain from this consciousness leads to what Rowe calls “a shattered, fallen world become 
conscious of itself” (174). And it is this knowledge that governs what I will term James’s 
economy of devastation. The limitations James imposes on the consciousness of Verena and 
Milly directly affect the self-knowledge of characters like Densher and Olive; more importantly, 
the effects of the knowledge each gains from their encounters with Milly and Verena annihilates 
their previous modes of self-knowledge and renders each alone and without the very 
relationships on which the plot of each novel depended. 
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 Because Milly is a more successful iteration for the consequences of double 
consciousness and because superficially Wings is a novel about economic concerns, it is easier to 
demonstrate the emergence of an economy of devastation. James notes in the Preface that each of 
his “centres,” as well as his narrator, who critics commonly refer to as the Jamesian reflector, 
must be “selected and fixed” in an “economy of treatment” so that they form a “related point of 
view” or a “represented community of vision” (12). With the exception of Milly, whose 
consciousness is largely inaccessible except for those brief moments in which she experiences a 
condition resembling Emersonian double consciousness, the characters of Wings are “fixed” in a 
society whose social codes reflect economic anxiety. Kate, though she refuses to admit it to Aunt 
Maud, has a predilection for the finer, material aspects of life and as a result, though she loves 
Densher, cannot agree to marry him since he has no money or prospects; Aunt Maud, though she 
has enough of a fortune to take-in Kate and participate in London society, offers her charity and 
her niece to Lord Mark in hopes of gaining a title in the family so that she has more social clout. 
Densher, who is penniless and thinks of money in terms only by which to live, loves Kate 
enough to participate in her scheme against Milly despite sacrificing his integrity. Lord Mark 
must depend upon Mrs. Lowder as he is broke and has no prospects despite his title. Even Milly 
and Susie Stringham participate in this system once they arrive in London as Milly is hungry to 
experience the true “English” life: she insists Kate take her to visit her sister, Mrs. Condrip, 
because she pictures her as something out of a Dickens novel. These characters are trapped in a 
society which understands value in fiscal terms and views people and relationships simply as 
material means for enhancing their positions relative to the delicate and complicated social strata 
of English life.  
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 At the simplest level, James’s “economy of treatment” is actually an economy of 
relations in the novel whereby people serve as capital. These characters constantly “give-up” and 
“renounce” one character for another in hopes of making the material or social gain of which 
they are desirous. This system is most lucid when Kate explains it to Milly early in their 
acquaintance. She tells her that theirs is a system of “working and being worked” where “every 
one who had anything to give [. . .] made the sharpest possible bargain for it, got at least its value 
in return” (117).  She refers to these mutually beneficial relationships as “happy understandings” 
because “the worker in one connexion was the worked in another” and calls it “as broad as it was 
long—with the wheels of the system, as might be seen, wonderfully oiled” (117). Kate defends 
these “happy understandings” by declaring that part of the value of these “connexions” is that 
one learns his or her worth which he or she would “never have found out for” themselves (118). 
And when the naïve Milly wonders about her own “‘paying’ power,” Kate declines discussion 
with the exception that “Milly would pay a hundred per cent—and even to the end, doubtless, 
through the nose” and that “was just the beautiful basis on which they found themselves” (118). 
In other words, “happy understandings” are justifiable because the participants are able to gain 
valuable knowledge about their own worth that would have otherwise been unknowable. Milly 
then should be satisfied to know that she will be involved in a “happy understanding” of her own 
that will not only cost her greatly, but also provide her with self-knowledge about her value to 
those with whom she forms a relationship. Though different in terms of their representation, the 
“happy understandings” in Wings resemble the external influences that provide self-knowledge 
to Verena in The Bostonians.  
 Yet, none of Kate’s “happy understandings” come to fruition in the novel. By the 
conclusion of Wings, the relationships each character valued either for gain or for affection are 
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decimated by this system in which people function as commodities up for trade. Because Kate 
mentions to Milly that part of the trade in the “worked and being worked” relationship is self-
knowledge, there is more at stake than the mere trading in people for financial, material, and 
social gain. Instead, these “happy understandings” produce an economy of devastation whereby 
the knowledge each character gains through his or her “connexion” with another character has 
disastrous effects for the ways in which the character knows herself. The relationship, in other 
words, forces each character participating in the “happy understanding” to acquire a new mode 
of self-consciousness. One’s original self-knowledge and the new self-knowledge acquired via 
this relationship cannot co-exist, cannot reconcile with one another to form the “whole” or 
“liberated” person that Kuchar and Cameron locate in Milly via the scene in Regent’s Park. 
Rather, individual relationships annihilate the ways in which the participants know themselves, 
forcing them to “renounce” or “give-up” such relationships. Whether human connections made 
simply for avarice or from a combination of avarice and affection, the kind of self-knowledge 
required changes the participants and devastates the conditions of the original connection.  
 Milly is the most obvious example of the ways in which the limitations of the 
consciousness can devastate the individual. But when considering the ways in which double 
consciousness produces an economy of devastation among the other characters, Densher emerges 
as the most obvious byproduct of the destructive effects of a doubly conscious mind. James notes 
in the Preface that the “state of others” as “affected by” Milly was their “case” for they “too 
should have a ‘case,’ bless them, quite as much as she” and that this is the “correlative half” of 
the novel’s focus (7). In an economy of devastation, Milly functions as the novel’s true center of 
consciousness—no matter how absent, elided, or effaced she may be—because her connection to 
every other character forces them to “see” and know themselves in a new way. Through the self-
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knowledge her connection to them provides, Milly acts as a destructive agent that devastates 
their current knowledge, much like the gradual confrontation of her own mortality that forces her 
to acknowledge herself as both a particular person with personal ties—her relationships with 
Susie, Kate, Densher—as well as an impersonal entity that makes up the larger stuff of life (even 
if that impersonality only demonstrates her as a necessary component to the scheming of her 
friends in order for their lives to continue as they desire). The difference between what happens 
to Milly and what happens to the other characters as a result of these competing modes of self-
knowledge corresponds to Milly’s ability to entertain both modes of knowing, albeit temporarily, 
at the same time. She achieves double consciousness, but as James confronts the limitations of 
the consciousness, she must sacrifice herself. Susie, Kate, and Densher, on the other hand, never 
transcend a singular knowledge of themselves—instead, through their connections with one 
another and most especially with Milly, they replace one mode of self-knowledge with another, 
despite the catastrophic consequences this replacement causes to their relations with one another 
and their previous way of knowing themselves.  
 The proof of how Milly affects the “state” of the other characters is most evident in 
Densher, who appears as quite a different man at the end of the novel than at the beginning. 
Densher, for most of the novel, describes himself as a man of inaction. He is a man “painfully 
aware” of his financial shortcomings as well as “the demands” that Kate “and Mrs. Lowder are 
making on him” (Bersani 135). As a man of feeling rather than action, he is content enough to 
acquiesce to Kate’s and Mrs. Lowder’s demands because he knows he feels intensely for Kate 
and that he likes Milly well enough to comply with their plotting.31 He even complies without 
                                                 
31 It is worth noting here that though Kate’s and Aunt Maud’s plan is the same—for Milly to love Merton and for 
Merton to shower Milly with enough attention so that she feels loved—their end goal is different. Mrs. Lowder 
hopes that Merton will return Milly’s affection and fall out of love with Kate, so that her niece will be free to marry 
Lord Mark (and as a result, Lord Mark will fall out of love with Milly). Kate, on the other hand, only wants Merton 
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fully understanding what the plot involves. Only when he does have a fuller knowledge of what 
he is to do with Milly, does he begin to resent his inaction. Once in Venice he reflects that he had 
“sunk so deep” because it was “all doing what Kate had conceived for him; it was in the least 
doing—and that had been his notion of his life—anything he himself had conceived” and this 
“glowed for him” as a “kind of rage [. . .] an exasperation, a resentment” (283). Moreover, he 
was starting to notice that he was becoming “conscious” of a “general necessity” that “making 
the best was the instinct [. . .] of a man somehow aware that if he let go at one place he should let 
go everywhere” (283). Merton partly recognizes how far he has “sunk” morally through his 
interactions with Milly, whose company he does enjoy and who through her own goodness 
makes him feel his own moral depravity. This insight causes him to reflect upon his own 
inaction, which has characterized much of his life, in his relationships with both Kate and Milly. 
For him this produces an awareness that he has conceded his own desires in an effort to make 
Kate happy and that recognition results in both a resentment and a disgust that gradually starts to 
convert Densher from a passive spectator directed by others to a man of action.  
The first way he demonstrates this shift his through his insistence that Kate “give up” 
something for him by coming to his rooms and consummating their relationship privately if they 
cannot do so publicly through marriage. For this, he tells Kate, he will help Kate defraud Milly 
of her money. His demanding something of Kate illustrates to the reader his growing conflict 
with his own consciousness and the way in which he has come to know and define himself. His 
promise, however, to remain complicit in Kate’s plans also demonstrates this conflict rather than 
any definite change in character. Densher does remain passive, he remains so passive in fact that 
after Lord Mark has visited Milly for a second time and she then refuses to admit Densher for 
                                                 
to act as interested as it takes, even if that means he must marry Milly, for Milly to leave him a substantial amount of 
her money upon her death so that he and Kate can eliminate the financial hiccup in their relationship. 
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visitation that he decides “to keep thoroughly still” (331). He does nothing either to contradict 
the knowledge that Lord Mark has brought Milly of his engagement to Kate, nor to confirm it. 
Instead he contents himself with the idea that Lord Mark is “a brute of a man” for wanting to 
hurt Milly, while he is the kinder of the two for not only remaining in Venice, but also for 
keeping quiet (332). This, not unlike Verena’s attempt to lead Ransom back in “the general” 
during their encounter in Central Park, becomes Densher’s defense mechanism and resistance to 
the experience of double consciousness.  
Only after Susie Stringham’s visit to bring the news that Milly “has turned her face to the 
wall” and Sir Luke’s gracious touring of Venice with him, does Densher sense “the larger real” 
in the current of Venetian life and begins to recognize himself as something other than the 
inactive man willing to sacrifice his moral integrity to please the woman he loves.  The narrator 
remarks: 
 The result of it was the oddest consciousness as of a blest calm after a storm. He had been  
trying for weeks, as we know, to keep superlatively still, and trying it largely in solitude 
and silence; but he looked back on it now as on the heat of fever. The real, the right 
stillness was this particular form of society. (353) 
The “blest calm” and “right stillness” Densher experiences in his walks with Sir Luke resemble 
the “current of life” Milly experiences in London as she starts to recognize the impersonality of 
life. In this current, Densher starts to “take it in perfectly”—that is, his situation—and “could 
turn cold at the image looking out of it” (353). Turning cold, Densher examines his situation and 
condition objectively and impersonally. The “heat of the fever” of remaining “superlatively still” 
has subsided and he begins to understand how his inactivity makes him a player in Kate’s 
scheme and Milly’s demise. Densher’s comprehension of his inaction as if outside of himself 
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immerses him in the “current of life” or the impersonal. It liberates him from his passivity and 
ultimately drives him to action as he returns to London and deals with Kate. Perhaps more 
important though, the calm Densher feels is a relief from the double consciousness he began to 
suffer with his arrival in Venice. The narrator says, “The liberation was an experience that held 
its own” and that “he had so fondly hoped for it” (353). Densher’s liberation alleviates the 
anxiety he felt about his own passivity. By “feeling the real” or the impersonal in the current of 
life in the Venetian streets, Densher is “let off” from the consequences of this passivity and 
comes to see himself as more than just a particular or singularly defined person. This letting off 
or liberation allows him to trade one form of self-knowledge for another, ending his temporary 
condition of double consciousness and allows him to reemerge from the experience as a newly 
defined version of himself so that he may start playing a more active role in his own life.  
Ultimately, Densher’s connection with Milly forces this conversion of consciousness 
from man of inaction to man of action who maintains moral integrity even if it means sacrificing 
those he loves (and in Densher’s case he not only must sacrifice Kate as he gives up knowing 
himself as passive, but also Milly whose death was partly caused by this passivity). Bersani 
argues that from his relationship with and the subsequent redemption he receives from Milly (in 
the form of an inheritance), Densher “emerges from his conflict having decisively chosen his 
higher self and renounced the acquisitive self that would possess the symbols of value in the 
material world.” And though he is “fully conscious now, has been wholly assimilated” to 
himself” his “spiritual victory does not resolve the moral ambiguities of his social behavior,” 
which means he must alienate himself from the people who required him to engage in such 
behavior (Bersani 142-3). He cannot, as in accordance with his new sense of identity, maintain 
relationships with Kate and Mrs. Lowder because they only know him and found value in him 
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prior to his relationship with Milly. The new Densher is not someone they understand as 
evidenced by his final encounters with Kate.   
Thus, Milly’s role as the central consciousness of The Wings of the Dove, the common 
point of connection for all of the other characters in the novel, creates an economy of devastation 
by helping each character come to terms with new ways of knowing the self. The allows the 
other characters to experience double consciousness temporarily, to expand the confines of their 
consciousness in order to redefine themselves. But such knowledge also negates the very 
relations those characters plan on “working” and “being worked by” as they strive to participate 
in the larger social economy in which they value so highly. Their various plans of “working” one 
another ostensibly work to cancel out the value they originally saw in one another. For instance, 
while Kate and Mrs. Lowder form a connection with Milly for her money, the very thing they 
prize in her is also the same thing that causes their undoing: Milly’s money devastates Kate’s 
relationship with Densher and destroys Mrs. Lowder’s plans for Lord Mark. And by being forced 
to choose between Densher and Milly’s money, Kate must define herself in a new way—one she 
has struggled to avoid over the course of the novel—as someone who cannot live without 
material wealth. The economy of devastation not only necessitates that each particular person 
trade existing knowledge of themselves to participate in the relationships they try “working” and 
“being worked” by, but also that they sacrifice those very relationships to gain what appears as a 
more valuable way of knowing themselves as new versions of the self keep a person successively 
participating in the physical world 
Although its concern with economies does not take a fiscal form and its articulation of 
double consciousness is less clear, The Bostonians also produces an economy of devastation that 
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annihilates individual consciousness through relation.32 Rawlings argues that “At one level, The 
Bostonians engages with the question of personal identity in relation to consciousness” and this 
is certainly the case with Verena as she encounters her consciousness and unsuccessfully tries to 
gain possession over it (232). Her relationships with Olive, Basil, her parents, etc. devastate any 
potential she has for possession as their forms of self-awareness try to integrate their modes of 
knowing into her own. What results is what Banta calls “a kind of spiritual murder” that takes 
place when the consciousness of two particular individuals attempt “to merge at the expense of 
one” and thus work to “annihilate personality” (103). Verena then, as a person who experiences 
double consciousness, encounters the consciousness of the other characters and alienation from 
personality and particularity, and this distance produces her final tears at the end of The 
Bostonians. 
While critics like Wolstenholme argue that “given James’s terms in the novel, the 
individual has no ‘personality’ or unique existence” in the first place, it cannot be ignored that 
characters like Olive and Basil have distinct personalities that separate them not only from one 
another and from Verena, but also from the ideologies that they come to represent (583). Despite 
their particularity though, Basil and Olive also experience the limitations of consciousness 
through an economy of devastation. By examining external influences such as social interactions 
on individual consciousness, James stages this economy of devastation to further emphasize the 
consequences of double consciousness outside of the consciousness of particular individuals. For 
James, economies of devastation rely on connections or relationships in which knowledge, and 
                                                 
32 The Bostonians, as most critics note, is concerned with “the warring claims of the democratic attitude and the 
aristocratic attitude” (Gabler 96). Inherent in this struggle, as noted by Howe and Trilling, are also concerns about 
what constitutes “natural relationships,” gendered identity, the political, and the spiritual, as well as the public realm 
and the private sphere. The dichotomous nature of these challenges and the way in which the novel, and more 
particularly the narrator, negotiates these challenges can all be described as economic systems in and of themselves 
and they are no less significant, though beyond the scope of this argument, than the fiscal economy that surfaces in 
Wings. 
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more particularly self-knowledge, is traded for new knowledge that decimates any prior notions 
of the self in the process; and these economies adhere to the Emersonian conception of double 
consciousness in that dual modes of knowing are irreconcilable to the individual. Moreover, if as 
Rawlings argues “feeling and consciousness are functions of and contingent on community,” 
then the very act of possessing self-knowledge determines consciousness as both particular and 
impersonal much as Milly experiences her conscious in Regents Park (237). Yet because persons 
cannot integrate multiple modes of self-knowledge, the ways in which the limitations of the 
human consciousness are present in characters like Olive is through an economy of devastation. 
Seeing consciousness as a function of and contingent on community means that as particular 
persons commune with the world and form relationships these relationships will inevitably 
destroy aspects of the particularity that define each person. 
In contrast to Verena, Olive, from the outset, is a distinct personality with particularities 
that not only differentiate her from the other major figures in The Bostonians, but also more 
generally from people in her age, gender, and class demographics. Olive is first introduced by 
Mrs. Luna as a “nihilist” and later by Ransom as “a tragic figure” (37, 46). The narrator, 
however, describes Olive as prone to fits of “tragic shyness,” “morbid,” and filled with “silent 
rage” at the “usual things of life” (41-42). She is “unmarried by every implication of her being” 
and lives by a “theory which bade her put off the invidious differences and mingle in the 
common life” though in “her heart she loathed it” (47, 52). She prefers not to be “a 
representative of the aristocracy” and instead proudly associates the Chancellor name to “the 
bourgeoisie—the oldest and the best” (61). And, as noted earlier, though Olive was “constantly 
exposing herself to offence and laceration” through her career, “her most poignant suffering 
came from the injury of her taste” (57). In fact, Olive wishes “to work in another field” because 
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she “had long been preoccupied with the romance of the people” and an “immense desire to 
know intimately some very poor girl” (62). She even tells Mrs. Farrinder that she wants to not 
only give herself “up to others,” but also “to know everything that lies beneath and out of sight” 
in order to “enter into the lives of women who are lonely, who are piteous” because she wants 
“to be near them – to help them” (63). However, she has trouble speaking to these sorts of 
women and therefore will not represent her cause publicly. Ultimately, the narrator tells us that 
“Poor Olive was, in the nature of things, entangled in contradictions” (165). 
These descriptions paint Olive as a person struggling to negotiate the person that she 
knows herself to be with the ideology she wants to represent. What distinguishes her personality 
is twofold. First, Olive is a person who conforms to societal norms such as taste and decorum. 
She prefers the finer things her “bourgeois” lifestyle provides and this differentiates her from the 
common people who she wants to mingle with and represent. Olive has trouble communicating 
or socializing with those that she desires because of her particularity; she does not share anything 
in common with those she wishes to know and more importantly she loathes the commonness of 
their life. Lionel Trilling notes that this is “the essence of Olive Chancellor’s nature” and “that 
she cannot endure social intercourse; a speech to a crowd is her notion of human 
communication” (94). Because she cannot endure social intercourse on an individual, one-on-one 
basis because of her personality, and because this inability counters her desires, she does not 
judge or relate to people as distinct personalities, but rather as “classes” like the men she 
despises or the women she wishes to liberate (127).  
Second, Olive’s personality, as opposed to Verena’s impersonality, is defined by the 
contradictory roles she comes to represent in the novel: she is an advocate of equality, liberty, 
and democracy more generally while maintaining the privileges and social codes her upper-class 
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lifestyle provides. What makes her distinct from other people then is what critics like Gabler and 
Wardley term her ambivalence.33 The contradictory terms of her identity are what distinguish her 
from others and provide her with an essence of personality. Though critics like Ross LaBrie 
argue that “Olive’s weakness” is that “she fails to understand the passions which motivate her,” I 
wish to argue here that Olive possesses enough of an understanding to recognize the struggles 
her identity poses for her and to her relationships with others (103).34 This is evidenced not only 
through her remarks to Mrs. Farrinder that she cannot speak on behalf of the movement, but also 
in the many instances where the narrator reflects Olive’s awareness of the tensions within her 
own conscious. For instance, the narrator notes that Olive would be, 
much happier if the movements she was interested in could have been carried on only by 
the people she liked, and if revolutions, somehow, didn’t always have to begin with one’s 
self – with internal convulsions, sacrifices, executions. A common end, unfortunately, 
however fine as regards a special result, does not make community impersonal. (129) 
This passage is noteworthy because it demonstrates Olive’s awareness of her particularity and 
her longing for something more general and impersonal as well as void of personalities that she 
dislikes or finds distasteful. Not only is Olive’s own particularity problematic for her, so are the 
                                                 
33 In “The Narrator’s Script: James’s Complex Narration in ‘The Bostonians,” Janet Gabler argues that “Verena’s 
primary role is to show Olive in the glare of all of her ambivalence,” and thus reflects the narrator’s ambivalence 
towards her as well (97). Lynn Wardley in “Women’s Voice, Democracy’s Body, and The Bostonians” also argues 
that Olive is ambivalent toward her own agenda (651). 
34 Similarly to LaBrie’s reading of Olive as unaware, Howe makes the following argument about the contradictory 
nature of Olive’s character:“yearning for martyrdom” she finds no “satisfactory release” because “she cannot bear to 
acknowledge the private and contaminated sources of this yearning” and associates the contaminated source to be 
her “lesbianism” as it is “both cause and emblem of her social incapacity” (xxii, xxiii). This reading implies that 
Olive is not conscious of what causes her paradoxical nature. It is also worth noting here that Olive’s lesbianism as a 
source for her identity struggles was often used by early critics like Howe and Trilling to read the novel’s ending 
with Ransom’s victory as a return to what was natural. Peter Shaw in “Refuting Human Nature” notes that it is this 
idea that lead early scholars of the novel like Howe and Trilling to read the ending of The Bostonians as “the 
natural” reasserting “itself as mutual attraction reaches across the ideological divide between the lovers and they set 
off to marry” (27). Conversely, later critics like Judith Fetterly in her chapter on The Bostonians in the Resisting 
Reader take offense to these early articulations of Olive’s contradictory nature as symptoms of her lesbianism and as 
opposed to what was considered natural relationships like that of Verena and Ransom.  
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particular personalities of others. It is worth noting here that the critical tendency to deem Olive 
ambivalent may represent a fractured consciousness that resembles a condition of double 
consciousness. However, Olive does not suffer from the full extent of this condition because 
Olive cannot access knowledge of herself as impersonal and part of something larger despite her 
desire for impersonality. The impersonal is something she longs to know, but as demonstrated 
through her remarks to Mrs. Farrinder, cannot fully access because of her personality and fixed 
ideas about herself (i.e. Olive cannot really know “some very poor girl” because she is not poor 
herself).  
 Olive’s longing for the impersonality that will more fully connect her to her cause is what 
attracts her to Verena. Barbara Straumann asserts that it is Olive’s “cultivated restraint” and the 
“power and presence” of Verena’s “impersonal voice” that allows the relationship between the 
two women to exist (91). Olive, as she extracts Verena’s promise to renounce marriage, sees 
their union as the “partnership of their two minds” because “each of them, by itself, lacking an 
important group of facets”—Verena a personality and Olive access to the impersonal—“made an 
organic whole which, for the work in hand, could not fail to be brilliantly effective” (169). Olive 
rather than acquiring direct access to the impersonality she desires, constitutes a relationship with 
Verena whereby she can have access to impersonality secondhand. Together they form the 
person that Olive wants to be (or rather the consciousness she wants to possess).  
 Olive’s relationship with Verena allows her to maintain her personality and her secret 
desires for taste, decorum, etc. while simultaneously providing her better access to the masses in 
which she longs to mingle via Verena’s ability to represent and speak to them. This relationship 
is an “organic whole” for Olive because she believes it is entirely based on the freedom she 
promises Verena as she extracts her pledge. The problem with her configuration of their 
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relationship as a union based on two equal parts that forms something greater than either of them 
individually (and thus something impersonal), the very characteristics that make the union 
possible, are also what makes each one of them vulnerable to be affected by the other. LaBrie 
states that “Olive’s vulnerability lies in the fact that her cause and her ideals are tied up with the 
idea of freedom, and yet, ironically, she has worked determinedly to bring the life of another 
human being within her power” (53). Verena tells Olive that she wonders if she should “feel” 
their cause “so very much” without her. She also tells Olive that she constitutes her “conscience” 
and is her “form” and “envelope,” which implies that Olive has been successful at exerting her 
consciousness over Verena and that Verena really hasn’t been free at all (168). Olive herself 
notes her power and control over Verena in the very passage where she reflects on the 
extraordinary nature of the organic whole that they form. She thinks that “Verena was often far 
more irresponsive than she liked to see her; but the happy thing in her composition was that, after 
a short contact with the divine idea – Olive was always trying to flash it at her [. . .] – she 
kindled, flamed up, took the words from her friends less persuasive lips” (169). Ironically, the 
impersonality Olive admires in Verena transforms by her own hand into a reflection of her own 
personality.  
 Olive’s vulnerability lies in more than just her confused notions of freedom. Olive’s 
vulnerability is a direct effect of the degree to which she possesses Verena’s consciousness and 
in her choice to ignore the knowledge that she has denied Verena freedom in pursuit of a greater 
and impersonal good of which their relationship is part. For Olive, limiting Verena’s 
consciousness to the parameters of her own means constructing and, more importantly, 
preserving the organic whole comprised by their relationship. Yet, by maintaining this 
relationship, Olive denies knowledge of herself as capable of imposing the type of oppression of 
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which she seeks to liberate other women. This denial of self-knowledge makes her privy to 
Verena’s influence and, subsequently, to the economy of devastation.  
 Though Olive’s relationship with Verena immediately triggers small changes in Olive’s 
character like the ability to deceive, once Verena comes to live with her Olive notices that “her 
aspirations” are “immensely quickened” and she “begins to believe in herself to a livelier tune 
than she had ever listened to before” (173). This newfound confidence in herself and her ability 
to participate in her cause derives solely from Verena’s acquiescence and acceptance of Olive’s 
control. Olive, however, attributes this change to the idea that “when spirit meets spirit there 
must be either mutual absorption or a sharp concussion” and Olive readily chooses to believe 
that she and Verena are mutually absorbed (173). Regardless of Verena’s level of commitment to 
their relationship, the problem in an economy of devastation is that a “mutual absorption” is not 
mutually exclusive from a “sharp concussion” so that Olive must also undergo what Banta terms 
a “spiritual murder” that “annihilates personality” due to her contact with Verena.  
 When Basil confronts Verena with an alternate mode of knowing herself, he too forces 
Olive to acknowledge what she has been up to this point successful at denying—that she has 
been too forceful in her control over and possession of Verena and her conscious. This image of 
herself first presents itself in New York through both Basil and Mrs. Burrage and again at 
Marmion when Verena begins her courtship with Basil.35 When Olive first sees Basil in New 
York, she is described as “white with the intensity of her self-consciousness” and “altogether in a 
very uncomfortable state” (253). Compelled to acknowledge this vision of herself, Olive cannot 
help but to reflect that Verena had an “extraordinary generosity with which she could expose 
                                                 
35 Mrs. Burrage tells Olive that she knows Verena “saw through her eyes, took the impress of all her opinions, 
preferences” (302). Though Olive replies with “She is absolutely free; you speak as if I were her keeper!” she also 
reflects that “This description of Verena was of course perfectly correct” though “not agreeable” to her (302).  
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herself, give herself away, turn herself inside out, for the satisfaction of the person who made 
demands of her” and that she was “deficient in the desire to be consistent with herself” (370). 
Confronting these thoughts, Olive must also acknowledge how “she contributed with all her zeal 
to the development of Verena’s gift” though she did not contemplate the “consequences of 
cultivating an abundant eloquence” as Verena was “attempting to smother her now in her own 
phrases” (371). 
 Through Olive’s relationship to Verena as well as the dominance she exerts over her, 
James can further shape an economy of devastation to depict the consequences of relation on all 
participants. More importantly, because Verena acts without particularity and merely reflects 
Olive’s conscious back upon her, Olive causes her own victimization in this economy. The 
results of limiting Verena’s consciousness to the confines of her own particularity produce a 
“fatal effect” whereby Olive must recognize not only the harm she inflicts on Verena’s 
impersonal nature and rendering her susceptible to alternative modes of self-knowledge that may 
appear preferable to Olive’s tyranny, but also the harm she ultimately inflicts upon herself (373). 
By forcing Verena to renounce marriage and denying her both freedom of thought and 
experience, Olive becomes a byproduct of the relationship she creates and thus a byproduct of 
the economy of devastation, ultimately causing her own renunciation of the self she has formerly 
known. Olive’s renunciation also requires her to negotiate some of the contradictions of her own 
character: she must reconcile who she was with who she is as well as how that identity fits within 
the ideology she wants to present to the world. In other words, Olive must renounce knowledge 
of herself as a constituent part of the organic whole she believed she formed with Verena. This in 
turn means that Olive must acknowledge Verena’s superficial commitment and motivations for 
forming the whole in the first place, which no doubt causes her to question her effectiveness at 
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possessing Verena. Thus, Olive must negotiate her role in the creation of and demise of their 
relationship and the relationship’s larger function to the women’s movement in which she so 
desperately wants to participate. And in these negotiations, Olive ironically ends up experiencing 
the type of suffering for which she so longs in the beginning of The Bostonians. 
 Although the novel’s final scene is significant because it attempts to demonstrate the 
effects of double consciousness through Verena’s tears, it is also important because it 
demonstrates the ways in which the economy of devastation has required Olive to exchange 
modes of knowing herself to avoid sustaining a condition of double consciousness. As Basil 
enters Verena’s dressing room in Boston’s famed Music Hall and prevents her from delivering 
her first real lecture, Olive, who was never free from “self-reference” as Verena was, collides 
head first with the knowledge of herself that she has so desperately been trying to ignore over the 
course of Verena’s courtship with Basil. Verena does not take the stage and as Olive loses her 
grasp over Verena she must finally accept herself as an inhibitor of freedom, which has 
ultimately driven Verena to accept Ransom’s very different and more appealing, as opposed to 
Olive’s prohibitive and constrained, version of herself. This forces Olive to confront the 
humiliation of Verena’s betrayal and inconsistency through the angry cries of the waiting crowd. 
What once would have been distasteful and lacking social mores to Olive, is now Olive’s only 
salvation. Rather than submit to her previous fits of shyness and to avoid the very public 
embarrassment Verena and Ransom have inflicted upon her, she takes the stage herself despite 
her exclamation that she will be “hissed and hooted and insulted” (432). Olive’s sudden ability to 
take the stage and speak to the impersonal masses reflects the work of the economy of 
devastation. Now that she has experienced true suffering through her relationship with Verena, 
she finally can relate to the crowd she must address. She now has suffering in common with her 
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audience. Ironically what she trades for the experience of suffering is her advocacy of freedom as 
she is confronted with her oppressive manner. Though she never fully trades what makes her 
particular for direct access to that which is impersonal, Olive’s relation to Verena helps her to 
negotiate her sense of self with the ideology she wants to inhabit and provides her with access to 
a common and impersonal consciousness that she represents through her cause. The economy of 
devastation finally permits Olive an experience—through her suffering—that allows her to more 
readily participate on her own in the movement she so values, but it also costs her what she 
values most—her relationship to and possession of Verena.  
 Through his presentation of double consciousness as a condition that necessitates 
suffering, loss, and even death for the individual who manages to ascertain such a state of being 
in The Bostonians and The Wings of the Dove, Henry James effectively demonstrates the various 
limitations of the human conscious as it strives to possess knowledge of itself. More significant 
than his articulation of double consciousness and its consequences for individual persons, 
through an economy of devastation, James takes the particular experience of this condition and 
demonstrates its effects on the particular social intercourses that govern one’s daily existence.  
Consciousness in these novels is not only inhibited by the human capacity to contain varying 
forms of knowledge, but external forces such as the relationships that individuals form with 
others also restrict the ways in which individuals are able to possess knowledge of themselves. In 
an economy of devastation, relationships are temporary and only exist as a means by which to 
exchange self-knowledge. As such social relations help individuals to progress through the 
temporal world which requires a continual re-knowing of the self in order to continue one’s 
existence. More significantly, James’s staging of an economy of devastation highlights the 
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unsustainable nature of double consciousness for either the person experiencing or the persons 
who try to maintain a relation to that person.  
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5 CHAPTER FOUR: DISCOVERING “SEPARATENESS”: THE PAINFUL PROCESS 
OF SELF-DEFINITION IN ALL THE KING’S MEN 
In his 1955 essay, “Knowledge and the Image of Man,” Robert Penn Warren asserts that 
“to be a man, to keep from going on all fours, implies the right to knowledge” (238).  This right 
to knowledge for Warren is “simply a way of saying man’s right to exist” in the world in order 
“to be himself, to be a man” (237). He explains that “only by knowledge does man achieve his 
identity” because 
  it gives him the image of himself. And the image of himself necessarily has a  
  foreground and a background, for man is in the world not as a billiard ball placed  
  on a table, not even as a ship on the ocean with a location determinable by latitude  
  and longitude, He is, rather in the world with continual and intimate  
  interpenetration, an inevitable osmosis of being, which in the end does not deny,  
  but affirms his identity. (241) 
Knowledge, for Warren, then provides an individual with the tools necessary to construct and 
shape his identity through “interpenetration” or an “osmosis of being,” which relies upon time 
and relation in order to piece together and make meaning of various versions of the self over the 
course of a lifetime. On one hand, Warren seems to confirm a condition of double consciousness 
as not only possible but also necessary to one’s understanding of self. A person constructs an 
identity in order to exist in the world, using knowledge of the self anchored both in the 
“background” of the past and the“foreground” of the present, which essentially is to know 
oneself, and to make meaning of that knowledge, in two ways simultaneously. To have dual 
knowledge is what allows a person to “achieve an identity” which ultimately provides that 
person with a purpose in the world.  
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 On the other hand, Warren also cautions that we must have a “progressive understanding” 
of “interpenetration” because it is a “texture of relations” whereby “man creates new 
perspectives, discovers new values—that is a new self” so that “identity is continually emerging, 
and unfolding” (241). For Warren, the construction of one’s identity reflects a “process of self-
definition” that is not static but constantly evolving as new forms of knowledge are encountered 
through the experience of life (241). The process of self-definition relies upon a relational 
knowledge that is determined by the interpenetration of the events and experiences that shape a 
person’s life. The ways in which these experiences and events interpenetrate one another to form 
a texture of relations will be different at different points of time: a person’s relation to an event 
or experience is determined by his or her current notion of self and position in life. Warren’s 
protagonist has the potential to view the same life event or circumstance differently at various 
points in time. This naturally affects the way a person makes meaning by integrating distinct 
instances of self-knowledge in order to construct and affirm an identity.  
 For Warren, this “progressive understanding” allows identity to continually reshape itself, 
but also allows it to become “a self-corrective creation” whereby an individual may adjust 
knowledge of the self according to a current moment by looking at the texture of relations, and 
editing out parts of the self that are unnecessary or might pose problems for one’s current 
situation (241). Knowledge, or one’s ability to possess and make meaning from knowledge, is 
thus dependent upon both time and relation. This then complicates the possibility of a condition 
like double consciousness because knowledge of the self is not static; even in the moment when 
one comes to be of two minds about the self, that self is already in flux, which recalls Emerson’s 
logic in an essay like “Circles.” Because both knowledge and the construction of the self are 
dependent upon relation and are constantly evolving, knowing oneself in two ways is at once 
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inevitable and virtually impossible. In this chapter, however, I wish to argue that Warren’s ideas 
of self-knowledge as relationally and temporally constructed actually works as a salve to the 
devastating and often fatal consequences that result from the condition of double consciousness.   
Jack Burden, arguably Warren’s most famous protagonist, from the 1946 Pulitzer Prize 
winning All the King’s Men, embarks on a process of self-definition. In order to define himself, 
Jack retells the story of his life through his relationship to Willie Stark. Jack works backward to 
trace Willie’s rise from a small-town idealistic lawyer to the corrupt governor we see at the 
beginning of the novel. In the process of telling Willie’s story, Jack reveals the role he played in 
Willie’s corruption as a journalist and then his employee; and, as a result, Jack must reflect on 
his past, which generates a personal narrative rather than a simple third-person retelling of 
Willie’s political career. And it is only as Jack constructs his narrative that he recognizes the 
interpenetration of his life and relationships achieving an “osmosis of being” in order to affirm 
his identity at the novel’s conclusion.  
The time between the events of the narrative and Jack’s telling of it enable Jack to come to 
know himself in multiple ways without suffering the consequences of double consciousness. 
This examines Jack Burden as both a character and a narrator, and it interrogates the relationship 
between the human consciousness and temporality in order to determine the ways in which time 
both limits and helps to construct an individual’s knowledge of himself. Through Jack’s 
narrative, Warren demonstrates the painful “process of self-definition” attached to man’s “right 
to knowledge,” but also provides a strategy for reconciling competing modes of self-knowledge. 
This strategy relies upon both time and relation. And time and relation are what helps Jack to 
achieve a temporary sense of what Warrren calls “the ultimate unity of knowledge,” which 
seems as close as an individual may get to the Emersonian ideal of double consciousness (242). 
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In other words, All The King’s Men uses the technology of the narrative structure as an attempt to 
tolerate or even remediate the excruciating experience and the subsequent ramifications of 
double consciousness on an individual that Dickinson, James, and Du Bois describe. 
5.1 The “one thing” Jack Burden Can’t Know 
 The act of knowing, as well as the uncertainty and limitations of human knowledge, 
produce anxiety for Jack Burden. This anxiety is demonstrated throughout All the King’s Men as 
Jack functions as the narrator of his story as well as a character within that story.36 Jack tells his 
story through Willie Stark, which allows him to act as a third-person narrator. In this capacity, 
Jack reveals that the story of Willie is actually his story, assuming a first-person identity at the 
novel’s conclusion, and maintains an emotional distance from Jack the character within Willie’s 
story. Norton R. Girault argues that “out of the novel’s first person narrator point of view grows 
an important aspect of the novel’s theme—that an understanding of the world depends upon an 
understanding of the self: Jack Burden cannot understand Willie Stark” or the world around him 
until he “understands himself” (220). Similarly, Jonathan Cullick contends that “Obviously 
Burden participates in the story he tells, giving him the involvement of a character with the 
detachment of a narrator. He is always narrator-agent rather than narrator-observer” allowing 
him to participate in the narrative while also progressing “toward acknowledging his 
participation and the personal responsibility that accompanies it” (197-8). Maintaining this 
distance from his past self also enables Jack to come to terms with and ultimately face his 
epistemological fears over the course of the narrative. Girault notes that “phrases along the way 
                                                 
36 Several critics note Jack’s multi-faceted role as the novel’s narrator and character within that narration. Among 
the most compelling of these accounts is Jonathan Cullick’s “From ‘Jack Burden’ to ‘I’: The Narrator’s 
Transformation in All the King’s Men.” Studies in American Fiction 25.2 (1997): 197-210; Norton R. Girault’s “The 
Narrator’s Mind as Symbol: An Analysis of All the King’s Men.” Accent: A Quarterly of New Literature 7 (1947): 
220-234; and Simone Vauthier’s “The Case of the Vanishing Narratee: An Inquiry into All the King’s Men.” 
Southern Literary Journal 6.2 (1974): 42-69. 
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like ‘at least that was the way I argued the case back then’ remind the reader of the fact that Jack 
has lived through the actions he is describing and that he is trying to reorient himself in relation 
to them” and as the story develops that it becomes apparent to the reader that “Jack is telling” as 
a means “defining to himself what actually did happen to him” (220). As Jack tells his story, and 
because the narrative spans a considerable passage of time, Jack integrates and reconciles all of 
the modes of knowledge to which he has previously subscribed with those he attains via personal 
and lived experience in order to achieve a new understanding of himself. 
 As both a narrator and a character within his own narrative, Jack demonstrates a 
complicated and ambivalent relationship to knowledge. He simultaneously seeks and evades 
knowledge throughout the novel. This ambivalence is revealed early in the narrative as he waits 
for Willie to deliver an impromptu speech to the residents of Mason City. He describes waiting 
for the speech while knowing that it will come as similar to coming home late at night and 
finding a telegram under the door but not immediately opening it. He says that while one stands 
there with the telegram in hand, one feels “there’s an eye on you, a great big eye looking straight 
at you [. . .] and sees you huddled up way inside, in the dark which is you, inside yourself, like a 
clammy, sad little foetus [. . .] The eye knows what’s in the envelope, and it is watching you to 
see you when you open it and know, too” (13).37 He goes on to note that the “sad little foetus 
which is you” is “blind” and “doesn’t want to know what is in that envelope,” that the foetus 
would rather “lie in the dark and not know, and be warm in its not knowing” (14). And yet, the 
“sad little foetus” does eventually open the envelope because Jack tells the reader that the “end 
                                                 
37The description of this omniscient eye, despite Warren’s apparent discontent with Emersonian transcendentalism 
(for a literary example of this discontent, see Warren’s poem “Homage to Emerson, On a Night Flight to New 
York”) recalls Emerson’s “transparent eye-ball” from Nature. More particularly, each writer’s eye demonstrates 
characteristics of impersonality in that an individual cannot have intimate knowledge of or see what that eye 
sees/knows. The implications of impersonality for Warren will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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of man is to know” but that there is “one thing he can’t know. He can’t know whether knowledge 
will save him or kill him” though he will “be killed, all right, but he can’t know whether he is 
killed because of the knowledge which he has got or because of the knowledge he hasn’t got and 
which if he had, would save him” (14).  
This early reflection about knowledge demonstrates Jack’s ambivalence in two ways. 
First, Jack’s use of the second person pronoun “you” here is representative of both the reader and 
himself. Though Jack is the narrator of this reflection, he is also a character within the story, and 
he functions as the reader/listener.38 In other words, Jack is the “you” to which he refers in this 
reflection. Thus, he describes himself as a “sad little foetus” who retreats into a womb state 
within himself where he is not fully formed and not conscious. In such a state, having knowledge 
and the ability to internalize/understand knowledge is not possible. Girault calls this Jack’s cozy 
stating of “not knowing” (221). Retreating into himself, or the womb, allows Jack to escape not 
only the possibility of knowledge, but also the implications and responsibilities of having 
knowledge.39  
 Though Jack retreats into a state of being before consciousness is possible, he is still 
susceptible to the gaze of the “great big eye” that sees him from “miles and dark and through 
walls and houses and through your coat and vest and hide and sees you huddled up way inside, in 
                                                 
38 Cullick notes that when Jack “speaks of his prior self in the third person, he makes himself his own main 
character. These various ways of speaking about himself—‘you’ (present), ‘yourself’ (past), and ‘Jack Burden’ 
(past)—indicate a divided modern consciousness, what Burden calls ‘the terrible division of our age’” (202). The 
significance of this “divided modern consciousness” is worth noting here as it also reflects the split of Jack’s own 
consciousness. Vauthier argues that when Jack addresses the “’you’, the narrator projects a state of split 
consciousness” and that Jack in fact is a “double whose rasion d’etre seems to be his non-subjectivity.” As a result, 
Jack, for Vauthier, is “unable to see himself clearly” and “posits in the subjective ‘you’ the double that embodies 
him, that makes him visible because he can address it” (184). 
39 Critics of All the King’s Men tend to agree that novel’s thematic concern is Jack’s escape and eventual acceptance 
of his complicity in the events of the novel. A major factor in this interpretation is Jack’s complex relationship with 
his distant relative, Cass Mastern’s, belief that the world resembles a large spider web. While I don’t dispute that 
personal responsibility, and Jack’s own personal responsibility in particular, is at stake in All the King’s Men, I do 
think the way constructions of knowledge, and self-knowledge especially, in the novel play a more significant role 
in how Jack comes to accept personal responsibility than previously discussed.  
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the dark which is you” (13). The eye can see Jack even before consciousness or knowledge 
occurs. More importantly, this eye already has the knowledge that Jack will eventually obtain 
upon opening the envelope. The omniscient eye in this passage not only sees Jack in his state of 
pre-knowing, but also knows what will become of Jack once he has consciousness. Jack’s desire 
not to know is not just a desire to escape consciousness, but also a desire to escape the gaze of 
this eye that knows the outcome of his life and actions before he does.40  
The eye is significant to the development of Jack’s consciousness and his ambivalence 
towards knowledge because it represents Jack’s awareness of an impersonal, governing force 
that controls a world in which he merely plays a constituent part by yielding and opening the 
envelope. Recognizing that there is something or someone outside of himself that knows more of 
the world and himself than he does causes Jack’s ambivalence towards knowledge as it raises 
questions about his particular role or purpose in the world. Accepting the presence of an external 
and impersonal force that has the ability to know and control the outcomes of one’s life calls into 
question Jack’s agency and identity. His actions, ideally determined by the knowledge he gains 
and possesses, are predetermined under the gaze of the “great big eye.” The eye, at least in this 
passage, merely waits for Jack, or the reader, to open the envelope in order to know while 
already knowing that Jack will indeed eventually open the envelope—he will possess the 
knowledge he wants to escape despite his retreat into the womb. Jack’s desire not to know, not to 
open the envelope, or not to act matter very little to the eye because Jack will eventually open the 
envelope, attain knowledge, and then act based on that knowledge. His actions, derived from the 
                                                 
40 Though the desire to escape consciousness is described early on through the womb-state, this desire manifests 
itself in several ways throughout the novel. Later the womb transforms into periods of “Great Sleep” where Jack 
literally evades consciousness through sleep. The “Great Sleep” then progresses into a theory about the “Great 
Twitch” where people’s consciousness and emotional reactions have little consequence has humans become mere 
mechanisms.  
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knowledge he receives, thus contribute to the impersonal force regardless of his desire to do so, 
which negates the notion that what makes him personal and particular—his unique identity, 
desires, feelings, etc.—is responsible for the outcomes of his life.  
The recognition that something impersonal and outside of himself plays a role in his life 
leads to the second way in which this passage demonstrates Jack’s initial ambivalence towards 
knowing. Since “the end of man is to know,” confronting different forms of knowledge and 
internalizing that knowledge in order to make meaning signifies a loss for Jack. In this passage 
the loss takes the form of death as man cannot “know whether knowledge will kill him or save 
him” though he will be killed either way because of knowledge he has or because of simply 
knowing that he hasn’t got the knowledge to save himself. On one hand, because Jack will “open 
the envelope” to know and because “the great big eye” knows that he will succumb to 
knowledge, Jack’s end is the end of his will or agency. He does not, in other words, have the 
knowledge to save himself from yielding to the will of the impersonal eye and so he must 
sacrifice his own agency in acquiring or denying knowledge, or in contributing to the 
impersonal. Knowledge thus kills what makes Jack a particular person with his own individual 
feelings and desires.  
On the other hand, Jack is ambivalent towards knowledge and in his certainty about the 
power of “the great big eye” because admittedly there is a chance that knowledge may also save 
him. The possibility that knowledge can provide a means of surviving is what causes Jack to 
open the envelope and to leave his womb-state, awake from his periods of Great Sleep, and 
ultimately dismiss his belief in the Great Twitch. In this context then, and this is important for 
Jack to make sense and come to terms with the knowledge he has of himself as the narrative 
progresses, there remains a possibility that one’s particularity does in fact matter: to possess 
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knowledge of oneself doesn’t necessarily mean to lose the self entirely or to be absorbed 
completely by the impersonal forces that exist outside of the self. However, Jack’s knowledge of 
the impersonal force and the subsequent lack of agency that results from that force may also be 
what enables him to survive: yielding his own constructions of self—his particularity—in favor 
of his knowledge that he merely serves the larger purpose of the impersonal may be the very 
knowledge that keeps him alive over the course of his narrative while others invested in their 
own particularity are destroyed.41  
To retreat into a womb state allows Jack the opportunity to escape from finding out—
albeit only temporarily—whether he will be destroyed or saved by different forms/constructions 
of knowledge. More importantly, it enables him to evade participation either as a particular 
person who determines his own identity and actions within the world or as a component of an 
impersonal force where individual identities and actions merely serve as a means to a larger end 
beyond that of particular persons. Though Jack acknowledges that both options are possibilities 
during this reflection in Mason City, his consistent withdrawal from people, places, and 
circumstances that present new modes of knowledge, especially those that require self-reflection 
that would produce a new way of knowing one’s self, allow him to exist in what James C. 
Simmons calls a state of “invulnerability” where his “comfort lies in his non-being, his 
impersonality, his complete dissociation” from people and life (85, 87).42 Equating this state of 
                                                 
41 When I speak of characters invested in their own particularity, I am specifically referring to characters like Willie 
Stark and Adam Stanton to whom Jack later refers to as  the “man of fact” and the “man of idea” respectively and 
who were “doomed to destroy each other”(Warren 657). Willie and Adam seem to have little cognizance or 
understanding of a larger impersonal force at work in their lives. Other characters invested in their own particularity 
are Anne Stanton and Sadie Burke; these women, however, seem, at least by the end of All the King’s Men, to accept 
and acknowledge their roles in the larger context of the world. For an account of Willie’s investment in his 
particularity, see Norton R. Girault’s “The Narrator’s Mind as Symbol: An Analysis of All the King’s Men.” Accent: 
A Quarterly of New Literature 7 (1947): 220-234. 
42 It is worth noting that Simmons borrows the idea of “invulnerability” from Jack himself. Because Jack is an 
idealist, he refers to himself as “invulnerable” (239). He says, “nothing happened to Jack Burden, for nothing ever 
happened to Jack Burden, who was invulnerable” (239). He goes on to say that perhaps his invulnerability is his 
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“nonbeing” or pre-consciousness to a form of impersonality that accounts for much of Jack’s 
behavior. While Jack desires a womb-state of pre-consciousness, his desire is to escape an 
omniscient force that renders his particularity inconsequential. Yet by escaping into this state,—
no matter which form the escape takes throughout Jack’s retelling (womb-state, brass-bound 
Idealism, the Great Sleep, the Great Twitch, etc.)—Jack negates his own particularity and thus 
his ability to fully know and define himself in order to form an identity. What results is that as a 
character Jack tends to deny his particularity in favor of impersonal forms of knowledge even as 
he remains anxious, ambivalent, and uncertain about the presence and power of an impersonal 
entity. For Simmons this tendency towards impersonal types of knowledge results in Jack the 
character’s “continual flight from involvement” which is a “flight from himself and self-
knowledge.” And, it is from Jack’s “fear of self-awareness” that he “dehumanizes others, and 
thus, in effect dehumanizes himself” (87).  
The retrospective narrative functions in a similar capacity. As the teller of his story, Jack 
maintains a level of “invulnerability” and dissociation from both the reader and from Jack the 
character’s actions. By functioning as the narrator, Jack dehumanizes himself as a person 
responsible for the events he narrates and instead avoids (self-)judgment of his past. The 
narrative distance Jack achieves through this dehumanization and invulnerability is necessary for 
Jack to examine, internalize, and integrate all of the knowledge provided from his lived 
experience during his telling of the story.  Having the opportunity to process and come to terms 
with how Jack knew and understood himself in the past is integral to reconciling how he knows 
himself in the present. And this reconciliation is essential if Jack hopes, as he says to, “go into 
the convulsion of the world, out of history into history and the awful responsibility of Time” 
                                                 
curse. Knowing for Jack does in fact seem to be a curse with a horrible burden that he is unwilling to bear for the 
majority of the novel.  
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(661).  Jack the narrator uses the retrospective narrative structure and the distance it affords to 
confront and negotiate his early ambivalence and uncertainty about knowledge—its multiple 
forms—and its possible outcomes in order to make meaning of himself and his actions in the past 
and the present, and thus to move forward as an active participant in the future.  
5.2 Jack Burden’s Multiple (Im)Personalities  
 Before examining how Jack’s narrative reconciles various modes of self-knowledge in 
relation to one another in order to construct and affirm his identity, it is necessary to determine 
how Jack’s aversions and retreats from knowledge allow him to compose a telos that relies upon 
impersonality and dehumanizes or ignores particular persons and the knowledge they 
represent/demonstrate. What results is a Jack who favors impersonal modes of knowing and who 
distances himself from particularized knowledge. Here, I trace here what I’m calling Jack’s 
“multiple impersonalities” as they evolve through the narrative’s sequence of events.  
Jack begins his narrative as a self-described “Idealist” who avoids particular and personal 
forms of knowing by studying history. When idealism fails him, he retreats into a period of what 
he calls “the Great Sleep” where all knowledge is inaccessible to his consciousness. As Jack 
awakens and goes about the business of life, he avoids particular knowledge by only believing in 
facts and a theory of “Life as Motion towards Knowledge” whereby a person who has complete 
knowledge—knowledge of himself as particular and impersonal—is not living. After Jack learns 
of an affair between Willie and his long-time love, Anne, he can no longer escape his own 
experiences and feelings, so he instead subscribes to a belief in “the Great Twitch” which is the 
ultimate form of impersonal knowledge as it works to dehumanize persons and eradicates the 
need for personal identities altogether. Though Jack evolves over the course of the narrative, 
Jack maintains his allegiance to impersonal knowledge until his facts work to uncover his true 
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identity with Judge Irwin’s death and the subsequent revelation that he was Jack’s father. Only 
after Jack learns of his paternity, and starts to lose faith in impersonal modes of knowing, can he 
begin to confront what it means to know himself in multiple ways.   
After Jack’s initial reflection about the “sad, little foetus” in Mason City, the narrative 
reveals that he tends to rely on and trust only knowledge that he describes as historical or factual, 
or knowledge substantiated by empirical evidence rather than memory or emotion determined by 
personal experience, which according to Jack should not be trusted.  As a student, Jack 
encounters a “principle” for which he says he owes his “success in life” (45). He describes this 
principle as “Idealism” and refers to himself as a “brass-bound Idealist” (45). Idealism for Jack is 
a belief that “What you don’t know don’t hurt, for it ain’t real” and that “it does not matter what 
you do or what goes on around you because it isn’t real anyway” (45). Philip Dubuisson Castille 
argues that Jack’s interpretation of idealism “implies not reality but the nonexistence of being, 
since in idealism only ideas have being; yet in Jack’s formulation, not even ideas are real.” Jack 
then is not an actual idealist, but rather what Castille calls a “nihilist” who believes that “Nothing 
has being, all action is meaningless, and experience is both incoherent and incommunicable” 
(27). Regardless of the actual term Jack attributes to this philosophy, his determination that 
nothing is real—actions, events, even people—is important because it signifies his initial desire 
to retreat from particularized and personal forms of knowledge.43 Even as a student, Jack avoids 
knowledge that he cannot immediately understand and interpret in a coherent and communicable 
manner. Ultimately, Jack both fears knowledge as well as his ability to construct meaning from 
                                                 
43 It is worth noting here that when I refer to particularized forms of knowledge, I am referring to a type of 
knowledge accessed or constructed via personal or individualized experiences. In other words, a person may gain 
new knowledge through an experience either with another individual or singularly. Thus, meaning is made for a 
person based on one’s reaction and subsequent interpretation of the events of that particular experience. This differs 
from an impersonal type of knowledge that Jack comes to favor which relies upon objective, empirical evidence and 
factual data.  
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knowledge; under the guise of idealism he averts his fear by dismissing any type of knowledge 
of which he cannot make sense as irrelevant because it isn’t real anyway.  
The best example of Jack’s early avoidance of particularized forms of knowledge occurs 
when he is a graduate student of history trying to complete his dissertation by editing the journals 
and letters of his distant relative, Cass Mastern. The journals and letters are largely about Cass’s 
affair with his friend’s wife, Annabelle Trice, and its subsequent consequences. As a narrator, 
Jack refers to this experience as his “first excursion into the enchantments of the past” and a 
failure because “in the midst of the process” he tried to “discover the truth and not the facts” 
(236). Then, when “the truth was not to be discovered, or discovered could not be understood” 
by him, he “could not bear to live with the cold-eyed reproach of the facts” (236). After 
recounting the story of Cass and his affair, Jack confesses that “he laid aside the journal of Cass 
Mastern not because he could not understand, but because he was afraid to understand for what 
might be understood there was a reproach to him” (284). Cass’s reflections in his journal and 
letters—his own attempt at integrating and reconciling different ways of knowing himself—have 
the potential to shed light on Jack’s own life experiences in order to reveal something about 
himself. Thus Jack is afraid to confront a new way of knowing himself if he is to understand the 
“truth” of Cass’s experience. Instead, Jack abandons the project and walks “out of the room, the 
room where the facts lived in a big box of three-by-five inch note cards” and enters “upon one of 
the periods of the Great Sleep” (236, 284).  
 The narrator Jack, who is different from the Jack who walked away from the project, 
concludes that Cass discovered the “world is all of one piece” and that “the world is like an 
enormous spider web and if you touch it, however lightly, at any point the vibration ripples to the 
remotest perimeter and the drowsy spider feels the tingle” and “springs out to fling the gossamer 
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coils about you who have touched the web” (283). Alfred J. Levy explains that “The spider web 
image” for Jack sustains “a view of the world which reflects the interdependence of man’s 
actions, as well as the corollary that any act, no matter how subtle, provokes a consequence 
within the surrounding social fabric [. . .] out to the remotest perimeter” where “intentions do not 
necessarily control the consequences nor, incidentally, do they provide any rationalization” (53). 
While Jack the narrator can understand what the spider web signified to him at the time of his 
research and why he feared that knowledge, the Jack performing the research cannot, and so he 
walks away from the project and from the “truth” of Cass’s particularized brand of knowledge. 
Cass’s spider web represents an idea that antagonizes graduate student Jack’s belief in idealism. 
Castille argues that “Jack is afraid to understand Cass Mastern, because if what Cass is saying 
about human complicity in guilt and history make sense, then Jack’s own philosophy—his way 
of seeing and understanding the world—is invalidated” (26).44 Understanding the world as a 
giant spider web confounds Jack’s ambivalence towards knowledge because it simultaneously 
depends upon man’s particularity while dismissing those particular motivations or intentions as a 
person acts: the vibrations of one’s action have an effect on others outside of and beyond one’s 
original intentions. For Jack, this would mean that his actions are in fact real and have real world 
consequences; more importantly though, accepting Cass’s philosophy implies a type of double 
consciousness where one’s particularity co-exists and is even necessary to the existence of the 
impersonal. Yet to know oneself as both particular and impersonal is destructive and even fatal 
                                                 
44 The image of the spider web in All the King’s Men has garnered much critical attention. The underlying concept, 
which appears in several of Warren’s novels, has caused Warren scholars to dub it the “web of being.” For 
treatments on the web of being specifically in All the King’s Men, see Levy’s “the Web and the Twitch: Images in 
All the King’s Men,” Forum 25(2): 53-56, Castille’s “The Book I Began Years Ago: The Construction in All the 
King’s Men,” rWP: An Annual of Robert Penn Warren Studies 4(2004): 21-39, and Robert S. Koppleman’s “All the 
King’s Men: Spiritual Aesthetics and the Reader,” Mississippi Quarterly, 48.1 (1994): 105-114. For treatments of 
the web of being in Warren’s fiction more generally see Barnett Guttenberg’s Web of Being: The Novels of Robert 
Penn Warren and Koppleman’s Robert Penn Warren’s Modernist Spirituality. 
167 
 
to individual notions of selfhood. Perhaps more importantly, Jack cannot coherently understand 
himself in both capacities and thus avoids this knowledge altogether by abandoning his 
dissertation project and retreating into “the Great Sleep.”  
Jack describes this particular period of “the Great Sleep” as a time when he “would sleep 
twelve hours, fourteen hours, fifteen hours, feeling himself, whole asleep, plunge deeper into 
sleep like a diver groping downward into dark water feeling for something which may be there 
and which would glitter if there were any light in the depth, but there isn’t any light” (284).45 
Jack’s periods of “the Great Sleep” resemble his escape into a womb-like state in that both make 
consciousness and, more importantly, self-consciousness impossible. Castille notes that “In this 
dark vortex all ideas collapse” and that “The Great Sleep asserts a reality which is absolutely 
dead [. . .] Under the spell of the Great Sleep everything looks alike: ‘God and Nothing’ are the 
same, good and evil merge, memory and history disappear, self-knowledge dissolves into 
unconsciousness” (23). Jack’s description indicates this when he describes the sleep state as one 
where an individual feels for something that may be there but cannot be found in the darkness: in 
other words, consciousness exists unlike in the womb—the state of pre-consciousness—but is 
unattainable and makes knowledge inaccessible. Simmons call these states “impulses of retreat 
and withdrawal” that resemble a “near-catatonic state” dominated by “lethargy” and produce 
“the security of a dreamless sleep away from those periodic intervals” of knowledge that may be 
“too painful” for Jack to confront (85).46 The problem, however, is that as with the “great, big 
eye” that sees Jack and knows that he will emerge from the womb, Jack cannot sleep forever and 
                                                 
45 Jack’s other periods of “the Great Sleep” occur during his marriage to Lois and later in Long Beach, California 
after he discovers Anne Stanton’s affair with Willie Stark.  
46 Simmons ultimately argues that Jack suffers from “symptoms of catatonia” and is a double to the catatonic patient 
that Jack watches Adam perform a lobectomy operation on in hopes of giving the patient a new personality (84). 
Simmons concludes that watching Adam perform the operation allows Jack to confront his own symptoms of 
catatonia—the womb-like retreat, the Great Sleep, the Great Twitch—in order to experience a “rebirth” which is 
necessary for Jack to produce the narrative. 
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must eventually wake up. As he wakes, he must again enter into consciousness where access to 
knowledge is not only possible, but, if one is to live his life, inescapable. Because Jack cannot 
fully and completely escape consciousness, except through death, he develops another strategy 
for avoiding forms of knowledge derived from “truth,” or personal experiences which are often 
left up to individual interpretation in order to make meaning. Jack avoids looking for “truth” 
altogether and instead finds solace in the “facts” he initially walked out on during his dissertation 
project.  
“Facts,” for Jack, are a trustworthy form of knowledge because there is no particularized 
or individualized meaning; rather, facts present evidence in the form of empirical data such as 
dates and times. Knowledge in the form of fact is also impersonal and detached from personal 
experience, emotion, and desire as factual knowledge is objective. An advocate of fact, Jack also 
advocates impersonal forms of knowledge because impersonal knowledge detached from human 
experience does not require any sort of self-consciousness or personal responsibility. It comes as 
no surprise then that after Jack emerges from “the Great Sleep” that follows his failure to 
understand and communicate the truth of Cass’s story that he finds a job as a newspaper reporter 
where he is only required to report the facts, not interpret them. According to Simmons, as a 
reporter Jack remains “the detached, curious, distant, and accurate observer of events, the aloof 
commentator who falls back on his flippant and sarcastic wit to maintain the distance and keep 
himself uninvolved” (85). He continues that Jack’s “‘plain curiosity’” is “exclusive of himself” 
and “excludes any situation or person which obviously threatens introspection” (85). This sense 
of “plain curiosity” exclusive of Jack continues as he transitions from newspaper reporter to 
Willie Stark’s personal researcher. 
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 Once employed by Willie, Jack describes himself, as the one-time “student of history” 
who “does not care what he digs out of the ash pile, the midden, the sublunary dung heap, which 
is the human past. He doesn’t care whether it is the dead pussy or the Kohinoor diamond” (235). 
Jack does not care what he finds as either a reporter or as Willie’s researcher so long as what he 
finds are facts. The mere existence of these facts proves their realness and thus renders them 
indisputable. In other words, Jack has no stake in the facts that he finds and cares little for the 
consequences that his “research” might have on others because if the facts are present in the first 
place, they exist objectively. More importantly, Jack performs “historical research” and digs his 
facts out of the “past,” in order to maintain the belief that objective truths which exist outside of 
individual experience are real and the only trustworthy form of knowledge. Fact-finding allows 
Jack to justify his research to himself without worrying whether or not he has touched Cass’s 
spider web so-to-speak. He remains detached from his own actions and from any sort of self-
reflection that might result from not only his actions of finding the facts, but also from what the 
uncovered facts might reveal.  
Detachment is necessary for Jack the character’s survival from the threat of knowledge as 
the narrative unravels. If Jack were to stop and reflect upon how his research impacted others 
and the world more generally, he would have to acknowledge his role in providing knowledge 
that was destructive and thus “the end of man,” or particular individuals. And recognizing his 
own guilt in the destruction of others, especially when working for Willie, would threaten the 
way in which Jack has come to know himself. Hiding behind facts keeps Jack safe from 
knowledge’s fatal qualities and allows him to maintain a relatively clear conscious about the 
knowledge he produces for the purposes of blackmail. It is important to note here that facts, 
because they are objective and result only from empirical evidence, are a limited and partial way 
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in which to gain knowledge. Though facts present one type of truth—an objective truth—they 
are void of the particular or personal interpretation or experience which would form what Jack 
would consider something akin to the “truth” he was trying to discover from Cass’s story.  
Jack’s acceptance or reliance on a limited, objective type of knowledge void of human 
experience is significant to his ambivalence because it signifies his desire to retain his 
particularity even as he puts stock only in knowledge that exists outside of particular conceptions 
of what it means to have knowledge. The tension that Jack feels from this paradoxical 
relationship causes him to shift his belief from “idealism” where nothing is “real” to a belief that 
“Life is Motion toward Knowledge” (226). Jack tells the reader that “If God is Complete 
Knowledge then He is Complete Non-Motion, which is Non-Life, which is Death” (226). In an 
encounter with Ellis Burden, the Scholarly Attorney who Jack believes to be his father for much 
of the novel, Jack explains this philosophy further: 
 ‘I’ll draw you another picture. It is a picture of a man trying to paint a picture of a 
sunset. But before he can dip his brush the color always changes and the shape. 
Let us give a name to the picture he is trying to paint: Knowledge. Therefore if 
the object which a man looks at changes constantly so that Knowledge of it is 
constantly untrue and is therefore Non-Knowledge, then Eternal Motion is 
possible. And Eternal Life. Therefore we can believe in Eternal Life only if we 
deny God, who is Complete Knowledge.’ (227)  
Limited knowledge enables Jack to live while complete knowledge—that is knowledge of both 
“fact” and “truth”—would be death. Moreover, though accessible to a person, knowledge is not 
stable or static, but fleeting and temporary. In turn, the instability of knowing makes meaning 
difficult to ascertain. Complete knowledge for Jack then resembles the condition of double 
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consciousness because an individual is incapable of reconciling “fact” with “truth” because truth 
is temporal; the inability to reconcile the two, while disconcerting to someone like Emerson, is 
what assures Jack of his survival and ability to live. In this sense, knowledge has the ability to do 
what Jack earlier tells himself and the reader that it does: to both kill and save man. Limited 
constructions of knowledge save, while complete or reconciled constructions result in death.  
 Paradoxically, or perhaps even ironically, Jack’s evolving ethos reinforces his 
ambivalence about knowledge and prevents him from fully committing to an identity as either a 
particular person or constituent part of a larger impersonal whole. Though Jack puts his faith in 
impersonal forms of knowing as represented by fact, his “Life as Motion toward Knowledge” 
denies the existence of a larger and impersonal force that governs the world such as God. To 
believe wholly in God, or the impersonal, would equate to death for Jack. Yet, to accept and 
make meaning from particularized knowledge such as “truth,” would devastate how Jack has 
come to know and identify himself. This would result in a type of figurative death for Jack as he 
would then be forced to ascertain and accept an alternative way of knowing himself in order to 
construct a new identity and to keep living “out of history into history.” 
 Jack’s “Life as Motion toward Knowledge” philosophy combines his theory of idealism 
to relegate both the impersonal and the particularity of individuals to a present absence. The 
impersonal for Jack, and here represented by God, is the absence of motion and the absence of 
life. Jack says, “For God and Nothing have a lot in common. You look either one of them 
straight in the eye for a second and the immediate effect on the human constitution is the same” 
(150). Similarly, to know and to recognize oneself solely as a particular person with a unique and 
individual identity is possible for Jack but he also recognizes this type of self-consciousness as 
temporary and not safe from the view and power of God or the “great, big eye.”   To embrace 
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only limited forms of knowledge then allows Jack to maintain his ambivalence, keep his 
construction of self intact, and remain “invulnerable” to the possibility of death that an 
integration or reconciliation of knowing onself in multiple ways would cause. Recognizing the 
existence of both modes of knowledge, but failing to participate or commit to either one allows 
Jack to remain detached and ambivalent and thus able to survive. In his detached and observatory 
state, Jack physically survives without investment or involvement in everyday life.  
 Jack’s invulnerability and denial of different forms of knowledge as well as his desire to 
treat life as a linear movement towards knowledge are forms of escape akin to the womb state 
and the “Great Sleep.” Jack tells the reader that “Life is a fire burning along a piece of string [. . 
.] and the string is what we don’t know, our Ignorance, and the trail of ash, which, if a gust of 
wind does not come, keeps the structure of the string, is History, man’s Knowledge, but it is 
dead, and when the fire has burned up all the string, then man’s Knowledge will be equal to 
God’s Knowledge and there won’t be any fire, which is life” (226). Moving towards complete 
knowledge by only having limited knowledge along the way allows an individual to escape 
history, and more importantly personal histories, as the past “is dead” or a decomposing string 
and therefore not real or relevant to the present. In other words, the past is not real, unless facts 
can substantiate it, and thus cannot have any sort of particular or personalized effect on persons 
or left open to subjective interpretations resulting in “truth.” Likewise, limited knowledge 
implies ignorance which is necessary for life and for motion. 
 The problem for Jack, however, is that though he accepts only factual knowledge in order 
to remain in this passive and detached state, he does not exist outside of “truth” derived from 
personal experience. Because Jack exists as a physical person, he participates in and experiences 
life even if he does not entirely recognize and integrate that experience as essential to how he 
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knows himself. Finding “facts” makes him an active participant in the lives of others as well as 
in the world and has implications on his own life. The act of fact-finding places Jack within the 
parameters of Cass’s spider web. More importantly, regardless of his acceptance or denial of an 
impersonal entity, Jack is a particular individual with his own unique emotions, motivations, etc.  
Jack, though he can deny and repress his personal history by believing in “Life is Motion 
towards Knowledge,” cannot fully escape the effects of his past on who he is and how he comes 
to know himself.  
 Jack’s inability to circumvent his past is best demonstrated when he learns of Willie’s 
affair with Anne Stanton, his first love. After learning about the affair from Willie’s first 
mistress, Sadie Burke, and then having it confirmed by Anne, Jack tests his “Life his Motion 
towards Knowledge” theory by literally putting himself in motion. The knowledge of the affair 
challenges Jack’s detachment and avoidance of his past because it propels him into motion with 
a drive west where he “kept on moving west” (405). Jacks says, “For West is where we all plan 
to go some day. It is where you go when the land gives out and the old-field pines encroach. It is 
where you go when you get the letter saying: Flee, all is disovered. It is where you go [. . .] to 
grow up with the country. It is where you go to spend your old age. Or it is just where you go” 
(405-6). Amy K. Lavender likens Jack’s motion west to his retreats into the womb and the 
“Great Sleep.” She argues that “By going west” Jack “removes himself from the passage of time 
and reality” because the West is “timeless for Jack” (77). Jacks views the West as timeless 
because 
The West, as an idea, has always been a symbol of both hope and death in 
America, and Jack, as an American, is part of this tradition. West has always been 
the direction of death because it is where the sun sets, where it ‘dies’ [. . .] 
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However, it is purely American for the West to have the dual responsibility of 
representing both death and hope. The West gives Americans hope because it is a 
place that wipes the slate clean and allows one to start over. In a sense, it starts 
time all over again for a kind of ‘new’ beginning. It does this for Jack: it helps 
him wipe away the time that existed before his visit to the West. (Lavendar 77-8) 
On one hand, Jack’s drive westward challenges his detachment from his own past because it 
forces him to confront his feelings as well as his past relationship with Anne. And if the West 
signifies death, than it appears that Jack is incapable of handling this confrontation and so drives 
west in order to die. This produces an interesting paradox: Jack moves west, but this westward 
movement also propels him forward while also requiring that Jack look backwards to his own 
history. In either case, whether Jack moves forward to escape his past or backwards to relive the 
past, he is confronted with death because the past, according to “Life is Motion towards 
Knowledge,” is a piece of decomposing string while the forward motion ends with the complete 
knowledge that signifies death. Though his evolving philosophies of knowledge rely on 
avoidance and denial in order to skirt death and to survive, when presented with his own past and 
personal experiences, Jack seems to have no choice but to suffer death in some capacity: 
knowledge must in fact kill him.  
 Jack describes his drive to Long Beach, California as “a showing of a family movie” 
where the “past unrolled in his head” because he was “moving back through time into” his 
memory (408). His drive took “seventy-eight hours” in which he replays the event of his 
relationship with Anne in his mind. Jack equates this experience to drowning as he says “the 
drowning man relives his life as he drowns” and that he “was drowning in West” until he reaches 
Long Beach and sinks “down to the very bottom of West.” And once there he lies in the 
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“motionless ooze of History” and he enters another period of “Great Sleep” though not before 
warning the reader that if they “have any home movies” they should “burn them and to be 
baptized to get born again” (408). While reliving his past with Anne over the course of his drive 
west, Jack says that “it was not so much any one example, any one event, which” he “recollected 
that was important, but the flow, the texture of events, for meaning is never in the event but in 
the motion through event. Otherwise we could isolate an instant in the event and say that this is 
the event itself. The meaning. But we cannot do that. For it is the motion which is important” 
(407-8). Jerome Meckier contends that Jack’s theorizing on his trip west has positive 
implications because this passage suggests “that the reality of an event may be a function of the 
relationship of that event to past and future events” though he also acknowledges that “the main 
thrust of the theory seems designed to prevent anyone from pinpointing the meaning of any 
particular event” (15). Jack’s reluctance to pinpoint meaning in an effort to emphasize the 
significance of motion results in another mechanism for survival against the threat of knowledge. 
It allows him to avoid the paradox created by his own theories of forward and backwards 
movement.  
Lavendar argues that Jack travels “back through both space and history at the same time 
to get to a new starting point so that he, like so many others, can start over again. Only Jack is 
trying to start over his history, his time, and his memories. In a sense he is born again” (78). She 
continues that the West as a traditional “place of death” is the place where Jack’s memory or his 
history goes to “die” but that it also is “a place of hope and renewal as a new and yet unwritten 
history for Jack Burden begins” so that “the trip to California is the step that begins to bring Jack 
Burden more in touch with reality and interconnectedness of time and his history. At the beach, 
he admits his connection to history and that all moments are connected” (79). Lavendar does not 
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account, however, for the fact that in the moments where Jack makes these connections, he is 
acting as Jack the narrator and not Jack the character who actually drove West in the first place. 
There remains a temporal gap between the story Jack recounts as narrator and what Jack the 
character experiences, which is why he refuses to pinpoint meaning and instead converts his 
belief in “Life is Motion towards Knowledge” to a belief in what he calls “the Great Twitch.”  
For instance, early in Jack’s tale about Anne, he says that after telling Anne he loved her 
that she disappeared into her room and he didn’t at the time even wonder why, but “later, much 
later, years later when it didn’t seem that it would ever matter again” that “she had gone up 
because she had to be alone, to sit by the window [. . .] to accustom herself to her new self [. . .] 
trying to discover what her new self was, for when you get in love you are made all over again” 
because “the person who loves you has picked you out of the great mass of uncreated clay which 
is humanity to make something out of” (423).47 Later in the same chapter, Jack says “I had not 
understood then what I think I have now come to understand: that we can keep the past only by 
having the future, for they are forever tied together. Therefore I lacked some essential confidence 
in the world and in myself” (467). These passages imply a sense of interconnectivity between 
events and indicate that Jack has in fact been “reborn,” but his rebirth does not occur in the West. 
He does not come to believe in interconnectivity in the “West” and this is indicated by his use of 
                                                 
47 The act of loving, a particularized type of knowledge, implies a form of double consciousness in and of itself. Jack 
continues the passage with “the poor lumpish clay which is you wants to find out what it has been made into. But at 
the same time, you, in the act of loving somebody, become real, cease to a part of the continuum of the uncreated 
clay and get the breath of life in you and rise up. So you create yourself by creating another person, who, however, 
has also created you, [. . .] So there are two you’s, the one you yourself create by loving and the one the beloved 
creates by loving you. The farther those two you’s are apart the more the world grinds and grudges on its axis. But if 
you were loved and were loved perfectly then there wouldn’t be any difference between the two you’s” (423-24). 
Jack’s failure to form a lasting relationship with Anne during their romance’s initiation represents the condition of 
double consciousness in that neither he nor Anne can “love perfectly” or reconcile these two versions of themselves 
as created by love.  
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the first person, “I,” in conjunction with phrases like “now.” These moments indicate that the 
Jack who is reborn is Jack the narrator and not Jack the character who drowns in West.  
Although Jack does not go west and experience the “rebirth” that brings him in touch 
with reality, history, and the interconnectivity that All the King’s Men seems to be about, his 
travel west does indicate a desire, perhaps even an intent, to kill himself or to die. He says, 
“when you don’t like where you are you always go west. We have always gone west” (464). On 
the one hand, because the west signifies death or the end—Long Beach is literally the end of the 
American space in which Jack can travel via car—the knowledge of Anne and Willie’s affair, 
which betrays “an idea” of Jack’s that “had more importance” than he “had ever realized,” 
propels him into motion towards a complete knowledge as he relives “his life like a home 
movie” so that he can kill himself (464). Though Jack constantly refers to his “having drowned 
in West,” he does not literally commit suicide. I argue that what compels Jack towards the West 
is not a literal desire to kill himself, but rather a desire to further suppress or eliminate any 
evidence of his particularity, or his personal investment in the knowledge of Anne and Willie’s 
affair which renders him vulnerable to that particularity. And this would resemble a figurative 
type of suicide or death which would then allow Jack to experience a “rebirth.” When Jack 
drowns in West by reliving his past with Anne, he confronts his experiences and what they 
meant for him in order to kill them. Once Jack relives those memories to determine how his 
experiences with Anne have impacted him, he can allow the “truth” of the experience to remain 
in the past and become part of the burnt piece of string that is dead and no longer real. In effect, 
who Jack has become because of that experience can also become part of the past and die as 
well. Jack drowns in “west” in order to drown out who Jack Burden has become. The rebirth he 
experiences then from “burning” his home movie allows him “to be baptized to get born again” 
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into the arms of the impersonal about which he has been so uncertain through much of the novel 
(408).  Jack’s “rebirth” allows him to find “innocence and a new start in the West, after all” and 
to convert his belief in “Life is Motion towards Knowledge,” which really ignored particularity 
more than anything else, to a belief in what he terms the “Great Twitch,” which denies the 
particularity of all persons including himself.48  
  “So I fled west from the fact,” he explains, “and in the West, at the end of History, the 
Last Man on that Last Coast, on my hotel bed, I had discovered the dream” (467). Jack calls this 
dream “the dream of our age” which is at first “always a nightmare and horrible, but in the end it 
may be, in a special way, rather bracing and tonic” (467). This dream is the “Great Twitch” 
which dehumanizes particular persons and renders them as nothing more than mechanisms that 
serve to keep the “Great Twitch” twitching or moving: “the dream was the dream that all life is 
but the dark heave of blood and the twitch of the nerve” (467). This dream and his subsequent 
belief in the “Great Twitch” provide Jack with a strategy for separating himself from both the 
“fact” and the “truth” of his relationship with and knowledge of Anne as well as his knowledge 
of himself. Both “fact” and “truth” are temporal and mechanical and only exist in order to give 
life to the “Great Twitch.” Though this is at first a horrible nightmare because it detaches and 
negates particular persons from their knowledge of themselves as well as their experiences in 
life, it is “bracing and tonic” for Jack because it divulges that “Anne Stanton did not exist” and 
the “words Anne Stanton were simply a name for a peculiarly complicated mechanism” and as 
words Anne could have no meaning to Jack “who himself was a another piece of complicated 
mechanism” (468).  
                                                 
48 James C. Simmons refers to Jack’s “rebirth” in this scene as “a symbolic lobectomy” that provides “contentment,” 
but that his sense of contentment is “unnatural and superficial” like that of the Adam Stanton’s catatonic patient 
(85). This artificiality of Jack’s rebirth allows him to return from the West, but also causes his eventual rejection of 
the “Great Twitch.”  
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 Simmons notes that “Jack’s theory of mechanistic determination effectively increases his 
distance and remoteness” from others “through a process of dehumanization, that is, by seeing 
people and their actions in terms of random impulses of electricity throbbing through the muscle 
tissue, as sequences of mindless, meaningless, unrelated stimuli that proved an automatic 
response”  (86-7). Dehumanizing and mechanizing individuals in this capacity aligns with Jack’s 
earlier notion that “direction is all” and “Life is Motion toward Knowledge” in that a person’s 
reaction to the knowledge of an event or relationship is simply an uncontrollable stimulation of 
nerves; and without this stimulation the nerves would not keep moving or functioning in order to 
have another random and uncontrollable spasm in which life (or the “Great Twitch”) depends. 
And because actual persons are nothing more than a “peculiarly complicated mechanism” human 
experiences are dependent only on the movement of the mechanism and therefore have no larger 
significance or “truth” to the mechanism outside of providing life. Ostensibly, the limited 
knowledge represented by Jack’s “facts” does not matter, nor does the “truth” that he cannot or 
will not understand, because these types of knowing are simply by-products of a reaction that 
stimulates movement.  
 The “Great Twitch’s” ability to negate the need for particularity among individuals via 
dehumanization extends Jack’s previous philosophies of idealism and “Life is Movement toward 
Knowledge.” By the same token, the “Great Twitch” also resembles Jack’s methods of escape 
when knowledge appears threatening. However, instead of having to withdraw into a state 
outside of consciousness through the womb or sleep, the “Great Twitch” permits Jack to remain 
fully conscious by denying the identities of particular persons. This in turn makes the threat of 
knowledge that comes from particularized forms of knowing non-existent; it also confirms that 
factual knowledge has no greater implications outside of objective reality and historical event. 
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Believing in the “Great Twitch” then allows the narrative to continue and ensures Jack’s 
survival, even if that survival renders nothing more than a physical existence devoid of any sort 
of conscious development. Thus Jack returns home because he knows now that “nothing was 
your fault or anybody’s fault, for things are always as they are,” that “you cannot lose what you 
never have had,” and that “you are never guilty of a crime which you did not commit” (468).49 
 Despite Jack’s vehemence about his faith in the “Great Twitch,” on his drive home from 
California he reverts to his usual anxiety and ambivalence about having this “secret knowledge.” 
At first he says he headed home at “high speed, for if you’ve really been to Long Beach, 
California, and have had your dream on the hotel bed, then there is no reason why you should not 
return with confidence to wherever you came from, for now you know, and knowledge is power” 
(469-70). Though he had envied people in the past for this “secret knowledge,” like Adam 
Stanton, he was sure that he had “the secret knowledge” and so could “face up to anything” 
(471). The “Great Twitch” Jack decides “was the live thing. Was all” and that was his secret 
knowledge (473). But as he continues his drive and picks up a hitchhiker who also seems to have 
the secret knowledge, Jack begins to wonder, “if the twitch was all, what was it that could know 
that the twitch is all? [. . .] And if I was all twitch, how did the twitch which was me know that 
the twitch was all?’” (473). Rather than concede that perhaps the impersonal “Great Twitch” was 
not all and that particular people are perhaps more than just complicated mechanisms, Jack 
concludes that he cannot attain a complete knowledge of the “Great Twitch” and that it is not 
important that he know for certain that the “twitch was all” for him to have faith that it is. He 
says, “that is the mystery. That is the secret knowledge. That is what you have to go to California 
to have a mystic vision to find out. That the twitch is all. Then, having found that out, in the 
                                                 
49 It is these passages, which appear at the very end of Jack’s journey west, that seem to indicate that Jack has not 
yet accepted the interconnectivity that Lavendar seems to think he does.  
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mystic vision,” or in the denial of his particularity, “you feel clean and free” and become “one 
with the Great Twitch” (473).  
 Jack feels “clean and free” because under the tenets of the “Great Twitch” the burden of 
human relationships as well as the emotions and experiences produced by those relationships are 
repudiated by the fact that the individuals involved have no unique and particular identities and 
that the existence of any relationship in the first place only fuels the twitch which enables life. 
However, the isolation that accompanies a belief in the “Great Twitch” is also further grounds 
for Jack’s uncertainty. Upon his return from California, Jack is eager to see Willie who now has 
everything, including Anne, but not “the thing” that Jack has which is “the great thing, the 
secret” (473). Much like Milly’s recognition that her connection to the impersonal isolates her 
from the other characters in Wings, Jack notes that “Everything was fine just the way it had been 
before” he left “except that now” he “knew the secret,” but that his “secret knowledge cut” him 
off. He continues, “If you have the secret, you cannot really communicate anymore with 
somebody who has not got it” (473). What Jack finds when he returns home is just like the scene 
in which he left, except now he has completely isolated himself through the dehumanization and 
mechanization of his friends and associates. By believing in the “Great Twitch,” Jack denies any 
significance they might have in his life and for the first time finds himself entirely disconnected 
from others. Willie, as well as the other characters in the novel, remain as Jack left them because 
they are still invested not only in their own particularity, but also in the particularity of others. 
Willie and Anne, for instance, still believe that their individual actions are significant to their 
own lives as well as to the lives of others rather than believing they are a mere series of 
spontaneous nerve spasms. To divest Willie or Anne from their particularity by telling them the 
“truth” of his “secret knowledge” Jack feels would be like asking them for “sympathy” or that he 
182 
 
would appear to be “feeling sorry for himself” because he is cut off and isolated (473). Jack says 
though that to tell the “truth” would not be asking for sympathy, but rather “for congratulations” 
(473). While on the surface Jack may celebrate his newfound belief in the “Great Twitch” and its 
ability to allow for his continual existence, the mere fact that he notes the potential isolation of 
holding such a belief demonstrates his ambivalence in its ability to make sense of the world and, 
perhaps more importantly, to make sense of his own existence within that world.  
 Ostensibly, Jack’s belief in the “Great Twitch” is a coping mechanism that keeps him 
from a (literal or figurative) death caused by knowledge. It prevents Jack from having to engage 
with and make meaning from the knowledge with which he has been presented. The “Great 
Twitch” in its ability to dehumanize and render individuals as impersonal entities intensifies 
Jack’s early methods of retreat and escape from the potential threat that not only certain types of 
knowledge present, but also the threat imposed by competing modes of knowing. If an event, 
person, or thing has no purpose in the world other than to stimulate the larger nerve which 
comprises life in order for life to keep happening, than knowledge, no matter what form it may 
take, poses no threat to the individual as individual identities are virtually non-existent. 
Moreover, knowledge loses its ability to kill or save man because it really has no real 
significance except to help stimulate the twitch.   
Paradoxically, these same characteristics that allow Jack to disengage from individual 
and particular persons also provide Jack continued access to knowledge. This is important 
because even after he returns home from California Jack continues to find “facts” for Willie. So 
while the “Great Twitch” serves to protect him from the threat knowledge may pose to his own 
identity, it also, in its mechanization, renders knowledge safe and thus allows for opportunities to 
know without having to internalize and construct meaning from that knowledge. The dual nature 
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of the “Great Twitch” enables Jack to mediate a relationship between Willie Stark and Adam 
Stanton, for instance, without worrying about the consequences of bringing two diametrically 
opposed personalities together; and it compels Jack to finish investigating long-time family 
friend, Judge Irwin, who Willie hopes to blackmail for political gain. Jack’s confidence in the 
“Great Twitch,” even with his suspicion that it is not “all,” is necessary to the development of the 
narrative, but also to the self-knowledge that Jack finally arrives at through the telling of the 
narrative. Without such a belief, Jack would not be able to construct the narrative in the first 
place as the events in his story would have unfolded much differently, perhaps have even ended 
when he learned of Anne’s affair.  
With his faith in the “Great Twitch” Jack finally finds what he has been looking for over 
the course of All the King’s Men—the “facts” about Judge Irwin that Willie had requested during 
the initial trip to Mason City and, more importantly, the “truth” about himself. The problem for 
Jack is that these “facts,” even with his convictions in the authority of the impersonal “Great 
Twitch,” reveal a “truth” about Judge Irwin that impact Jack in several ways. Jack cannot escape 
or retreat from either the “facts” or the “truth” of what he uncovers. He says that though he drove 
to Burden’s Landing to confront the judge, he considered returning to Willie and telling him that 
he “was convinced” the evidence he found was not true. Jack says, “But I had to know. Even as 
the thought of going away without knowing came through my head, I knew that I had to know 
the truth. For the truth is a terrible thing. You dabble your foot in it and it is nothing. But you 
walk a little further and you feel it pull you like an undertow or a whirlpool [. . .] there is a 
blackness of truth, too” (516). On one hand, the fact that Jack is compelled to find out the “truth” 
by confronting Judge Irwin further demonstrates his ambivalence or uncertainty regarding the 
power of the “Great Twitch.” If everything, including “facts” and “truth,” are simply stimulants 
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to a nerve, confronting the Judge would just be another random series of twitches to serve a 
larger function: the knowledge Jack discovers is immaterial and just another cog to keep the 
machine that is the “Great Twitch” functioning.  
On the other hand, and of particular note, Jack’s desire to confront Judge Irwin and to get 
confirmation of a “truth” in which the “facts” of Judge Irwin’s history seem to point, undermine 
the threat he perceives knowledge to contain. Because Judge Irwin served as a surrogate father to 
Jack as he grew up, confirming the “truth” of the events surrounding the Judge’s past—his 
involvement with the shady dealings of the American Electric Power Company and subsequent 
suicide of Mortimer Littlepaugh—will alter Jack’s history, or at least how he has understood his 
history.50 Altering how he has viewed his history will force Jack to interrogate how a new 
version of his past changes how he knows himself as well as how he constructs and projects his 
identity to others. In his confrontation with the Judge, Jack risks the possibility of attaining 
“complete knowledge” of his past and of himself: that is, Jack risks testing whether or not 
knowledge will kill him or save him.  
What Jack learns from this encounter with Judge Irwin is far greater than he can imagine. 
While just an admittance of the Judge’s guilt, who Jack believed to be “clean” and free from 
events that would make for successful blackmail, would have been enough to alter Jack’s 
conception of his own history, Jack gains knowledge that forces him into a state of self-
consciousness. After leaving the Judge’s house with a confirmation of his involvement in the 
electric company scheme as well as a refusal from the Judge to yield to the pressures of Willie 
Stark, Judge Irwin shoots himself and causes Jack’s mother to exclaim: “You did it, you did, you 
                                                 
50 It is also worth noting here that because of the Judge’s relationship to Governor Stanton, Anne’s and Adam’s 
father, as well as Jack’s own relationship with the Stanton’s, that his confirmation of the “facts” will alter the history 
and self-perception of both Anne and Adam as well as himself.  
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killed him! [. . .] Your father, [. . .] your father and oh! you killed him” (525). Jack learns that his 
father was not Ellis Burden, or the Scholarly Attorney, with whom he has been disgusted with 
for much of the novel due to Ellis’s early abandonment of his family as well as his fervent belief 
in God. Confronted with the knowledge that Judge Irwin was actually his father and that he, 
through his work with Willie, is ultimately responsible for his father’s death, Jack is no longer 
able to escape the potential threat of knowledge. He must reflect upon how he has come to know 
himself as well as how this new mode of knowing himself may alter that method of knowing; 
and as a result, Jack’s faith in the “Great Twitch” is tested.  
Knowledge “kills” man in two ways in this scene. First, Jack’s insistence on confronting 
the Judge with the “facts” he has dug up, produces a “truth” with a “blackness” that results in 
Judge Irwin’s death. The Judge kills himself not solely because of the knowledge with which 
Jack has forced upon him, but also because of the knowledge he has that Jack is his son. Right 
before Jack leaves the Judge’s house, Judge Irwin tells Jack that he could stop him from 
blackmailing him. He  says to Jack, “I could just—[. . .] I could just say to you—I could just tell 
you something—[. . .] But I won’t” (523). Jack says, “I stood there irresolutely for a moment. 
Things were not making sense. He was not supposed to be standing there, brisk and confident 
and cheerful” (523). Though Jack does not understand what is happening, the Judge knows that 
he has the power to stop Jack by revealing his paternity. Yet, he does not use this knowledge to 
save himself from blackmail; instead, he permits Jack’s knowledge to trigger his death. Jack’s 
earlier reflection about knowledge’s ability to kill man eventually proves to be true. Interestingly 
enough, in the death of Judge Irwin, the man who Jack had come to identify as his father—Ellis 
Burden—figuratively dies for Jack from this same knowledge. Jack notes, “I was peculiarly 
situated. I had lost two” fathers “at the same instant” (533). He also reflects, “I had dug up the 
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truth and the truth always kills the father, the good and weak one or the bad and strong one, and 
you are left alone with yourself and the truth” (533).  
Second, knowledge figuratively kills Jack, though this death is slower and more painful 
than the literal death of Judge Irwin. Because Jack is left alone with the “truth” about himself 
which is produced from the “facts” he has excavated from the past, he must come to terms with 
and begin to acknowledge his particularity. In other words, Jack has all of the components—or 
different modes of knowing himself—available in order for him to make meaning of himself and 
to construct an identity comprised of this new knowledge. Doing so also means that he has to let 
go of or “kill” the way in which he currently knows himself as well as the other people in his life 
(i.e. his mother, Anne Stanton, and even Willie), which also requires that he shed his 
ambivalence towards knowledge as well as forgo his methods of justifying his disengagement 
such as the womb, the “Great Sleep,” “Life is Motion towards Knowledge,” and ultimately the 
“Great Twitch.” To deconstruct his identity in order to know himself with the new knowledge 
requires a killing of the self: Jack must shed his old way of knowing and defining himself in 
order to process and internalize the new knowledge that he now possesses. And it is here, after 
the death of Judge Irwin and when his paternity is revealed, that Jack engages with multiple 
forms of knowledge in order to start the process of self-definition in order to experience a rebirth 
and acquire a new sense of himself. It is only once Jack has shed or killed off his past 
construction of self and possessed a new construction that he can affirm his identity at the end of 
the novel by marrying Anne, leaving Burden’s Landing, and finishing the Cass Mastern project.   
5.3 Relation is All: Affirming Identity through Narrative 
 In “Knowledge and the Image of Man,” Warren writes that “man’s process of self-
definition” requires that he “distinguishes himself from the world and from other men” so that 
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“he disintegrates his [. . .] sense of unity” and “discovers separateness.” And “in this process he 
discovers the pain of self-criticism and the pain of isolation. But in the pain may, if he is 
fortunate, develop its own worth, work its own homeopathic cure” (241). Jack’s rebirth, the way 
in which he starts to know himself anew, begins a process of “self-definition” initiated by the 
death of Judge Irwin. Though Jack has isolated himself through his theories of impersonality for 
much of the narrative, the Judge’s death necessitates a new type of isolation in which Jack must 
distinguish himself from himself. In other words, once Jack learns the identity of his father, he 
must wade back through his past in order to reposition himself and his memories with his new 
knowledge. He must redefine or re-know himself in the context of this new knowledge, but this 
redefinition requires that he reevaluate how his understanding of the past as well as his past 
actions will help to shape his new identity. Jack must then dispense of his belief in the “Great 
Twitch” and become self-conscious, and more importantly self-critical in order to make sense of 
himself as the son of Judge Irwin.  
 The process of self-definition or rebirth is slow and painful for Jack because he must 
dismantle his entire way of knowing the world; and this too requires time as well as relation. In 
other words, Jack must first come to understand how and why people are more than just 
impersonal “peculiarly complicated mechanisms” and in turn overcome his fear of the reproach 
of the truth. Shortly after Judge Irwin’s death, Jack reflects that 
  By the time we understand the pattern we are in, the definition we are making for  
  ourselves, it is too late to break out of the box. We can only live in terms of the  
  definition, like the prisoner in the cage in which he cannot lie or stand or sit, hung  
  up in the justice to be viewed by the populace. Yet the definition we have made of 
  ourselves is ourselves. To break out of it, we must make a new self. But how can  
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  the self make a new self when the selfness which it is, is the only substance from  
  which the new self can be made? (529) 
Up until this point in Jack’s story, his identity has been defined impersonally through his life 
philosophies as well as his disengagement and disinterest in others and life more generally. His 
belief in the “Great Twitch” is the crux of the identity he has crafted for himself. Jack has 
sustained this “pattern” of self-definition impart because of his constant avoidance of new forms 
of knowledge that would interfere with this pattern, but also because of what Warren calls in the 
later essay the “incompleteness of knowledge” (243). According the Emersonian ideal of double 
consciousness, an individual only has access to incomplete knowledge as multiple modes of 
knowing the self are unable to be reconciled and integrated to decipher a complete picture of the 
self. Jack confirms this for much of his story by reminding the reader and himself that complete 
knowledge equates to death.  
 Yet, Judge Irwin’s death frustrates both the logic of double consciousness as well as 
Jack’s theories of impersonality that dismiss particular forms of knowing as it forces Jack to 
acknowledge that an alternative construction of his self-definition is not only possible, but 
necessary. This alternative self depends upon the knowledge of his particularity whereby he is no 
longer just an impersonal “heave of the nerve” in order to propel the “Great Twitch,” but rather a 
son who now possesses the knowledge he has been searching for in order to make sense of his 
complicated family dynamics and of himself. The Judge’s death thus provides a more complete 
version of who Jack is though this knowledge contradicts his previous notion of self. Jack’s 
dilemma then when he asks how a new self can be made out of the existing self is really a 
question of how one can know the self in two ways. And Jack’s two selves in this instant 
resemble the Emersonian ideal of double consciousness in that the selves Jack is trying to 
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reconcile and integrate are not just his past and present selves, but versions of himself that relied 
upon his respective rejection and acceptance of impersonal and particular forms of knowledge.  
 It is worth noting that Jack’s process of self-definition is slow and painful because the 
Judge’s death merely triggers the process. Jack’s dilemma is a result of the “Great Twitch” 
failing to make sense of the knowledge he has acquired through the Judge’s death. The “Great 
Twitch” does not provide the evasion for which he typically takes comfort and thereby forces 
him to possess the “truth” of his paternity. Because he cannot escape the “truth” produced by the 
“facts” that he himself discovered, Jack has no choice but to accept and possess this new and 
uncomfortable knowledge. In possessing the knowledge that Judge Irwin was his father, Jack 
must acknowledge the ways in which this information may alter his identity. Jack though still 
fears the “reproach of the truth” and complete forms of knowing. The Judge’s death then initiates 
the process of self-definition for Jack because it forces a new way of knowing upon him; 
however, Jack continues to live and define himself “in terms of the definition” from which he 
has previously constructed his identity. He returns to work for Willie, though he requests work 
that doesn’t involve the blackmail of particular persons and concentrates solely on finding 
“facts” for bills Willie hopes to pass into law. He remains relatively disengaged from Willie, 
Anne, and Adam Stanton until Willie’s son, Tom Stark, is hospitalized from a football injury.  
He continues to possess his newfound knowledge, but does not integrate the knowledge in order 
to redefine himself as he is unsure of how to do so. His possession and acceptance of this 
knowledge, rather than his typical avoidance, triggers his process of self-definition because it 
starts to challenge his previous forms of knowing such as the “Great Twitch” and “Life is Motion 
towards Knowledge.”  
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 When Jack returns to work for Willie after Judge Irwin’s funeral, he says that “after a 
great blow, or crisis, after the first shock and then after the nerves have stopped screaming and 
twitching, you settle down to the new condition of things and feel that all possibility of change 
has been used up” (534). Jack adjusts because he is sure that the “new equilibrium is for eternity” 
(534). Jack’s crisis is the acquisition of his new knowledge and it is only once he has accepted its 
reality and existence that he returns to work for Willie. Possessing this knowledge though does 
not require an immediate integration or a new self formulated from this knowledge; instead, Jack 
gets comfortable in his new equilibrium by simply containing the knowledge and determining 
that this particular “story was over” and that he can continue living in terms of the self he has 
constructed prior to having this knowledge (534). He has yet to achieve an “osmosis of being” 
and maintains his believe in the impersonality of the “Great Twitch.” 
 Jack does not fully immerse himself in the process of self-definition until Willie’s story 
has concluded. Instead, he merely acts as a container for the knowledge he acquires from Judge 
Irwin’s death. The conclusion of Willie’s story is necessary for Jack to confront this knowledge 
in order to affirm his identity in two ways. First, Jack literally witnesses the ways in which 
knowledge can kill man; after all, the knowledge of Willie’s affair with his sister, Anne, 
motivates Adam to gun Willie down and get himself killed in the process. Looking back, the 
narrator Jack reflects that Adam, “whom he called the man of idea,” and Willie, “the man of 
fact” were “doomed to destroy each other, just as each was doomed to try to use the other and to 
yearn toward and try to become the other, because each was incomplete” (657). Though Jack 
attributes this incompleteness to “the terrible division of their age,” the separation of Adam and 
Willie into the man of idea and the man of fact respectively also suggests an incompleteness of 
knowledge and the failure of either man to integrate alternative modes of self-consciousness. 
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Neither Adam nor Willie achieves what Warren calls the “ultimate unity of knowledge” or the 
“full balance” and “responsibility” of self-knowledge (“Knowledge and the Image of Man” 242, 
244). Ironically, and contrary to all of Jack’s previous philosophies that posited complete forms 
of self-knowledge as death, an incomplete knowledge kills both Willie and Adam. The idea that 
their union, though doomed from the start, reflects an attraction for each to possess portions of 
the other’s identity that they may have lacked. Their movement towards knowledge and towards 
each other to achieve a complete sense of self destroyed them. This experience allows Jack the 
narrator to reflect upon the destructive qualities of knowledge over the course of his narrative, 
especially during the early moment in Mason City. But more importantly witnessing the deaths 
of Adam and Willie forces Jack to confront his belief in impersonal forms of knowledge such as 
the “Great Twitch” because if these two men had been nothing more than impersonal and 
mechanized entities, their deaths and the subsequent after effects would not have impacted Jack 
quite so much. Watching the ways in which knowledge destroyed his friends and forced change 
in his own life requires that Jack begin to examine and process the knowledge he possesses in a 
new way.  
 The second way that the conclusion of Willie’s story forces Jack into a process of self-
definition is, because the experience undermines and challenges his previous methods of knowing, 
by requiring that he acknowledge his complicity not only in the action of Willie’s  story, but also 
within his own life. By recognizing the implications of his actions over the course of his life, Jack 
determines that individuals are more than “peculiarly complicated mechanisms” that work as cogs 
in the impersonal machine of life; thus he must admit the validity of particular identities and the 
“agony of will” for which individuals are responsible (657). At the end of the novel, Jack says, 
  This has been the story of Willie Stark, but it is my story too. For I have a story. 
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  It is the story of a man who lived in the world and to him the world looked one way  
  for a long time and then it looked another and very different way. The change did  
  not happen all at once. Many things happened, and that man did not know when he  
  had any responsibility for them and when he did not. There was, in fact, a time  
  when he came to believe that nobody had any responsibility for anything and there  
  was no god but the Great Twitch. (656) 
Jack reflects that this belief in the “Great Twitch” was at first horrible and then comforting 
because it invalidated his will and the consequences of any action in which he might partake. But 
after Willie’s death, Jack discovers that “he did not believe in the Great Twitch anymore. He did 
not believe in it because he had seen too many people live and die” (657). His faith in the “Great 
Twitch” is destroyed not only through Willie’s and Adam’s death, but also by his confrontation 
with Tiny Duffy, Willie’s lieutenant governor. Duffy tells Adam of Anne’s affair with Willie, 
driving Adam to shoot Willie, which gets him shot in the process. After Duffy offers Jack a job, 
Jack wonders why Duffy had been so sure he would work for him. Jack the narrator says that in 
this instance he “read myself to myself” so that Jack the character finally understood. Jack 
reflects that Duffy “knew the nightmare truth, which was that we were twins bound together 
more intimately and disastrously than the poor freaks of the midway [ . . .] We were bound 
together forever and I could never hate him without hating myself or love myself without loving 
him. We were bound together under the unwinking eye of the Great Twitch whom we must all 
adore” (629). This realization causes Jack to hate “everything and everybody” because they “all 
looked alike to him” and he “looked like them” (629). Jack, through the use of “fact,” has acted 
just as Duffy had acted in his dealings with Judge Irwin. He provided the knowledge that impart 
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caused the Judge to shoot himself—he is just as responsible for killing someone as Duffy is 
though neither actually ever held a weapon.  
 Jack’s acceptance of his responsibility, both in the Judge’s death and in the unlikely 
partnering of Adam and Willie, is what finally sets in motion the isolation and the self-criticism 
Warren describes as necessary to the process of self-definition. In turn, Jack must accept the 
consequences of the “Great Twitch”: its power to annihilate the particularity and personality of 
individuals has rendered his identity the same as Duffy’s, who he finds reprehensible. Thus, he 
comes to realize the significance of particularity and particular forms of knowing because only 
this allows him to differentiate himself from others and to differentiate his actions. Accepting his 
particularity as well as the responsibility that comes with it permits him to accept the tenets of 
Cass’s spider web and to make more responsible and intentioned choices in his life. This 
acceptance allows him to refrain from telling Sugar Boy about Duffy’s responsibility thus 
preserving Duffy’s life as well as enables Jack to rebuild his relationships with his mother and 
Anne Stanton.  As Jack’s knowledge of himself and his actions begins to shift, he notes “there 
isn’t anything to say to somebody who has found out the truth about himself, whether it is good 
or bad” (647). He also notes that “all knowledge that is worth anything is maybe paid for by 
blood. Maybe that is the only way you can tell that a certain piece of knowledge is worth 
anything: it has cost some blood” (647). The blood that has produced the knowledge Jack needed 
to accept responsibility and start his process of self-definition is literal in the case of Judge Irwin, 
Willie Stark, and Adam Stanton. 
 This knowledge and the recognition that he is more than just a cog in an impersonal 
machine also figuratively costs Jack his own blood. Even though Jack starts to accept his role in 
the events of All the King’s Men with the deaths of Willie and Adam and his confrontation with 
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Duffy, it isn’t until Jack assumes the first person at the end of Willie’s story that he achieves or 
affirms a new identity that differs from the character Jack. It is only after the events of the novel 
have unfolded and he has found out the “truth” about himself that Jack is able to assume the role 
of narrator and recount both the “facts” and the “truth” in order to make meaning of how the two 
forms of knowledge have worked and are working together to construct the first person Jack 
Burden.  
 Warren remarks in “Knowledge and the Image of Man” that the “ultimate unity of 
knowledge is in the image of knowledge of himself that man creates through knowledge, the 
image of his destiny, the mask he stares at” (242). Jack, through the narration of his life via his 
relationship with Willie, stares at the mask of himself he has worn and taken off by the time he 
tells the story. Staring at this mask and examining it through various moments in time and 
various relationships allows Jack to piece together these moments and people as if his life were a 
puzzle so that he may begin to see the full picture—the image of himself that the reader gets at 
the end of the novel. Warren goes on to say that “the knowledge of make, that of do, that of see, 
that of be [. . .] ultimately interfuse in our life process” so that “Any change of environment—
including any making—creates a new relation between man and his world, and other men. Any 
doing changes the doer. Any seeing changes the see-er. And any knowledge one has of his own 
being modifies that being, re-creates it, and thus changes the quality of making, doing, and 
seeing” (242). Telling his story through Willie is Jack’s way of seeing and making his identity 
anew not only by putting events and people in relation to one another, but also by putting the 
knowledge he gained and possessed at each individual moment and through each individual 
relationship in order to become conscious of and to understand how collectively these events and 
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people have influenced his identity. In other words, it allows him to construct his self outside of 
the terms by which he previously lived, but still from his previous self.   
 In this way, the narrative acts as a mediator and provides the “self-corrective” features of 
self-definition that Warren describes in his essay while simultaneously providing Jack with the 
tools necessary to determine the “texture of relations” and the “interpenetration” of his life. 
Simone Vauthier argues that Jack functions as both the narratee and the narrator so that “the 
‘you’ is dependent” on the “‘I’” in order for Jack to form “an image of the Other.” This Other 
“reveals Jack’s need to extract private meaning out of public events and socialize personal 
meaning in a dialectic process” so that in Jack’s choice of narratees, Jack “betrays both his 
anxiety at being limited, defined, limited because defined, and his desire for self-definition” 
(183). Yet Jack is only able to project this Other in the form of the narratee because the narrative 
is retrospective—the events of Willie’s story have already transformed him and thrust upon him 
new modes of knowledge. Though the transformation has already occurred in time, it has not yet 
culminated in his consciousness. It is only through the narration of the events and the 
relationship that Jack the narrator is able to draw through relation that he can internalize and 
make sense of the ways in which knowledge has transformed him: he must tell his story, to 
himself at least, if he is to “affirm” the identity that has resulted from his transformation. 
Vauthier continues that the second person you is so effective “that it is truly a ‘didactic you’” 
(184). The didactic nature of the narrative, on one hand, allows Jack to reexamine his actions 
through his newfound acceptance of his responsibility in and to the world. He is able to relive the 
events of his life and assign meaning to his actions which he previously shirked from as he lived 
the experience of the events; thus correlating his will as well as his avoidance of responsibility in 
order to derive new perspectives about himself.  
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The narrative is then a tool Jack uses to develop consciousness of himself in order to 
correct and refashion himself and his actions as he ventures out of the past and into the present; 
but the narrative is dependent upon temporality in that it time must elapse in order for Jack to put 
his life into relation in order to determine meaning. In other words, to have this new knowledge 
of himself, Jack can only attain consciousness by projecting himself as an Other, or a character 
within the story, after the events have occurred and new forms of knowing are made possible. 
Vauthier notes that “By telling parts of his story [. . .] through a second person, the first-person 
narrator shows that he is not yet fully aware for all the aspects of his own life or is at any rate 
reluctant to face them. The ‘you’ which conveniently separates and distances” Jack from his 
experience also “clarifies” that experience in order for Jack to “make progress in self-
consciousness” (185). It is only over the course of telling his story that Jack begins to see clearly 
the image the narrative creates of himself and thus as the narrator is able to assign meaning to the 
various pieces of that image. For instance, after Jack the character learns of Tom Stark’s 
paralysis, Jack the narrator notes that as he “experienced that day, there was at first an 
impression of the logic of the events, caught flickeringly at moments, but as they massed to the 
conclusion I was able to grasp, at the time only the slightest hints as to the pattern that was taking 
shape” which made the incident and the subsequent events (Willie and Adam’s death) feel like a 
“sense of dreamlike unreality” (577). Looking back as the narrator, after a considerable passage 
of time, Jack notes that “the sense of reality returned, long after, when” he had “been able to 
gather the pieces of the puzzle up and put them together to see the pattern” (577-8). To the 
present Jack, this ability to piece together his reality and make sense of his identity is 
“unremarkable” because “reality is not a function of the event as event, but of the relationship of 
that event to past, and future, events” (578).  
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Time then both limits and affords an individual the ability to attain consciousness of 
themselves. First, it restricts the ways in which an individual can know himself. As Jack is living 
through an experience such as Tom Stark’s paralysis or the deaths of Judge Irwin, Willie, and 
Adam, he has immediate access to the “facts” of that experience (i.e. Tom crushes his spinal cord 
by playing football), but as time, and thus life, keeps moving forward Jack must continue to live. 
The consciousness cannot fully process the knowledge, or the “truth” of the event itself as well 
as its subsequent effects both on the world and the individual, until they have already occurred. 
Jack’s inability to process the knowledge of the event does not keep these effects from 
happening or time from moving forward. Conversely, temporality allows for the consciousness 
to develop through memory and relation. Once time has moved forward and the consequences of 
an event have taken place, the self in the current or new moment is able to look back on the event 
and put it into relation to its current experience or position in life. In relating past events to 
current ones, the self, and Jack in the case of All the King’s Men, is able to derive “reality” or 
meaning from the relationship of the past event to the present one. This meaning allows someone 
like Jack to achieve a complete knowledge of himself through relation and thus to affirm his 
identity. And as Jack says, it is “only as we realize this do we live, for our own identity is 
dependent upon this principle” (578). Yet, it should be noted that this affirmation of identity 
through complete knowledge of self—that is a knowledge derived from the varying pieces of 
past constructions of identity—is temporary and fleeting. Because even as Jack is narrating the 
story, time is already moving forward and thus limits the completeness of this knowledge of self 
as new events occur and new relationships form, which then produce news ways for Jack to 
know himself in the future. Jack will have to undergo this process of self-criticism and self-
reflection again and again in order to continually reaffirm his identity so long as he is alive, 
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which confirms Jack’s earlier suspicion that all knowledge worth having is paid for in blood. In 
his case, as Jack must revisit and reevaluate himself over the course of his life, he pays for his 
newfound knowledge of self by sacrificing the previous ways in which he knew himself: he 
trades one identity for a new and more relevant, productive, and responsible one.   
The narrative, because of its reliance on time and relation, thus allows Jack to achieve, 
albeit temporarily, “the ultimate unity of knowledge” as well as the “full balance and 
responsibility in self-knowledge” that Warren describes and that Emerson hopes for in his idea of 
double consciousness. Jack, through the narrative, is able to achieve consciousness of how the 
impersonal and the particular manifested in his prior constructions of self. But he does not reach 
a true condition of double consciousness because the narrative happens retrospectively after he 
has already garnered a new identity from his different modes of knowing the self. The narrative 
merely serves as a device that permits Jack to integrate and reconcile alternative notions of self 
in order to assign meaning and definition to who he is at the time of the telling.  This integration 
allows Jack to affirm his identity with a full picture of who he was with who he is, but that 
identity is already shifting because Jack continues to live and time continues to progress. Time 
then prevents true double consciousness, while still allowing one to get closer to a complete state 
of consciousness of themselves by permitting a fuller picture of that self at different moments in 
time. More importantly, because the narrative uses relation to piece together multiple versions so 
that they can coexist, the individual is able edit that self to exist more responsibly in the present 
and future.  
Warren, through the narrative structure of All the King’s Men, offers a method of 
arranging experience so that a person has the possibility of merging versions of the self over the 
course of a lifetime without feeling the full extent of the painful consequences of double 
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consciousness.  Because narrative requires a temporal distance from the events, the person 
involved in the telling embarks on a process of self-discovery that allows for self-editing. Both 
the necessary distance required of narrative and the subsequent ability to edit the self through 
that narrative, allow the person telling the story to retain a sense of agency and identity that a 
knowledge of the impersonal challenges. At the same, however, this strategic form of narrating 
individual knowledge and experience also moves the teller closer to the impersonal as they are 
able to shed previous constructions of self and to generate more developed and relevant versions 
of the self in order to move forward through life.    
200 
 
WORKS CITED 
Anderson, Charles R. “The Conscious Self in Emily Dickinson’s Poetry.” American Literature 
 31.3 (1959): 290-308. 
Arsić, Branka. “Brain Walks: Emerson on Thinking.” The Other Emerson. Eds. Branka Arsić  
 and Cary Wolfe. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2010. 59-94. 
Banta, Martha. Henry James and the Occult. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1972. 
Bell, Millicent. Meaning in Henry James. Cambridge (MA): Harvard UP, 1991. 
Bersani, Leo. “The Narrator as Center in The Wings of the Dove.” Modern Fiction Studies 
 3(1960): 131-144.  
Boudreau, Kristin. Henry James’ Narrative Technique: Consciousness, Perception, and  
 Cognition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Bruce, Dickson D., Jr. “W. E. B. Du Bois and the Idea of Double Consciousness.”  
 American Literature 64.2 (1992): 299-308. 
Budick, E. Miller. “Temporal Consciousness and the Perception of Eternity in Emily Dickinson.”  
 Essays in Literature 10.2 (Fall 1983): 227-239. 
Buell, Lawrence. Literary Transcendentalism: Style and Vision in the American Renaissance. 
 Ithaca (NY): Cornell UP, 1973. 
Butte, George. “Henry James and Deep Intersubjectivity.” The Henry James Review 30.2 (2009):  
 129-43. 
Cameron, Sharon. Lyric Time: Dickinson and the Limits of Genre. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
 UP, 1981. 
- - -. “Representing Grief: Emerson’s ‘Experience.’” Representations 15 (1986): 
 15-41. 
201 
 
- - -. Thinking in Henry James. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989.  
- - -.  “The Way of Life by Abandonment: Emerson’s Impersonal.” The  
 Other Emerson. Eds. Branka Arsić and Cary Wolfe. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota  
 P, 2010. 3-40.  
Castille, Philip Dubuisson. “The Book I Began Years Ago: The Construction in All the King’s 
 Men.” rWp: An Annual of Robert Penn Warren Studies 4 (2004): 21-39. 
Cavell, Stanley. Emersons Transcendental Etudes. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003. 
Cullick, Jonathan. “From ‘Jack Burden’ to ‘I’: The Narrator’s Transformation in All the King’s 
 Men.” Studies in American Fiction 25.2 (1997): 197-210.  
Davidson, Frank. “This Consciousness: Emerson and Dickinson.” The Emerson Society  
 Quarterly. 44 (1966): 2-7.  
Dickinson, Emily. The Poems of Emily Dickinson: Reading Edition. Ed. R.W. Franklin.  
 Cambridge (MA): The Belknap P, 1999.  
Du Bois, W. E. B. The Souls of Black Folk. Three African American Classics. New York: 
 Dover Publications, Inc., 2007. 159-331. 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. “Circles.” Essays: First Series. 1841. Emerson: Essays & Poems. 
 The Library of America College Edition. New York: The Library of America, 1996. 401- 
 413. 
- - -. “Experience.” Essays: Second Series. 1844. Emerson: Essays & Poems. 
 The Library of America College Edition. New York: The Library of America, 1996. 469- 
 492. 
- - -. “Fate.” The Conduct of Life. 1860. Emerson: Essays & Poems. The Library of America  
 College Edition. New York: The Library of America, 1996. 767-794. 
202 
 
- - -. “Illusions.” The Conduct of Life. 1860. Emerson: Essays & Poems. The Library of America  
 College Edition. New York: The Library of America, 1996. 939-950. 
- - -. Nature. Emerson: Essays & Poems. New York: Library of America  
 College Editions, 1996. 5-50. 
- - -. “Nominalist and Realist.” Essays: Second Series. 1844. Emerson: Essays & Poems. 
 The Library of America College Edition. New York: The Library of America, 1996.573- 
 587. 
- - -. “The Over-Soul.” Essays: First Series. 1844. Emerson: Essays & Poems. The Library of  
 America College Edition. New York: The Library of America, 1996. 383-400. 
- - -. “Self-Reliance.” Essays: First Series. 1844. Emerson: Essays & Poems. The Library of  
 American College Edition. New York: The Library of America, 1996. 257-282. 
- - -. “The Transcendentalist.” 1842. Emerson: Essays & Poems. The Library of  
 American College Edition. New York: The Library of America, 1996. 193-209. 
Fetterly, Judith. “The Bostonians: Henry James’s Eternal Triangle. The Resisting Reader: A  
 Feminist Approach to American Literature.  Indiana: Indiana UP, 1978. 101-53. 
Finan, E. Thomas. “‘Captivity is Consciousness’: Consciousness and its Revisions in  
 Dickinson’s Poetry.” The Emily Dickinson Journal. 24.2 (2015): 24-45.   
Fowler, Virginia C. “Milly Theale’s Malady of Self.” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 14.1  
 (Autumn 1980): 57-74.  
Gabler, Janet A. “The Narrator’s Script: James’s Complex Narration in ‘The Bostonians.” The 
 Journal of Narrative Technique 14.2 (Spring, 1984): 94-109.. 
Gabler-Hover, Janet. Truth in American Fiction: The Legacy of Rhetorical Idealism. Athens  
 (GA): U of Georgia P, 1990. 
203 
 
Garvey, Gregory, ed. The Emerson Dilemma: Essays on Emerson and Social Reform. Athens  
 (GA): U of Georgia P, 2001.  
Girault, Norton R. “The Narrator’s Mind as Symbol: An Anaylsis of All the King’s Men.”  
 Accent: A Quarterly of New Literature 7 (1947): 220-234.  
Goodman, Russell B. “Paths of Coherence through Emerson’s Philosophy: The Case of  
 ‘Nominalist and Realist’.” The Other Emerson. Eds. Branka Arsić and Cary Wolfe. 
 Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2010. 41-58.  
Grabher, Gudrun. “Dickinson’s Lyrical Self.” The Emily Dickinson Handbook. Eds. Gudrun  
 Grabher, Roland Hagenbüchle, and Cristanne Miller. Amherst (MA): U of Massachusetts  
 P, 1998. 224-239. 
Guttenberg, Barnett. Web of Being: The Novels of Robert Penn Warren. Vanderbilt UP, 1975.  
Heilman, Robert B. “Melpomene as Wallflower; or, the Reading of Tragedy.” Robert Penn  
 Warren: A Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. John Lewis Longley, Jr.. New York: New 
 York UP, 1965. 82-95. 
Howe, Irving. Introduction. The Bostonians. By Henry James. 1886. Modern Library Edition. 
 New York: The Modern Library, 1956. v-xxviii. 
James, Henry. The Bostonians. Ed. Charles R. Anderson. Penguin Classics Edition. London:  
 Penguin Books Ltd., 1986. 
- - -. The Wings of the Dove. Norton Critical Edition. Eds. J. Donald Crowley and  
 Richard A. Hocks. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003. 
Juhasz, Suzanne. The Undiscovered Continent: Emily Dickinson and the Space of the Mind.  
 Bloomington (IN): Indiana UP, 1983.  
Kateb, George. Emerson and Self-Refliance. 2nd ed. Lanhan (MD): Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.  
204 
 
Kher, Inder Nath. The Landscape of Absence: Emily Dickinson’s Poetry. Yale UP, 1974. 
Koppleman, Robert S. “All the King’s Men: The Experience, Language, and Concentric Circles 
 of Conversion.” Robert Penn Warren’s Modernist Spirituality. Columbia (MO): U of  
 Missouri P, 1995. 18-40.  
- - -. “All the King’s Men, Spiritual Aesthetics, and the Reader.” The Mississippi Quarterly 48.1 
 (1994): 105-114.  
Kuchar, Gary. “Henry James and the Phenomenal Reader: Consciousness and the Variation of 
 Style in The Wings of the Dove.” The Henry James Review 21.2 (Spring 2000): 170-85. 
LaBrie, Ross. “The Power of Consciousness in Henry James.” Arizona Quarterly: A Journal 
 Of American Literature, Culture, and Theory 29 (1973): 101-14. 
Ladin, Joy. “’This Consciousness that is Aware’: The Consolation of Emily Dickinson’s  
 Phenomenology.” Wider Than the Sky: Essays and Meditations on the Healing  
 Power of Emily Dickinson. 2007. 33-43 
Lavender, Amy. “Time and Space Connect the World in Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s  
 Men.” rWp: An Annual of Robert Penn Warren Studies 6 (2006): 73-81.  
Levy, Alfred J. “The Web and the Twitch: Images in All the King’s Men.” Forum 25.2 (1984):  
 53-56.  
Lopez, Michael. “The Conduct of Life: Emerson’s Anatomy of Power.” The Cambridge  
 Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson. Eds. Joel Porte and Saundra Morris. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge UP, 1999. 243-266. 
Meckier, Jerome. “Burden’s Complaint: The Disintegrated Personality as Theme and Style in  
 Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s Men.” Studies in the Novel 2.1 (1970): 7-21.  
Miller, Cristanne. “Dickinson’s Experiments in Language.” The Emily Dickinson Handbook. 
205 
 
 Eds. Gudrun Grabher, Roland Hagenbüchle, and Cristanne Miller. Boston: U of  
 Massachusetts P, 2004. 240-258.  
- - -. Emily Dickinson: The Poet’s Grammar. Cambridge (MA): Harvard UP, 1987. 
Noble, Mark. “Emerson’s Atom and the Matter of Suffering.” Nineteenth Century Literature. 
 64.1 (2009): 16-46. 
Packer, B.L. Emerson’s Fall: A New Interpretation of the Major Essays. New York: Continuum, 
 1982. 
Page, Philip. “The Curious Narration of The Bostonians.” American Literature: A Journal of  
 Literary History, Criticism, and Bibliography 46.3 (Nov. 1974): 374-383. 
Patterson, Anita Haya. From Emerson to King: Democracy, Race, and the Politics of Protest. 
 New York: Oxford UP, 1997. 
Poirier, Richard. The Renewal of Literature: Emersonian Reflections. New Haven: Yale UP,  
 1987. 
Porte, Joel. “Emerson, Thoreau, and the Double Consciousness.” The New England Quarterly 
 41.1 (1968): 40-50. 
Porter, David. “The Crucial Experience in Emily Dickinson’s Poetry.” ESQ 20.4 (1974): 280- 
 290.  
Rawlings, Peter. “The Painful Production of Verena Tarrant: John Locke and The Bostonians.” 
 Becoming Visible: Women’s Presence in Late Nineteenth-Century America. Amerstdam: 
 Rodopi, 2010. 219-38.  
Rowe, John Carlos. Henry Adams and Henry James: The Emergence of a Modern  
 Connsciousness. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1976. 
Schneider, Ryan. The Public Intellectualism of Ralph Waldo Emerson and W. E. B. Du Bois: 
206 
 
 Emotional Dimensions of Race and Reform. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010.  
Sewell, Richard B. The Life of Emily Dickinson. Cambridge (MA): Harvard UP, 1972. 
Shaw, Peter. “Refuting Human Nature in Henry James’ The Bostonians.” Explorations 7 (1993): 
 25-51.   
Simmons, James C. “Adam’s Lobectomy Operation and the Meaning of All the King’s Men.”  
 PMLA 86.1 (Jan 1971): 84-89. 
Strandberg, Victor. The Poetic Vision of Robert Penn Warren. Lexington (KY): UP of Kentucky, 
 1977. 
Straumann, Barbara. “Vocal Effect and Resonance: Voice in Henry James’s The Bostonians.”  
 English Text Construction 1.1 (2008): 83-96.  
Teahan, Sheila. The Rhetorical Logic of Henry James. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1995. 
Trilling, Lionel. “The Bostonians.” The Opposing Self. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,  
 1979. 92-103. 
Vauthier, Simone. “The Case of the Vanishing Narratee: An Inquiry into All the King’s Men.”  
 Southern Literary Journal 6.2 (1974): 42-69. 
Vendler, Helen. Dickinson: Selected Poems and Commentaries. Cambridge (MA): The Belknap 
 P, 2010. 
Wardley, Lynn. “Women’s Voice, Democracy’s Body, and the Bostonians.” ELH 56.3 (Autumn, 
 1989): 639-665. 
Warren, Robert Penn. All the King’s Men. 2nd ed. New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1996.  
- - -. “Knowledge and the Image of Man.”Sewanee Review LXII (Spring, 1955). Rpt. in Robert 
Penn Warren: A Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. John Lewis Longley, Jr. New York: 
New York UP, 1965. 237-246. 
207 
 
Weisbuch, Robert. Emily Dickinson’s Poetry. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1975.  
Worley, Sam McGuire. Emerson, Thoreau, and the Role of the Cultural Critic. New York: 
 State U of New York P, 2001 
Wolosky, Shira. Poetry and Public Discourse in Nineteenth-Century America. New York:  
 Palgrave MacMillan, 2010. 
Wolstenholme, Susan. “Possession and Personality: Spiritualism in The Bostonians.” American  
 Literature: A Journal of Literary History, Criticism, and Bibliography 49.4 (1978): 580- 
 91.New York UP, 1965. 237-246.  
 
 
